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Abstract
Proactive Security Auditing for Clouds
Suryadipta Majumdar, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2018
Cloud computing is emerging as a promising IT solution for enabling ubiquitous, convenient,
and on-demand accesses to a shared pool of configurable computing resources. However, the
widespread adoption of cloud is still being hindered by the lack of transparency and account-
ability, which has traditionally been ensured through security auditing techniques. Security
auditing in the cloud poses many unique challenges in data collection and processing (e.g.,
data format inconsistency and lack of correlation due to the heterogeneity of cloud infrastruc-
tures), and in verification (e.g., prohibitive performance overhead due to the sheer scale of cloud
infrastructures and need of runtime verification for the dynamic nature of cloud). To this ex-
tent, existing security auditing solutions can mainly be categorized into three types: retroactive,
intercept-and-check and proactive. The retroactive auditing approach is the traditional auditing
technique, which audits after the fact and cannot prevent irreversible damages (e.g., leakage of
sensitive information and denial of service attacks). The intercept-and-check approach offers
runtime auditing and performs all the auditing steps after the occurrence of a critical event (i.e.,
which may potentially violate a security property). However, this approach results significant
delay in responding each critical event. On the other hand, the existing proactive approach
requires the changes (in the cloud configurations) planned for the future in advance to verify
its compliance; however, this approach is not practical, because the future change plan is not
always available due to cloud’s dynamic and ad-hoc nature. In this thesis, we address all the
above-mentioned limitations of the existing works by proposing a proactive security auditing
system, which potentially can prevent irreversible damages, respond in significantly less time
and offer a practical approach without requiring any future change plan. To this purpose, we
conduct our work into three main phases. During the first phase, we propose a runtime security
auditing system for the user-level of the cloud; where our proposed system audits wide range
of security properties relevant to different authentication and authorization mechanisms, such
as role-based access control (RBAC), attribute-based access control (ABAC) and single sign-on
(SSO), and enhances the existing intercept-and-check solutions by adopting an incremental ap-
proach to improve the efficiency. In the second phase of our work, we propose a novel approach
of proactive security auditing; which leverages the dependency relationship among cloud events
and pre-computes the most expensive parts of the auditing process to keep the response time
iii
of the solution to a practical level. In our final phase, we utilize learning techniques to auto-
matically capture these probabilistic dependency relationships, and propose an automated log
processing approach to prepare the raw logs collected from cloud deployments for these learn-
ing methods to significantly enhance the practicality of our proactive security auditing system.
Also, to demonstrate the applicability, scalability and efficiency of our proposed system, we
integrate it to OpenStack, a major cloud platform, and evaluate it using both synthetic and real
data. In summary, this thesis contributes towards enhancing security, efficiency and practicality
of security auditing in the cloud environment.
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Cloud computing has been gaining momentum as a promising IT solution specially for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, and on-demand accesses to a shared pool of configurable computing re-
sources. From small to large sized companies nowadays leverage the cloud service for conduct-
ing their major operations (e.g., web service, inventory management, customer service, etc.).
Based on the provided services, cloud computing has been divided into different categories
such as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and hardware as a service
(HaaS). In most of the categories, there exist at least three main stakeholders: cloud service
providers, tenants and their users.
A cloud service provider owns a significant amounts of computational resources, e.g., servers,
and offers different paid services (e.g., IaaS, PaaS, etc.) to its customers by utilizing this pool
of resources. A cloud tenant, the direct customer of cloud providers, enjoys the ad-hoc and
elastic (i.e., allocating/deprovisioning based on demands) nature of cloud to use the shared pool
of resources for conducting its necessary operations. Usually, tenants are different companies
or departments within a company. A user being a customer of a cloud tenant mainly avails
different services offered by a tenant. Thus, by providing a dynamic (i.e., ever changing) and
measured services (i.e., “pay as you go”) to its users and tenants, cloud computing has become
a popular choice for diverse business models in recent years.
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While cloud computing has seen such increasing interests and adoption, the fear of losing
control and governance still persists due to the lack of transparency and trust [98]. Security
auditing and compliance validation may increase cloud tenants’ trust in the service providers
by providing assurance on the compliance with the applicable laws, regulations, policies, and
standards. However, there are currently many challenges in the area of cloud auditing and com-
pliance validation. For instance, there exists a significant gap between the high-level recom-
mendations provided in most cloud-specific standards (e.g., Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) [18]
and ISO 27017 [53]) and the low-level logging information currently available in existing cloud
infrastructures (e.g., OpenStack [89]). In practice, limited forms of auditing may be performed
by cloud subscriber administrators [84], and there exist a few automated compliance tools (e.g.,
[25, 108]) with several major limitations, which are discussed later in this section.
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of cloud computing may introduce additional com-
plexity to the task, e.g., the use of heterogeneous solutions for deploying cloud systems may
complicate data collection and processing and the sheer scale of a cloud, together with its self-
provisioning, elastic, and dynamic nature, may render the overhead of many verification tech-
niques prohibitive. In particular, the multi-tenant and self-service nature of clouds usually im-
plies significant operational complexity, which may prepare the floor for misconfigurations and
vulnerabilities leading to violations of security compliance. Therefore, the security compliance
verification with respect to security standards, policies, and properties, is desirable to both cloud
providers, and its tenants and users. Evidently, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has recently
introduced the Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) for security assurance in clouds,
which defines three levels of certifications (self-auditing, third-party auditing, and continuous,
near real-time verification of security compliance) [19]. However, above-mentioned complexi-
ties coupled with the sheer size of clouds (e.g., a decent-size cloud is said to have around 1,000
tenants and 100,000 users [2]) implies one of the main challenges in cloud security auditing.
In summary, the major challenges are to handle the unique nature of cloud and to deal with the
sheer size of cloud in providing a scalable and efficient security auditing solution for clouds.
To this end, existing approaches can be roughly divided into three categories (a more de-
tailed review of related work will be given in Section 2.2). First, the retroactive approaches
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(e.g., [25, 108]) catch compliance violations after the fact by verifying different configurations
and logs of the cloud. However, they cannot prevent security breaches from propagating or
causing potentially irreversible damages (e.g., leaks of confidential information or denial of
service). Second, the intercept-and-check approaches (e.g., [16, 88]) verify the compliance of
each user request before either granting or denying it, which may lead to a substantial delay to
user requests. Third, the proactive approach in [16, 88] verifies future change plan to identify
any potential breach from the proposed plan. However, due to the dynamic and ad-hoc nature
of clouds, providing future change plan in advance is not always feasible, and hence, this ap-
proach is not practical for clouds. In conclusion, existing works suffer from at least one of the
following limitations: i) supporting a very limited set of security properties, ii) responding with
a significant delay, and iii) involving unrealistic amounts of manual efforts.
1.2 Problem Statement
In this thesis work, we mainly address the aforementioned limitations of the existing cloud
auditing solutions. To this end, we focus on providing a practical security auditing system for
clouds, which significantly improves the existing state-of-the-art over at least three dimensions,
i.e., security, efficiency and practicality. In particular, this thesis work mainly answers the
following research questions:
1. How can we audit different security properties that are important to cloud tenants to en-
sure the accountability and transparency of cloud providers?
2. How can we provide an efficient runtime auditing solution with practical response time?
3. How can we automate different auditing steps to ensure better scalability, correctness and
usefulness of the auditing tools?
We elaborate the aforementioned problems in the following.
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1.2.1 Runtime Security Auditing for Clouds
During the first phase of our work, we target providing a continuous security auditing solution
for the user-level (e.g., authentication and authorization) (which can potentially be adapted to
other layers) of the cloud. To this purpose, our main focuses are to address the limitations of
the existing solutions as well as to overcome the aforementioned challenges in the area of cloud
security auditing. More specifically, we explore the off-the-shelf verification methods and al-
ternatively consider customized verification algorithms to tackle the sheer scale of cloud (e.g.,
a large-size cloud is said to have around 10,000 tenants and 100,000 users [92]), together with
its self-provisioning, elastic, and dynamic nature, which potentially render the overhead of run-
time verification process prohibitive. Additionally, our work intends to bridge the gap between
the high-level recommendations provided in most cloud-specific standards (e.g., Cloud Con-
trol Matrix (CCM) [18] and ISO 27017 [53]) and the low-level logging information currently
available in existing cloud infrastructures (e.g., OpenStack [89]), and identify a wide range of
security properties to mainly cover the user-level of the cloud. Furthermore, designing the data
collection and pre-processing steps specifically to handle the use of heterogeneous solutions in
a cloud system. Chapter 3 details how our runtime security auditing approach works.
1.2.2 Proactive Security Auditing for Clouds
In the second phase of this work, our target is to overcome the significant delay in all existing
works and respond in a very practical time to audit a cloud at runtime. More specifically, after
a careful observation, we identify one of the main reasons behind the inefficiency of existing
intercept-and-check approaches (e.g., [16]) is that all the auditing steps are performed at a single
point (a.k.a. critical event 1) and not taking any advantage of the dependencies. Alternatively,
leveraging dependencies (if any) among cloud events potentially may allow starting the auditing
process in advance and conduct auditing incrementally. Therefore, in this work we explore the
possibility of deriving the relationship (e.g., dependency) among cloud events and devise a
proactive auditing technique leveraging those relationships. Chapter 4 elaborates our idea of
1The event type which potentially can violate a security property.
4
proactive security auditing approach.
1.2.3 Learning-Based Proactive Security Auditing
During the final phase, our main target is to strengthen the security guarantee and improve the
practicality of our proactive auditing approach to offer a practical proactive security auditing
system which potentially can be integrated to a popular cloud platform (e.g., OpenStack). To
this end, our first objective is to capture various relationships (e.g., dependency) among cloud
events to support wider range of security properties. Our second objective is to avoid error-
prone and tedious manual efforts involved with the auditing process, and to contribute towards
the automation of the auditing process. Chapter 5 further describes our idea on achieving both
aforementioned goals, and provides the details of our learning-based proactive security auditing
approach.
In summary, the three phases of this PhD research address the security, efficiency, and prac-
ticality aspects of security auditing in clouds, respectively. Those topics are complementary
to each other, and the following details the link between them, and how they were identified.
We start by addressing the security concerns of cloud tenants by enabling runtime auditing for
them. A key challenge emerged during this first research is that the sheer size of cloud renders
the overhead of runtime auditing prohibitive, and hence, the response time may not be practi-
cal. Therefore, in the second research, we address this limitation through a proactive auditing
approach, which leverages the dependency relationship among cloud events. One key obser-
vation during this second research is that the dependency model must be manually created;
which may turn to be an error-prone and tedious task especially considering the sheer size of
cloud. Therefore, in the third research, we address this limitation and fully automate the depen-




The main contributions of this thesis work are towards security, efficiency and practicality im-
provements in cloud security auditing. To this end, we propose a proactive security auditing
system, which bridges the gap between high-level standards and low-level cloud logs and con-
figurations, supports a wide range of security properties to audit both user and virtual infrastruc-
ture levels in the cloud, significantly reduces the response time of runtime auditing, and offers
a fully automated auditing solution for clouds. We elaborate each contribution as follows.
First, this thesis concentrates on filling in the gap between standards and cloud imple-
mentations. To this end, we first study the major cloud specific standards (e.g., CCM [18],
ISO27017 [53] and NIST 800-53 [81]). Then, we prepare a list of security properties, which
mainly covers the security of both user and virtual infrastructure levels in the cloud. Next,
we investigate different configurations and log files in the cloud to propose a uniform solution
which can support various formats of those files. Finally, we transform the description of these
security properties based on the real cloud implementations and their supporting configurations
and logs.
Second, we propose a runtime security auditing system specially designed for the user-level
of the cloud. More specifically, the user-level auditing is supported by covering a wide range
of security properties from most popular access control mechanisms, such as role-based access
control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC), and major authentication plugins,
such as single sign-on (SSO). The runtime auditing is offered by performing the expensive au-
diting operations during the one-time initialization phase and by keeping the runtime operations
incremental and light-weight so that our proposed system can achieve a realistic practical time
(e.g., the response time is less than 500 milliseconds for a large cloud with 100,000 users).
Third, we propose a proactive security auditing approach for both user and virtual infrastruc-
ture levels of the cloud. Note that the proactive security auditing approach is a complementary
to the runtime security auditing as will be discussed in Section 4.3. In this work, we first cap-
ture the structural dependencies (which are mainly imposed by the cloud implementations) by
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studying the cloud platform specifications. Then, we utilize this dependency model to pre-
compute expensive parts of the auditing incrementally. Finally, at a critical event (i.e., events
that potentially can violate the security properties), our proposed solution simply checks the
pre-computed results to verify any security property and responds to the request very quickly
(e.g., 8.5 milliseconds to verify 100,000 virtual ports).
Finally, we automate major proactive auditing steps and integrate them into a popular cloud
management platform (e.g., OpenStack) to offer a proactive security auditing system for clouds.
For instance, we automate the dependency capturing step by leveraging different learning mech-
anisms (e.g., Bayesian network and structural pattern mining). We also propose a log processing
approach, which automatically prepares the raw logs of clouds for the learning tools. Further-
more, we integrate our proposed system into OpenStack [89], one of the major cloud manage-
ment platforms, and conduct experiments to measure the efficiency, scalability and applicability
of this system.
In summary, main contributions of this thesis work are as follows.
• As per our knowledge, we are the first to propose a runtime security auditing for user-
level of the cloud which verifies security properties covering important authentication
and authorization mechanisms, such as RBAC, ABAC and SSO.
• We are the first to propose the concept of dependency-based proactive security auditing
approach for clouds which potentially can reduce the response time of runtime auditing
to a practical level.
• We are also the first to capture both structural and behavioral dependencies among cloud
events which potentially can be leveraged in different security solutions to enhance the
efficiency of those systems.
• We integrate our proposed auditing solution into OpenStack [89], a major cloud platform,
and evaluate it with both synthetic and real data; the results of which show scalability,
efficiency and applicability of our approach.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into six chapters as follows. Chapter 2 provides background on the
traditional security auditing steps and discusses the major auditing approaches through related
works. Chapter 3 presents our runtime security auditing system for the user-level of the cloud,
where we further elaborate our motivation and problem, then describe the methodology of our
approach, and finally present implementation details and experimental results. Chapter 4 details
the design and implementation of our proactive security auditing approach with its experimental
evaluation with both synthetic and real data. In Chapter 5, we elaborate the methodology and
implementation of the steps involved with learning the probabilistic dependencies and process-
ing raw logs from real cloud environments along with the evaluation of how above-mentioned
steps can enhance the auditing process. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with the summary of




2.1 Security Auditing for Clouds
Security compliance auditing is in practice for years. However, the growing popularity and
underlying design features in the cloud, revive the need of security compliance of auditing with
newer challenges e.g., scalability and practical response time. In this section, we first describe
different categories of security auditing in cloud and then, explain different steps of a traditional
security auditing process.
2.1.1 Categorization of Cloud Security Auditing
Generally, there are two categories of cloud security auditing: 1) offline auditing and 2) online
auditing. Offline auditing is performed on the snapshots (e.g., configurations and logs) col-
lected from a real cloud deployment or the simulated model of a real cloud. Online auditing is
performed on the cloud at runtime or near runtime. The basic goal of the offline auditing is to
detect security violations either after the fact or to verify a future change plan. Whereas, the
online auditing either prevents a violation, or detects them as soon as they occur (i.e., with a
very little delay). In the following, we provide a brief description along with their limitations.
A detailed literature review is presented in Section 2.2.
Furthermore, the offline auditing approaches can be divided into two types: retroactive au-
diting and proactive auditing. The retroactive auditing is performed periodically (e.g., daily,
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weekly and monthly) irrespective to the occurrence of any event or security violation. This
form of auditing is more traditional, however, the fundamental problem with this approach is
that it cannot prevent any irreversible damages, e.g., DoS attack and leaking sensitive infor-
mation. The existing proactive approaches verify future change plans and simulate them on
the devised model of the real cloud. The implicit assumption is that the future change plan is
known in advance so that at first the plan can be verified against security properties, and then
be applied.
On the other hand, the online auditing approaches interact with the cloud system and identify
security violations at real-time or near real-time. Near real-time (e.g., [14]) approaches detect
security violations with a little delay. On the other hand, real-time auditing solutions (e.g., [61])
are inline with the continuous monitoring to detect any violation right away. The response time
plays a critical role in adopting this approach.
2.1.2 Structure of the Automated Security Auditing Process
Though security auditing is not a new process, automation of this process and complexity of tar-
geted infrastructures introduce non-trivial challenges. Manual auditing is still in practice, where
internal or third party auditors conduct the auditing process based on the collected data/ev-
idence. Initial approaches of automating the auditing process are mostly to detect network
intrusions. Later it has been adapted in other domains, such as data systems, access control
and distributed systems. One of the most recent additions in the list is the cloud infrastructure.
Based on the proposed solutions and best practices, we identify different phases of an automated
security auditing process.
Defining the Scope and Threat Model. As a very first step, an organization should define the
scope of its auditing. Part of it is to identify the critical and sensitive assets, operations and
the modules in the system that deal with those assets and operations. The following step is
to identify threats or nature of threats to be considered for the auditing process. Most of the
time, threat model depends on the nature of the business and demand of customers. Part of this
step is to describe security assumptions while considering each threat. To this end, last few
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years different studies have been conducted to identify risks and threats in the cloud comput-
ing ecosystem. Based on those threats, several security properties are proposed by CSA [17],
ENISA [28], ISO [53], NIST [81], CUMULUS [20], etc.
Data/evidence Collection. The next phase is to gather evidences/data to conduct the audit
process. Based on the target system and threat model, audit data is enlisted. In some cases (e.g.,
cloud and distributed systems), locating those audit data is non-trivial.
The data collection phase has become more dynamic with the virtualization and multi-
tenancy; which results an increase in the amount of data to be collected. We also consider
security aspects of data collection in addition to the different runtime and continuous data col-
lection techniques of different data types. The trust model ensures that the audit data provided
by a tenant is real and fresh. At the same time, there might exists the privacy concerns in a cen-
tral auditing system, such as any tenant must not leak any sensitive information to the auditor,
which can benefit any other tenants in case of colluding with the auditor.
In the cloud, most of the audit data is any of events, logs and system configurations. Differ-
ent collection techniques vary each other in terms of targeted environments and data, e.g., what
data to collect based on the scope, threat model and objectives, and how to collect data (more
challenging in a cloud-based system).
Data/evidence Processing. The previous step collects raw data from the system. It requires
further processing to be able to conduct auditing. In case of verifying compliance with a policy
language, it depends on the language. Collected data needs to be sanitized, as data is collected
from different sources. For better understanding and interpretation, different correlation meth-
ods are applied on sanitized data to categorize them. There are different techniques (e.g., call
graph, information flow graph, reachability graph) to represent the audit data. Heterogeneous
data is normalized by different methods, e.g., [23]. Storing this processed audit data is also
an important phase specially when dynamic cloud auditing generates enormous amount of data
over time.
Auditing. In the auditing phase, processed data is verified against the policies for any violation.
The process either validates the system or detects if any anomaly exists. There are different
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auditing techniques proposed over time, though comparatively less automated techniques exist
for the cloud. To understand better and to adapt other approaches, automated auditing methods
in other analogous environments, such as intrusion detection systems and event correlation in
multi-domain network/infrastructure, might be interesting. We consider different techniques of
verifying policy compliance or detection of any policy violation including formal verification
and validation (V&V) methods.
Audit Output. The proper representation of auditing output is the last and one of the important
phases of security auditing. The audit report varies depending on the different demands and
requirements of the customers (e.g., tenants). Hierarchy-based reporting helps to fulfill different
levels of expectation. Major concern in outputting the result is not to leak any sensitive and
unnecessary information to any tenant. Proper information isolation must be ensured.
2.2 Literature Review
This section discusses existing cloud security auditing approaches.
2.2.1 Retroactive Auditing
In the context of cloud auditing, there are several works that target auditing data location and
storage in the cloud (e.g., [58]) and others target infrastructure change auditing (e.g., [25]). Par-
ticularly, Ullah et al. [108] propose an architecture to build automated security compliance tool
for cloud computing platforms focusing on auditing clock synchronization and remote admin-
istrative & diagnostic port protection. Doelitzscher [24] proposes on-demand audit architecture
for IaaS clouds and an implementation based on software agents to enable anomaly detection
system to identify anomalies in IaaS clouds for the purpose of auditing. The works in [108, 24]
have the same general objective, which is cloud auditing, as ours, but they use empirical tech-
niques to perform auditing whereas we use formal techniques to model and solve the auditing
problem. Tang et al. [107] formalize the core OpenStack access control (OSAC) and propose a
domain trust extension for OSAC to facilitate secure cross-domain authorization. We adapt this
model in our work. To the best of our knowledge, none of the aforementioned works support
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auditing a wide variety of security properties in the cloud.
Several industrial efforts include solutions to support cloud auditing in specific cloud envi-
ronments. For instance, Microsoft proposes SecGuru [12] to audit Azure datacenter network
policy using the SMT solver Z3. IBM also provides a set of monitoring tool integrated with
QRadar [49], which is their security information and event management system, to collect and
analyze events in the cloud. Amazon is offering web API logs and metric data to their AWS
clients by AWS CloudWatch & CloudTrail [6] that could be used for the auditing purpose.
Although those efforts may potentially assist auditing tasks, none of them directly supports
auditing a wide range of security properties covering authentication, authorization and virtual
infrastructure on cloud standards.
Several existing efforts consider the verification of access control policies at the design time
expressed in the standard eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) using formal
reasoning. Among them, Fisler et al. [30] propose Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) and
custom algorithms to verify access-control policies. Ahn et al. [2] use answer set programming
(ASP) and leverage existing ASP reasoning models to conduct policy verification. Arkoudas et
al. [7] propose a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) policy analysis framework. In most of
those works, multi-domain access control models are not considered.
To accommodate the need of secure collaborative environments such as cloud computing,
there have been some efforts towards proposing multi-domain/multi-tenant access control mod-
els (e.g., [36, 107, 40]). Gouglidis and Mavridis [40] leverage graph theory algorithms to verify
a subset of the access control security properties. Gouglidis et al. [41] utilize model-checking
to verify custom extensions of RBAC with multi-domains [40] against security properties. Lu
et al. [68] use set theory to formalize policy conflicts in the context of inter-operation in the
multi-domain environment. However, auditing encompasses more than a verification approach.
In contrast to these works, we are dealing with the verification of not only the policies but also




Existing intercept-and-check approaches (e.g., [16, 88]) perform major verification tasks while
holding the event instances blocked, and usually cause significant delay to a user request. There
are several other works (e.g., [61, 59]) monitoring network events and checking network poli-
cies at runtime. Weatherman [16] and OpenStack Congress [88] offer security verification of
virtual infrastructure using the intercept-and-check approach. These works focus on operational
network properties (e.g., black holes and forwarding loops) in traditional networks, whereas our
effort is oriented toward preserving compliance with structural security properties that impact
isolation in cloud virtualized infrastructures. Designing cloud monitoring services based on
security service-level agreements have been discussed in [96].
2.2.3 Proactive Auditing
Proactive security analysis has been explored for software security enforcement through mon-
itoring programs’ behaviors and taking specific actions (e.g., warning) in case security poli-
cies are violated. Many state-based formal models are proposed for those program monitors
over the last two decades. First, Schneider [103] modelled program monitors using an infinite-
state-automata model to enforce safety properties. Those automata recognize invalid behaviors
and halt the target application before the violation occurs. Ligatti [65] builds on Schneider’s
model and defines a more general program monitors model based on the so called edit/security
automata. Rather than just recognizing executions, edit automata-based monitors are able to
suppress bad and/or insert new actions, transforming hence invalid executions into valid ones.
Mandatory Result Automata (MRA) is another model proposed by Ligatti et al. [66, 26] that can
transform both actions and results to valid ones. Narain [80] proactively generates correct net-
work configurations using the model finder Alloy, which leverages a state of the art SAT solver.
To this end, they specify a set of end-to-end requirements in First Order Logic and determine
the set of existing network components. Alloy uses a state of the art SAT solver to provide the
configurations that satisfy the input requirements for each network component. Considering the
huge size of cloud environments and the tremendous space of possible events, adapting those
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solutions in the cloud is possibly very challenging.
Weatherman [16] is the most closely related work to ours. Aiming at mitigating miscon-
figurations and enforcing security policies in a virtualized infrastructure, Weatherman has both
online and offline approaches. Their online approach intercepts management operations for
analysis, and relays them to the management hosts only if Weatherman confirms no security
violation caused by those operations. Otherwise, they are rejected with an error signal to the
requester. The work defines a realization model, that captures the virtualized infrastructure
configuration and topology in a graph-based model. The latter is synchronized with the ac-
tual infrastructure using the approach in [14]. Two major limitations of this proposition are:
i) the model capturing the whole infrastructure causes a scalability issue for the solution, and
ii) the time consuming operation-checking that should be performed on the emergence of each
event, makes security enforcement not feasible for large size data centers. Our work over-
comes these limitations using dependency models, which are not context-dependent, and the
pre-computation steps, which considerably reduce the response-time.
Congress [88] is an OpenStack project offering both online and offline policy enforcement
approaches. The offline approach requires submitting a future change plan to Congress, so that
the changes can be simulated and the impacts of those changes can be verified against specific
properties. In the online approach, Congress first applies the operation to the cloud, then checks
its impacts. In case of a violation, the operation is reverted. However, the time elapsed before
reverting the operation can be critical to perform some illicit actions, for instance, transferring
sensitive files before loosing the assigned role. Foley et al. [31] provide an algebra to assess the
effect of security policies replacement and composition in OpenStack. Their solution can be
considered as a proactive approach for checking operational property violations.
2.3 Notations
In this thesis, we use several terminologies and notations. Table 2.1 describes the terminologies
and notations that we frequently use in this work.
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Terminology/Notation Description
User-Level A cloud level includes the authentication and access control
mechanisms
Multi-Domain Cloud A cloud that consists of multiple domains (i.e., a collection
of tenants)
RBAC Role-based access control
ABAC Attribute-based access control
SSO Single sign-on
V&V Verification and validation
Event Type The generic name of each cloud event independent of any
cloud platform (e.g., create VM and delete port)
Event Instance An instance of an event type that is observed in logs
Runtime Event An event instance that is intercepted at runtime
Session The period within which a user remains active
Watchlist A list of resources that are allowed as parameters
Critical Event The events that may violate a security property
Table 2.1: Description of frequently used terminologies in this work.
16
Chapter 3
Runtime User-Level Auditing for Clouds
3.1 Introduction
The widespread adoption of cloud is still being hindered with the fear of losing control and
governance due to the lack of transparency and trust [98, 1]. Particularly, the multi-tenancy and
ever-changing nature of clouds usually implies significant design and operational complexity,
which may prepare the floor for misconfigurations and vulnerabilities leading to violations of
security properties. Runtime security auditing may increase cloud tenants’ trust in the service
providers by providing assurance on the compliance with security properties mainly derived
from the applicable laws, regulations, policies, and standards. Evidently, the Cloud Security
Alliance has recently introduced the Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) for secu-
rity assurance in clouds, which defines three levels of certifications (self-auditing, third-party
auditing, and continuous, near real-time verification of security compliance) [19].
Motivating Example. Here, we provide a sketch of the gap between high-level standards and
low-level input data, and the necessity of runtime security auditing.
• Section 13.2.1 of ISO 27017 [53], which provides security guidelines for the use of cloud
computing, recommends “checking that the user has authorization from the owner of the
information system or service for the use of the information system or service...”.
• The corresponding logging information is available in OpenStack [89] from at least three
different sources:
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– Logs of user events (e.g., router.create.end 1c73637 94305b c7e62 2899
meaning user 1c73637 from domain 94305b is creating a router).
– Authorization policy files (e.g., "create_router": "rule:regular_user"mean-
ing a user needs to be a regular user to create a router).
– Database record (e.g., 1c73637 Member meaning user 1c73637 holds the Member
role).
• Continuously allocating and deprovisioning of resources and user roles for up to 100,000
users mean any verification results may only be valid for a short time. For instance, a re-
verification might be necessary after certain frequently-occurred operations such as: user
create 1c73637 (meaning the 1c73637 user is created), and role grant member
1c73637 (meaning the member role is granted to the 1c73637 user).
Existing approaches can be roughly divided into three categories. First, the retroactive ap-
proaches (e.g., [70, 73]) catch security violations after the fact. Second, the intercept-and-check
approaches (e.g., [88, 16]) verify security invariants for each user request before granting/deny-
ing it. Third, the proactive approaches (e.g., [88, 16, 71]) verify user requests in advance.
Our work falls into the second category. Therefore, this work potentially prevents the limi-
tation of the retroactive approaches, and also requires no future change plan unlike proactive
approaches (e.g., [88, 16]). In comparison with existing intercept-and-check solutions, our ap-
proach reduces the response time significantly and supports a wide range of user-level security
properties.
Clearly, during the runtime security auditing, collecting and processing all the data again
after each operation can be very costly and may represent a bottleneck for achieving the desired
response time due to the performance overhead involved with data collection and processing
operations (as reported in Section 3.5). In addition to data collection and processing, runtime
verification of ever-changing clouds within a practical response time is essential and non-trivial.
In this specific case, no automated tool exists yet in OpenStack for these purposes.
Objectives and Contributions. In this work, we propose a user-level runtime security auditing
framework in a multi-domain cloud environment. We compile a set of security properties from
18
both the existing literature on authorization and authentication and common cloud security stan-
dards. We perform costly auditing operations (e.g., data collection and processing, and initial
verification on whole cloud) only once during the initialization phase so that later runtime op-
erations can be performed in an incremental manner to reduce the cost of runtime verification
significantly with a negligible delay. We rely on formal verification methods to enable auto-
mated reasoning and provide formal proofs or counter examples of compliance. We implement
and integrate the proposed runtime auditing framework into OpenStack, and report real-life ex-
periences and challenges. Our framework supports several popular cloud access control and
authentication mechanisms (e.g., role-based access control (RBAC) [29], attribute-based ac-
cess control (ABAC) [48] and single sign-on (SSO)) with the provision of adding such more
extensions. Our experimental results confirm the scalability and efficiency of our approach.
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• We propose an efficient user-level runtime security auditing framework in a multi-domain
cloud environment.
• The study on security properties provides a bridge between the cloud security standards and
the literature on multi-domain access control and authentication.
• Our prototype system can be a part of the auditing system for OpenStack-based cloud in-
frastructure management systems providing a practical auditing solution with the support of
common access control and authentication mechanisms (e.g., RBAC, ABAC and SSO).
• The experimental results show that our proposed system is realistic for large-scale cloud
environments (e.g., the response time is less than 500 ms for a large cloud with 100,000
users).
3.2 User-Level Security Properties
We first show different attack scenarios based on authorization and authentication models. Then
we formulate user-level threats as a list of security properties mostly derived from the cloud-
specific standards, and finally discuss our threat model.
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3.2.1 Models
We now describe RBAC, ABAC and SSO models.
RBAC Model. We focus on verifying multi-domain role-based access control (RBAC), which
is adopted in real world cloud platforms (as shown in Table 3.1). In particular, we assume the
extended RBAC model as in [107], which adds multi-tenancy support in the cloud. The brief
definitions of different components of this model are as follows. The details can be found in
[107].
• Tenant1: A tenant is a collection of users who share a common access with specific privileges
to the cloud instances.
• Domain: A domain is a collection of tenants, which draws an administrative boundary within
a cloud.
• Object and operation: An object is a cloud resource e.g., VM. An operation is an access
method to an object. Object and operation together represent permissions.
• Token: A token is a package of necessary information used to authenticate prior to avail any
operation.
• Group: Groups are formed for better user management.
• Trust: Trust is the concept, which enables delegation of duties over tenants or domains.
• Service: A service means a distributed cloud service.
Plugins
Cloud Platforms
OpenStack [89] Amazon EC2 [5] Microsoft Azure [77] Google GCP [38] VMware [109]
RBAC • • • • •
ABAC Blueprint [56] • Azure AD Firebase •
SSO Federation AWS Directory Microsoft account G Suite myOneLogin
Table 3.1: Usage of RBAC, ABAC and SSO in major cloud platforms
Example 1 Figure 3.1 depicts our running example, which is an instance of the access con-
trol model presented in [107]. In this scenario, Alice and Bob are the admins of domains, Da
and Db, respectively, with no collaboration (trust) between the two domains; Pa and Pb are
two tenants2, respectively, owned by the two domains. In such a scenario, we consider a real
1We interchangeably use the terms, tenant and project, in Figure 3.1.
2We interchangeably use the terms, tenant and project in Figures 3.1 and 3.2
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world vulnerability, OSSN-00101, found in OpenStack, which allows a tenant admin to become
a cloud admin and acquire privileges to bypass the boundary protection between tenants, and il-
licitly utilize resources from other tenants while evading the billing. Suppose Bob has exploited
this vulnerability to become a cloud admin. Figure 3.1 depicts the resultant state of the access
control system after this attack. Therein, Mallory belonging to domain,Da, is assigned a tenant-
role pair (Pb, Member), which is from domain, Db. This violates the security requirement of








































             {Bob,  Mallory}
Role
{Admin, Member}
Figure 3.1: Two domain instances of the access control model of [107] depicting the resultant
state of the access control system after the exploit of the vulnerability, OSSN-0010. The shaded
region and dotted arrows show an instance of the exploit described in Example 1.
ABACModel. ABAC [48], is considered as a strong candidate to replace RBAC in Sandhu [99],
which identifies several limitations of RBAC and thus emphasizes the importance of ABAC
specially for large infrastructures (e.g., cloud). In fact, major cloud platforms have started sup-
porting ABAC (as shown in Table 3.1). We briefly review the central concepts of ABAC model
here, while leaving more details to [48]. Attributes are name and value pairs, and associated
with different entities. The attribute is considered as a function, which takes users or objects
1Keystone exposes privilege escalation vulnerability, available at: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-
0010
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as inputs and returns a value from the attribute’s scope. A user is a person or a non-person
entity, e.g., an application, which requests for actions on objects. A user is described with a
set of attributes (UATT), e.g., name, salary, role, etc. Objects are system resources (e.g., VMs,
files, etc.) which can be accessed only by authorized users. Object attributes (OATT) represent
resource properties such as risk level, classification and location. Actions are the list of allowed
operations on an object by a user. In this work, we mainly use two ABAC functions, i.e., user
attribute (UATT) and object attribute (OATT).
Example 2 Figure 3.2 depicts our running example for ABAC, and shows a similar attack
scenario as Example 1. The model in the figure is an instance of the access control model
presented in [97], and shows the resultant state of the access control system after this attack.
SSO Mechanism. SSO, which is a popular cloud authentication extension and supported by
major cloud platforms (shown in Table 3.1), only requires a single user action to permit a user
to access all authorized computers and systems. In this work, we detail two SSO protocols:
OpenID [85] and SAML [82] supported by OpenStack and many other cloud platforms.
However, there are several attacks (e.g., [111, 42, 83, 8]) on two above-mentioned SSO
protocols. The following describes several security concerns specific to these protocols.
• In SAML, there is no communication between service provider (SP) and identity provider
(IdP). Therefore, an SP maintains a list of trusted IdPs, and any ID generated by an IdP that
is not in this list must be strictly restricted.
• On the other hand, OpenID accepts any IdP by communicating with the corresponding re-
lying party (RP), which provides the login service as a third party. Therefore, a proper
synchronization between IdP and RP is essential for the OpenID protocol. Otherwise, it may
result following security critical incidents:
– Logging out from IdP may not ensure logging out from RP, and thus an unauthorized
session is possible.
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Figure 3.2: Two tenant instances of the access control model of [97] depicting the resultant state of the access control system after the exploit of
the vulnerability, OSSN-0010. The shaded region and dotted arrows show an instance of the exploit described in Example 2.
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To address such security concerns and to be compliant with aforementioned cloud-specific se-
curity standards, we devise security properties in the next subsection.
3.2.2 Security Properties
Table 3.2 presents an excerpt of the list of user-level security properties that we identify from the
access control and authentication literature, relevant standards (e.g., ISO 27002 [52], NIST SP
800-53 [81], CCM [18] and ISO 27017 [53]), and the real-world cloud implementation (e.g.,
OpenStack). Even though some properties (e.g., cyclic inheritance) are not directly found in
any standard, they are included based on their importance and impact described in the literature
(e.g., [41]).
RBAC Security Properties. RBAC-specific security properties are shown in Table 3.2. For
our running example, we will focus on following two properties. Common ownership: based
on the challenges of multi-domain cloud discussed in [41, 107], users must not hold any role
from another domain. Minimum exposure: each domain in a cloud must limit the exposure of
its information to other domains [107].
Example 3 The attack scenario in Example 1 violates the common ownership property. Ac-
cording to the property, Mallory must not hold a role member in tenant, Pb, belonging to do-
main, Db, because Mallory belongs to domain, Da, and there exists no collaboration between
domains, Da and Db.
ABAC Security Properties. Table 3.2 provides an excerpt of ABAC-related security properties
supported by our auditing system. Some properties are specific to ABAC, and rests are adopted
from RBAC. We only discuss the following properties, which are extended or added for ABAC.
• Consistent constraints: Jin et al. [57] define constraints for different basic changes in ABAC
elements e.g., adding/deleting users/objects. After each operation, certain changes are nec-
essary to be properly applied. This property verifies whether all constraints have been per-
formed.
• Common ownership: For ABAC, the common ownership property also includes objects and














Properties ISO27002 [52] ISO27017 [53] NIST800 [81] CCM [18]
Role activation [54] 13.2.2b 15.2.2b AC-1 IAM-09 • •
Permitted action [54] 11.2.1.b, 1.2.2c 13.2.1b, 13.2.2c AC-14 IAM-10 • •
Common ownership [41] 11 13 AC IAM • •
Minimum exposure [107] 11.6.1 13.4.1 AC-4 IAM-04,06 • •
Separation of duties [107] 11.6.2 13.6.2 AC-5 IAM-02,05 •
Cyclic inheritance [41] •
Privilege escalation [41] 11.2.2.b 13.2.2b AC-6 IAM-08 • •
Cardinality [54] 11.2.4 13.2.4 AC-1 • •
Consistent constraints [57]
add/delete user 11.5.1 13.4.2 AC-7,9 IAM-02 •
modify user attributes 13.2.2b 15.2.2b AC-1 IAM-09 •
add/delete object 13.2.2b 15.2.2b AC-1 IAM-09 •
modify object attributes 13.2.2b 15.2.2b AC-1 IAM-09 •
Session de-activation [81] 11.5.5 13.2.8 AC-12 • •
User-access validation [53] 11.5.2 13.4 AC-3 IAM-10 •
User-access revocation [52] 11.2.1h 13.2.1h AC-2 IAM-11 •
No duplicate ID [18] 11.5.2 13.5.2 AC-2 IAM-12
Secure remote access [53] 11.4.2 13.4.2 AC-17 IAM-02,07
Secure log-on [53] 11.5.1 13.4.2 AC-7,9 IAM-02
Session time-out [81] 11.5.5 13.2.8 AC-12 •
Concurrent session [81] 13.5.4 AC-10
Brute force protection 11.2.2.b 13.2.2b AC-1 IAM-09 •
No caching 11.2.1.b, 1.2.2c 13.2.1b, 13.2.2c AC-14 IAM-10 •
Table 3.2: An excerpt of user-level security properties
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actions on that object must be the same.
Authentication-Related Security Properties. Table 3.2 shows an excerpt of security proper-
ties related to generic authentication mechanisms and extensions (e.g., SSO). We discuss the
SSO-related properties as follows. Brute force protection: account lockout, CAPTCHA or any
such brute force protection must be applied in SSO. No caching: SSO and associated applica-
tions should set no-cache and no-stored-cache directives. User access revocation: logout from
one application must end sessions of other applications. User access validation: only a valid
authentication token must pass the authentication step.
3.2.3 Threat Model
Our threat model is based on two facts. First, our solution focuses on verifying the security
properties specified by cloud tenants, instead of detecting specific attacks or vulnerabilities
(which is the responsibility of IDSes or vulnerability scanners). Second, the correctness of
our verification results depends on the correct input data extracted from logs and databases.
Since an attack may or may not violate the security properties specified by the tenant, and
logs or databases may potentially be tampered with by attackers, our results can only signal an
attack in some cases. Specifically, the in-scope threats of our solution are attacks that violate
the specified security properties and at the same time lead to logged events. The out-of-scope
threats include attacks that do not violate the specified security properties, attacks not captured
in the logs or databases, and attacks through which the attackers may remove or tamper with
their own logged events. More specifically, in this work we focus on user-level security threats
and rely on existing solutions (e.g., [16, 71]) to identify virtual infrastructure level threats. We
assume that, before our runtime approach is launched, an initial verification is performed and
potential violations are resolved. However, if our solution is added from the commencement
of a cloud, obviously no prior security verification (including the initial phase) is required. We
also assume that tenant-defined policies are properly reflected in the policy files of the cloud
platforms.
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3.3 Runtime Security Auditing
This section presents our runtime security auditing framework for the user-level in the cloud.
3.3.1 Overview
Figure 5.20 shows an overview of our runtime auditing approach. This approach contains two
major phases: i) initialization, where we conduct a full verification on the collected and pro-
cessed cloud data, and ii) runtime, where we incrementally verify the compliance upon dynamic
changes in the cloud. The initialization phase is performed only once through an offline veri-
fication. This phase performs all costly operations such as data collection and processing, and
an initial full compliance verification for a list of security properties. The initial verification
result is stored in the result repository. For the latter, we devise an incremental verification ap-
proach to minimize the workload at the runtime. During the runtime phase, each management
operation (e.g., create/delete a user/tenant) is intercepted, its parameters are processed with the
previous result, and finally the verification engine evaluates the compliance and provides the
latest verification result. We elaborate major phases of our system as follows.
Data Collection Data Processing Offline Verification









Previous result Current result
i
{Property}iCloud
Figure 3.3: An overview of our runtime security auditing approach
3.3.2 Initialization Phase
Our runtime auditing approach at first requires one-time data collection and processing, and full
verification of the cloud, namely, the initialization phase, against a list of security properties.
Initially, we collect all necessary data from the cloud, which are in different formats and in
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different levels of abstractions. Therefore, we further process these data to convert the format
and correlate them to identify required relationships for considered security properties. Then,
we generate inputs for the verification engine incorporating the processed data in the previous
step. Finally, the verification engine checks the compliance for a list of security properties, and
provides an initial verification result.
The collection engine is responsible for collecting the required data in a batch mode from
the cloud management system. The role of the processing engine is to filter, format, aggregate,
and correlate this data. The required data is distributed throughout the cloud and in different
formats (e.g., files and databases). The processing engine must pre-process the data in order
to provide specific information needed to verify given properties. A final processing step is to
generate and store the inputs to be used by the compliance verification engine. Note that the
format of the inputs depends on the selected back-end verification engine.
The compliance verification engine is to perform the actual verification of the security prop-
erties. We use formal methods to capture the system model and to verify properties, which
facilitates automated reasoning and is generally more practical and effective than manual in-
spection. If a security property is violated, evidences can be obtained from the output of the
verification back-end, e.g., a set of real data in the cloud for which all conditions of a security
property are not satisfied are provided as a feedback. Once the outcome of the initial verifica-
tion is ready, results and evidences are stored in the result repository and made accessible to the
runtime engine.
3.3.3 Runtime Phase
The initialization phase conducts an offline verification, where we verify security properties
on the whole cloud. However, verifying the whole cloud after each configuration change is
very expensive. Alternatively, we intercept each event and verify the impact of the events in an
incremental manner, where we perform runtime verification on a minimal dataset based on the
current change to provide a better response time, to catch a security violation.
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We update the verification results continuously by verifying the cloud at runtime. The run-
time verification is event-driven and property-specific. Table 3.3 shows the events that may
affect the result of verification for certain properties. The bottom part of Figure 5.20 depicts the
steps of this phase. We intercept each operation request generated from the cloud management
interface. We further retrieve the parameters of the request and pass them to the data pro-
cessing module. The data processing module performs similarly as described in Section 3.3.2.
However, during the runtime phase, mostly partial data are sent for the incremental verifica-
tion for each security property. Thus, the incremental verification is only conducted on the
impact of the current change. Then, the final verification result is inferred from the result of
current incremental verification and the previous result. Incremental verification is performed
using any of the two methods: i) deltaVerify, where compliance verification mechanism dis-
cussed in the initialization phase is applied on the delta data, and ii) customAlgo, where security
property specific customized algorithms are performed. We discuss our runtime verification
algorithm in more details in Section 3.4.2. In the following examples, we assume that the
previous verification result for a specific property is stored in Resultt0, the parameters of the
intercepted event is in ∆i and the updated result will be stored in Resultt . For example, all
user-role pairs violating the common ownership property at time t0 are stored in Resultt0 as
{Mallory,Da,(Pb,Member),Db}.
Example 4 Table 3.3 shows that the verification result for the common ownership property
may change for following events: grant role, delete role, delete user, delete tenant and delete
domain. Upon intercepting any of these events, we conduct incremental verification as follows:
• Grant a role: Each role assignment alone may affect the common ownership property, and
hence, it does not depend on the previous assignments. Therefore, upon a grant role request,
we only verify the parameters of the intercepted event using the deltaVerify method, and
combine the obtained result with the previous result (Resultt0) to infer the updated result
(Resultt).
• Delete a role: If the deleted role (∆i) is present in the previous result (i.e., ∆i ∈ Resultt0), then
we update the current result by removing that role (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0−∆i). Otherwise,
the result remains unchanged (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0). Deleting a user/tenant/domain can be
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similarly handled.
Example 5 Similarly, upon intercepting any of the events marked for the permitted action prop-
erty in Table 3.3, we conduct incremental verification as follows:
• Grant a role: If the granted role (∆i) is present in the previous result (i.e., ∆i ∈ Resultt0), then
we update the current result by removing that role (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0−∆i). Otherwise,
the result remains unchanged (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0).
• Delete a role: If the deleted role (∆i) is present in the previous result (i.e., ∆i ∈ Resultt0), then
we update the current result by removing that role (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0−∆i). Otherwise,
the result remains unchanged (i.e., Resultt = Resultt0). Deleting a user/tenant/domain can be
similarly handled.
Identifying the Impacts of Events. By observing the impacts of cloud events, Table 3.3 lists
all events that may change the verification result of certain security properties. However, iden-
tifying impacts of events in cloud can be challenging. Also, the completeness of the method of
identifying the impacts, relies on the specifications of APIs by the cloud platforms. In this work,
we mainly follow two methods (i.e., API documentation and infrastructure change inspection)
proposed by Bleikertz et al. [16]. Firstly, we go through the API documentation provided by
cloud platforms to obtain API specifications including their functionality, parameters and im-
pacts on the infrastructure. Secondly, we perform different events and observe the infrastructure
configuration change to capture the impact of those events. Finally, we combine this knowledge
with the definition of security properties to populate Table 3.3.
Provision of Enriching the Security Property List. Beside the security properties in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, tenants might intend to add new security properties over time. Our framework pro-
vides the provision of adding new security properties through following simple steps. First, the
new security property is defined in the cloud system context, which can be simply performed by
following our existing techniques discussed in Section 3.2.2 to apply high-level standard termi-
nologies to cloud-specific resources. Next, the property is translated to the first order logic and
then to Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) constraints, and in many cases the existing rela-



































































































































































Common Ownership • • • • •
Permitted Action • • • • •
Minimum Exposure • • • • •
Role Activation • • • •
Separation of Duties • • • • •
Privilege Escalation • • • • • •
Cardinality • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Cyclic Inheritance • •
No Duplicate ID • • • • • • • • • • • •
User Access Validation • • •
User Access Revocation • • • • • • • • • • • •
Secure Remote Access • • • •
Secure Log-on • • • •
Session Time-out • • • • • • • • • • • •
Concurrent Session • • • • • •
Table 3.3: Events that influence verification results for certain properties
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owner of, authorized for, etc. Our data collection engine already collects data from all relevant
sources of data of a cloud platform regardless of security properties. Therefore, no extra effort is
needed in the data collection phase, unless the new property requires data from a different layer
in the cloud (e.g., SDN). Then, the data processing effort for a new property mainly involves
building correlation between data from different sources, because other processing steps are
mostly property-independent. The remaining initial verification step is only to add constraints
of the new property to the verification list. Finally, we identify the events that may alter the
verification result of the new property by re-utilizing the knowledge of impacts of events, and
perform the runtime verification through incremental steps either using the deltaVerify method
or by a customized algorithm (as in Section 3.4.2). Additionally, whenever there is any change
in the event specification for a cloud system, we capture the update on impacts (if any) of events
on the security properties.
3.3.4 Formalization of Security Properties
As a back-end verification mechanism, we formalize verification data and properties as Con-
straint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) and use a constraint solver, namely, Sugar [105], to validate
the compliance. CSP allows formulation of many complex problems in terms of variables de-
fined over finite domains and constraints. Its generic goal is to find a vector of values (a.k.a.
assignment) that satisfies all constraints expressed over the variables. If all constraints are satis-
fied, the solver returns SAT, otherwise, it returns UNSAT. In the case of a SAT result, a solution
to the problem is provided. In our case, we formalize each security property in CSP to verify
in Sugar. After verification, Sugar provides proper evidence (a.k.a counter examples) of a vio-
lation (if any) of a security property. In the following, we first provide a generic description of
model formalization, then illustrate examples of property formalization, and finally show some
counter examples for those security properties.
Model Formalization. Referring to Figures 3.1 and 3.2, entities are encoded as CSP variables
with their domains definitions (over integer), where instances are values within the correspond-
ing domain. For example, User is defined as a finite domain ranging over integer such that
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(domainUser 0 max_user) is a declaration of a domain of users, where the values are between
0 and max_user. Relationships and their instances are encoded as relation constraints and their
supports, respectively. For example, AuthorizedR is encoded as a relation, with a support as
follows: (relation AuthorizedR 3 (supports (r1,u1,t1) (r2,u2,t2))). The support of this relation
will be fetched and pre-processed in the data processing step. The CSP code mainly consists of
four parts:
• Variable and domain declaration. We define different entities and their respective domains.
For example, u and op are entities (or variables) defined respectively over the domains User
and Operation, which range over integers.
• Relation declaration. We define relations over variables and provide their support from the
verification data.
• Constraint declaration. We define the negation of each property in terms of predicates over
the involved relations to obtain a counter example in case of a violation.
• Body. We combine different predicates based on the properties to verify using Boolean op-
erators.
Properties Formalization for RBAC. Security properties are presented as predicates over re-
lation constraints and predicates. We detail two representative properties in this work. We first
express these properties in first order logic [11] and then in their CSP formalization (using Sugar
syntax). Table 3.4 summarizes the relations that we use in these properties.
1. Common ownership: Users are authorized for the roles that are only defined within their
domains.
∀u ∈ User,∀d ∈ Domain,∀r ∈ Role,∀t ∈ Tenant (1)
BelongsToD(u,d)∧AuthorizedR(u,t,r) −→
TenantRoleDom(t,r,d)
The corresponding CSP constraint is
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Relations in Properties Evaluate to True if Corresponding Rela-
tions in Fig. 3.1
AuthorizedOp(d, t,u,r,o,op) In domain d, and tenant t, the user u, with the role r is
authorized to perform operation op on object o
UA, PO, tenant-role
pair, PA, PRMS
OwnerD(od, t,o) Domain od is the owner of the object o in tenant t PO, tenant-role pair,
PA
AuthorizedR(u, t,r) User u belonging to tenant t is authorized for the role r UA, tenant-role pair
BelongsToD(u,d) User u belongs to the domain d UO
TenantRoleDom(t,r,d) Role r is defined within the domain d in tenant t PO, tenant-role pair
LogEntry(d, t,u,r,o,op) Operation op on object o is actually performed by user u
having role r in tenant t and domain d
ND
ActiveToken(tok,d, t,u,r, time) Token tok is active at time time and in use by user u having




Table 3.4: Correspondence between relations in our formalism and relationships/entities in Figure 3.1. Note that one of the relations (in third
column) is denoted by ND as it is inferred from dynamic data (e.g., logs).
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(and BelongsToD(u,d) AuthorizedR(u,t,r) (2)
(not TenantRoleDom(t,r,d)))
2. Minimum exposure: We assume that the user access is revoked properly and that each do-
main’s administrator may share a set of objects (resources) with other domains. The admin-
istrator defines accordingly a policy governing the shared objects, the allowed domains for
a given object and the allowed actions for a given domain with respect to a specific object.
During data processing, we recover for each domain, the set of foreign objects (belonging to
other domains) and the actual operations performed on those objects (from the logs). This
property allows checking whether the collected and correlated data complies with the defined
policy of each domain.
∀d,od ∈ Domain,∀o ∈ Object,∀op ∈ Operation, (3)
∀r ∈ Role,∀t ∈ Tenant,∀u ∈ User
LogEntry(d,t,u,r,o,op)∧BelongsTo(u,d)∧
OwnerD(od,t,o) −→ AuthorizedOp(d,t,u,r,o,op))




Properties Formalization for ABAC. In the following, we show formalization of one security
property for ABAC.
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Common ownership: Formally the common ownership property is violated in the
following conditions: userOwner(u) 6= uattOwner(userRolei(u)) OR ob jOwner(o) 6=
oattOwner(ob jRolei, j(o)). Through this extension, we complement the previous definition,
and the property is now more general in the sense that we can identify the misconfiguration in
defining policies for an object. Following example further explains this benefit. Alice is a user
(from the user set, U) owned by the domain, d1. Alice holds a member role in the domain,
d2, expressed as userRole2(Alice). The owner of this role is the domain, d2 (inferred from
the uattOwner(userRole2(Alice)) relationship). This situation violates the common ownership
property, as the first part of the condition (i.e., userOwner(u) 6= uattOwner(userRolei(u))) is
true. Additionally, there is an object i.e., VM1 (from the object set O) owned by the domain,
d2. The policy related to VM1 states that a user with the member role of the d2 domain can
read fromVM1 (as described in ob jRole1,2(VM1)). To verify the owner of the role that policy
allows certain action on the object using the oattOwner(ob jRole1,2(VM1)) relation. In this
case, ob jOwner(o) 6= oattOwner(ob jRolei, j(o)) is false; hence, the property is preserved.
Since ABAC is more expressive, there might be a larger set of properties for ABAC (as
shown in Table 3.2). However, the verification complexity depends more on the security prop-
erties, and less on the model. For example, the common ownership, permitted action and min-
imum exposure properties show different level of complexities, as shown through their formal
representation and as supported by the experiment results in Section 3.5.
Properties Formalization for SSO. In the following, we present formalization steps of one
SSO related security property (i.e., user access revocation). The user access revocation property
is for the token-based user access. At a given time, for active tokens, we check that none of the
situations leading to their revocation has been occurred. Function TimeStamp(tok) returns the
token expiration time.
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∀tk ∈ Token,∀r ∈ Role,∀t ∈ Tenant, (5)





Thus, the corresponding CSP constraint is:




Evidences of Violations. Our auditing system using the formal verification tool, Sugar, indi-
vidually identifies the causes (a.k.a. counter examples) for each security property violated in
the cloud. With the following examples, we show how our system can locate the cause of the
violations.
Example 6 The CSP predicate for the common ownership property is as follows:
(and BelongsToD(u,d) AuthorizedR(u, t,r) (not Tenant- RoleDom(t,r,d))). The property
is violated when a user from one domain holds a tenant-role pair from another domain.
In other words, in case of a violation there exists at least a set of predicates as follows:
(and BelongsToD(u1,d1) AuthorizedR(u1, t2,r2) (notTenant-RoleDom(t2,r2,d1))); mean-
ing that the user, u1, from domain, d1, holds a role pair, t2-r2, which is not from domain,
d1. In such cases, our auditing system using Sugar identifies that the (u1, d1, t2, r2) tuple is
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the cause for a violation of the common ownership property. In Section 3.4, Example 7 further
extends this example to show concrete examples of evidences provided by our auditing system.
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we first illustrate the architecture of our system. We then detail our auditing
framework implementation and its integration into OpenStack along with the challenges that
we face and overcome.
3.4.1 Architecture
Figure 3.4 shows a high-level architecture of our runtime verification framework. It has three
main components: data collection and processing module, compliance verification module, and
dashboard & reporting module. In the following, we describe different engines inside the data
collection and processing module. The security property extractor identifies the sources of
required data for a list of security properties. The event intercepter intercepts each manage-
ment operation requested by the user in the cloud infrastructure system. The data collection
engine interacts mainly with the cloud management system, the cloud infrastructure system
(e.g., OpenStack), and elements in the data center infrastructure to collect various types of audit
data. Then the data processing engine aids to build the correlation and to uniform the collected
data. Our compliance verification module is responsible for the offline and runtime verification
using the formal verification and validation (V&V) tools and our custom algorithms. Finally,
the dashboard & reporting module interacts with the cloud tenant through the dashboard to ob-
tain the tenant requirements and to provide the tenant with the verification results in a report.
Tenant requirements encompass both general and tenant-specific security policies, applicable








Requirements (general/ tenant-specific security 




























Figure 3.4: A high-level architecture of our runtime verification framework
3.4.2 Integration into OpenStack
We focus mainly on three components in our implementation: the data collection and process-
ing module, the compliance verification module and dashboard & reporting module. In the
following, we first provide background on OpenStack, and then describe our implementation
details.
Background. OpenStack [89] is an open-source cloud infrastructure management platform in
which Keystone is its identity service, Neutron is its network component, Nova is its compute
component, and Ceilometer is its telemetry.
Data Collection Engine. The collection engine involves several components of OpenStack
e.g., Keystone and Neutron for collecting data from log files, policy files, different OpenStack
databases and configuration files from the OpenStack ecosystem to fully capture the config-
uration. We present hereafter different sources of data in OpenStack along with the current
support for auditing offered by OpenStack. The main sources of data in OpenStack are logs,
configuration files, and databases. Table 3.5 shows some sample data sources. The Open-
Stack logs are maintained separately for each service, e.g., Neutron, Keystone, in a direc-
tory named var/log/component_name, e.g., keystone.log and keystone_access.log are stored
in the var/log/keystone directory. Two major configuration files, namely, policy. json and
policy.v3cloudsample. json, contain policy rules defined by both the cloud provider and tenant
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Relations Sources of Data
AuthorizedOp user, assignment, role in Keystone database and
policy. json and policy.v3cloudsample. json
OwnerD user, assignment in Keystone database and policy. json
AuthorizedR user, tenant, assignment in Keystone database
BelongsToD user, domain tables in Keystone database
TenantRoleDom tenant, assignment, domain tables in Keystone
database
LoggedEntry keystone_access.log and Ceilometer database
ActiveToken Keystone database and keystone_access.log
Table 3.5: Sample data sources in OpenStack for relations in Table 3.4
admins, and are stored in the keystone/etc/ directory. The third source of data is a collection of
databases, hosted in a MySQL server, that can be read using component-specific APIs such as
Keystone and Neutron APIs. With the proper configuration of the OpenStack middleware, noti-
fications for specific events in Keystone, Neutron and Nova can be gathered from the Ceilometer
database.
The effectiveness of a verification solution critically depends on properly collected evi-
dences. Therefore, to be comprehensive in our data collection process, we firstly check fields
of all varieties of log files available in Keystone and more generally in OpenStack, all config-
uration files and all Keystone database tables (18 tables). Through this process, we identify all
possible types of data with their sources. Due to the diverse sources of data, there exist incon-
sistencies in formats of data. On the other hand, to facilitate verification, presenting data in a
uniform manner is very important. Therefore, we facilitate proper formatting within our data
processing engine.
Data Processing Engine. Our data processing engine, which is implemented in Python, mainly
retrieves necessary information from the collected data, converts it into appropriate formats, re-
covers correlation, and finally generates the source code for Sugar. First, our tool fetches the
necessary data fields from the collected data, e.g., identifiers, API calls, timestamps. Simi-
larly, it fetches access control rules, which contain API and role names, from policy. json and
policy.v3cloudsample. json files. In the next step, our processing engine formats each group of
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data as an n-tuple, i.e., (user, tenant, role, etc.). To facilitate verification, we additionally cor-
relate different data fields. In the final step, the n-tuples are used to generate the portion of the
Sugar’s source code, and the relationships for security properties (discussed in Section 3.3.4)
are also appended with the code. Different scripts are needed to generate the Sugar source code
for the verification of different properties, since relationships are usually property-specific.
The logs generated by each component of OpenStack usually lack correlation. Even though
Keystone processes authentication and authorization steps prior to a service access, Keystone
does not reveal any correlated data. Therefore, we build the data correlation support within
the processing engine. For an example, we infer the relation (user operation) from the avail-
able relations (user role) and (role operation). In our settings, we have 61,031 entries in the
(user role) relations for 60,000 users. The number of entries is larger than the number of users,
because there are some users with multiple roles. With the increasing number of users having
multiple roles, the size of this relation grows, and as a result, it increases the complexity of the
correlation step.
Initial Compliance Verification. The compliance verification module contains two major
modules responsible for the initial verification and runtime verification, respectively. The pre-
requisite formalization steps of the initial verification are already discussed in Section 3.3.4.
Here, we explain different parts of a Sugar source code through a simple example and verifica-
tion algorithm (as in Algorithm 1) in the following.
Listing 3.1: Sugar source code for the common ownership property
1 / / D e c l a r a t i o n
2 ( domain Domain 0 500) ( domain Tenan t 0 1000)
3 ( domain Role 0 1000) ( domain User 0 60000)
4 ( i n t D Domain ) ( i n t R Role )
5 ( i n t P Tenan t ) ( i n t U User )
6 / / R e l a t i o n s D e c l a r a t i o n s and Aud i t Data as t h e i r Suppo r t
7 ( r e l a t i o n BelongsToD 2 ( s u p p o r t s (100 401) (40569 123)
8 (102 452) (145 404) (156 487) (128 4 6 3 ) ) )
9 ( r e l a t i o n Au tho r i zedR 3 ( s u p p o r t s (100 301 225)
10 (40569 1233 9 ) (102 399 230) (101 399 2 3 1 ) ) )
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11 ( r e l a t i o n TenantRoleDom 3 ( s u p p o r t s (301 225 401)
12 (1233 9 335) (399 230 452) (399 231 4 5 2 ) ) )
13 / / S e c u r i t y P r o p e r t y : Common Ownership
14 ( p r e d i c a t e ( owner sh ip D R U P )
15 ( and ( Au tho r i zedR U P R ) ( BelongsToD U D)
16 ( no t ( TenantRoleDom P R D) ) ) )
17 ( owner sh ip D R U P )
Example 7 Listing 3.1 is the CSP code to verify the common ownership property. Each do-
main and variable are first declared (lines 2-5). Then, the set of involved relations, namely,
BelongsToD, AuthorizedR, and TenantRoleDom, are defined and populated with their support-
ing tuples (lines 7-12), where the support is generated from actual data in the cloud. Then,
the common ownership property is declared as a predicate, denoted by ownership, over these
relations (lines 14-16). Finally, the predicate is instantiated (line 17) to be verified. As we are
formalizing the negation of the properties, we are expecting the UNSAT result, which means
that all constraints are not satisfied (i.e., no violation of the property). Note that the predicate is
unfolded internally by the Sugar engine for all possible values of the variables, which allows to
verify each instance of the problem among possible values of domains, users and roles.
In this example, we also describe how a violation of the common ownership property may
be caught by our verification process. Firstly, our program collects data from different tables
in the Keystone database including users, assignments, and roles. Then, the processing engine
converts the collected data and represents as tuples; for our example: (40569 123) (40569
1233 9) (1233 9 335), where Mallory: 40569, Da: 123, Pb: 1233, member: 9 and Db: 335.
Additionally, the processing engine interprets the property and generates the Sugar source code
(as Listing 3.1) using processed data and translated property. Finally, the Sugar engine is used
to verify the security properties. The CSP predicate for the common ownership property is
as follows: (and BelongsToD(u,d) AuthorizedR(u, t,r) (not Tenant−RoleDom(t,r,d))). As
Mallory belongs to domain, Da, BelongsToD(Mallory,Da) evaluates to true. Mallory has been
authorized a tenant-role pair, (Pb,member), thus AuthorizedR(Mallory,Pb,member) evaluates
to true. However, TenantRoleDom(Pb,member,Da) evaluates to false, as the pair (Pb,member)
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does not belong to domain Da. Then, the whole ownership predicate unfolded for this case
is evaluated to true. In this case, the output of sugar is SAT, which confirms that Mallory
violates the common ownership property and further presents the cause of the violation, i.e.,
(d = 123,r = 9, t = 1233,u= 40569).
Algorithm 1 Runtime Compliance Verification
1: procedure INITIALIZE(Properties,CloudOS)
2: rawData = collectData(CloudOS)
3: verData = processData(rawData)
4: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
5: Resultt0,pi= Verify (pi,verData)
6: procedure RUNTIME(Event,Resultt0,Properties)
7: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
8: ∆i = processData(event.parameters)





14: procedure DELTAVERIFY(event,pi ,Resultt0,pi,∆i)
15: Resultt,pi = verify(pi,∆i)
Runtime Verification. Our runtime verification engine implements Algorithm 1. Firstly, the
interceptor module intercepts each management operation based on the existing intercepting
methods (e.g., audit middleware [90]) supported in OpenStack. Events are primarily created
via the notification system in OpenStack; Nova, Neutron, etc. emit notifications in a JSON for-
mat. Here, we leverage the audit middleware in Keystone to intercept Keystone, Neutron and
Nova events by enabling the audit middleware and configuring filters. Secondly, the data pro-
cessing engine handles the intercepted parameters to perform similar data processing operations
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as discussed previously. The processed data is denoted as ∆i. Finally, the runtime verification
engine performs incremental steps either using the deltaVerify method, which involves Sugar, or
custom algorithms. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the incremental steps for the common ownership
and permitted action properties, respectively.
There exist difficulties in locating relevant information, e.g., the initiator of Keystone API
calls is missing, and in obtaining adequate notifications from Ceilometer for Keystone events.
Therefore, to obtain sufficient and proper information about user events to conduct the auditing,
we collect Neutron notifications from the Ceilometer database.
Start
Event.name?
  Δi    Resultt0
Delete a roleGrant a role
Resultt = deltaVerify(Δi)
  Δi = Resultt0
Resultt = Resultt0
No Yes
Resultt = Resultt0 - Δi Resultt = No violation
End
No Yes
Figure 3.5: Showing the runtime steps for the common ownership property
Dashboard & Reporting Module. We further implement the web interface (i.e., dashboard) in
PHP to place audit requests and view audit reports. In the dashboard, tenant admins can initially
select different standards (e.g., ISO 27017, CCM V3.0.1, NIST 800-53, etc.). Afterwards,
security properties under the selected standards can be chosen. Additionally, admins can select
any of the following verification options: i) runtime verification, and ii) retroactive verification.
Once the verification request is processed, the summarized verification results are shown and
continuously updated in the verification report page. The details of any violation with a list of
evidences are also provided. Moreover, our reporting engine archives all the verification reports




  Δi    Resultt0  Δi    Resultt0
Delete a role Grant a role
Resultt = Resultt0 Resultt = Resultt0 - Δi
  Δi = Resultt0
Resultt = Resultt0
No NoYes Yes
Resultt = Resultt0 - Δi Resultt = No violationEnd
YesNo
Figure 3.6: Showing the runtime steps for the permitted action property
3.4.3 Integration to OpenStack Congress
To demonstrate the service agnostic nature of our framework, we further integrate our auditing
method with OpenStack Congress [88]. Congress implements policy as a service in OpenStack
in order to provide governance and compliance for dynamic infrastructure. Congress can inte-
grate third party verification tools using a data source driver mechanism. Using Congress policy
language that is based on Datalog, we define several tenant specific security policies as same as
security properties described in Section 3.2.2. We then use our processed data to detect those
security properties for multiple tenants. The outputs of the data processing engine in both cases
of initialization and runtime are in turn provided as inputs for Congress to be asserted by the
policy engine. This integrates compliance status for some policies whose verification is not yet
supported by Congress (e.g., permitted action and minimum exposure).
3.5 Experiments
This section evaluates the performance of this work by measuring the execution time, and mem-
ory and CPU consumption.
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Runtime Verification Retroactive Verification
Figure 3.7: Comparing the verification time required after each event for our system and the
retroactive approach (e.g., [73]) for the common ownership property. Here, E1=initialization,
E2=grant a role, E3=delete a role, E4=delete a user and E5=delete a tenant. The results are for
our largest dataset.
3.5.1 Experimental Settings
We collect data from the OpenStack setup inside a lab environment. Our OpenStack version is
Mitaka (2016.10.15) with Keystone API version v3. There are one controller node and three
compute nodes, each having Intel i7 dual core CPU and 2 GB memory with the Ubuntu 16.04
server. To make our experiments more realistic, we follow recently reported statistics (e.g., [92]
and [35]) to prepare our largest dataset consisting 100,000 users, 10,000 tenants, and 500 do-
mains. For verification, we use the V&V tool, Sugar V2.2.1 [105]. We conduct the experiment
for 12 different datasets in total. All data processing and V&V experiments are conducted on
a PC with 3.40 GHz Intel Core i7 Quad core CPU and 16 GB memory, and we repeat each
experiment 1,000 times.
3.5.2 Results
The objective of the first set of our experiments (see Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9) is to demon-
strate the time and memory efficiency of our solution, and to compare the performance with
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Runtime Verification Retroactive Verification
Figure 3.8: Comparing the verification time required after each event for our system and the
retroactive approach (e.g., [73]) for the permitted action property. Here, E1=initialization,
E2=grant a role, E3=delete a role, E4=delete a user and E5=delete a tenant. The results are
for our largest dataset.












Retroactive Verification Runtime Verification
Figure 3.9: Total size (in Kilo Bytes) of the data to be verified both for our approach and a naive
approach for different properties (where CO: common ownership, PA: permitted action, ME:
minimum exposure, C: cardinality, ND: no duplicate ID). The results are for our largest dataset.
47






















data processing verification data collection
Figure 3.10: Time required for each step during the initialization phase for the common owner-
ship property while varying the number of users. Time for the data collection (right) is shown
separately, as it is a one-time effort. In all cases, the number of domains is 500 and number of
tenants is 10,000.
a retroactive auditing approach similar as in [73]. Firstly, Figure 3.7 shows time in millisec-
onds required for our runtime verification framework for the common ownership property. Our
runtime verification requires a relatively expensive (i.e., about 2.5 seconds) initialization phase,
similar to that of the retroactive approach. Afterwards, our runtime approach takes less than 100
ms; whereas, the retroactive approach always takes 2.5 seconds. Secondly, Figure 3.8 compares
time in milliseconds required for verifying the permitted action property by our framework and
a retroactive verification method. For this property, we obtain results of the same nature as the
previous one i.e., requiring only a relatively expensive (i.e., about 3.5 seconds) initialization
phase followed by runtime verification costing maximum 500 ms. For the permitted action
property, after the delete a role event, a search for a certain role is performed; hence the verifi-
cation time reaches the maximum value. Otherwise, verification time is within 100 ms for both
properties. Finally, Figure 3.9 depicts the comparison between memory requirement for both
approaches while verifying different properties. The retroactive approach requires 12 MB to 17
MB space, as each time we have to load the whole verification data. Whereas, in the runtime
approach, mostly we perform verification only on the changed data, therefore it takes maximum
1 MB memory.
Our second set of experiments (see Figures 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15) is to
demonstrate the time efficiency of individual phases of our solution. Firstly, Figure 3.10 shows
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common ownership minimum exposure two properties
Figure 3.11: Total time required to perform the initialization phase for common ownership,
minimum exposure and both properties together, by varying the number of users with fixed
5,000 tenants (left) and the number of tenants with fixed 30,000 users (right). In all cases, the
number of domains is 500. Note that time in curves encompasses all three steps (collection,













Common ownership Permitted action
Figure 3.12: Total time required to perform the runtime phase of the common ownership and
permitted action properties, by varying the number of tenants with fixed 30,000 users. In all













Common ownership Permitted action
Figure 3.13: Total time required to perform the runtime phase of the common ownership and
permitted action properties, by varying the number of users with fixed 5,000 tenants. In all
cases, number of domains is 500.












Grant role Delete role Delete user Delete tenant
Figure 3.14: Time required to perform the runtime phase of the common ownership property
for different events, by varying the number of tenants with 10 users per tenant. In all cases,
number of domains is 500.
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Grant role Delete role Delete user Delete tenant
Figure 3.15: Time required to perform the runtime phase of the permitted action property for
different events, by varying the number of tenants with 10 users per tenant. In all cases, number
of domains is 500.
time in milliseconds required for data collection, data processing and compliance verification
during the initialization phase to verify the common ownership property for different cloud
sizes (e.g., the number of users). The obtained results show that the verification execution time
is less than two seconds for fairly large numbers of users. Knowing that this task is performed
only once upon each request, we believe that this is an acceptable overhead for verifying a
large setup. Figure 3.11 shows the total time required for separately performing the initializa-
tion phase for common ownership and minimum exposure properties, and also for both of the
properties together. We can easily observe that the execution time is not a linear function of
the number of security properties to be verified. In fact, we can see that verifying more se-
curity properties would not lead to a significant increase in the execution time. Figures 3.12
and 3.13 show the total time required for separately performing the runtime phase for common
ownership and permitted action properties for different cloud sizes. The obtained results sup-
port that the verification time for the permitted action (i.e., up to 500 ms) is more than that of
the common ownership (i.e., up to 100 ms). Figures 3.14 and 3.15 further depict the effects of
different events on the runtime phase for different security properties, while varying the number
of tenants up to 10,000. As our runtime phase is an incremental approach and verifies mainly
parameters of the events (as shown in Figure 3.9), the size of the cloud affects the verification
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time very less.












0-7s: data collection, 7-9s: data processing, 9-12s: verification
Figure 3.16: CPU usage for each step during the initialization phase over time with 60,000
users, 10,000 tenants and 500 domains for the common ownership property.












0-7s: data collection, 7-9s: data processing, 9-12s: verification
Figure 3.17: Memory usage for each step during the initialization phase over time with 60,000
users, 10,000 tenants and 500 domains for the common ownership property.
Our third experiment (see Figures 3.16, 3.18 and 3.20) measures the CPU usage (in %) dur-
ing the initialization and runtime phases. Figure 3.16 depicts the fact that the data collection step
requires significantly higher CPU usage than the other two steps. However, the average CPU
usage for data collection is 30%, which is reasonable since the verification process lasts only























Figure 3.18: Peak CPU usage to perform the initialization phase for the common ownership
property by varying the number of users with 10,000 tenants (left) and number of tenants with
60,000 users (right). In both cases, there are 500 domains.



























Figure 3.19: Peak memory usage to perform the initialization phase for the common ownership
property by varying the number of users with 10,000 tenants (left) and number of tenants with
60,000 users (right). In both cases, there are 500 domains.
can be verified through concurrent independent Sugar executions, we can easily parallelize this
task by running several instances of Sugar on different VMs in the cloud environment. Thus,
performing verification using the cloud or even with multiple servers possibly reduces the cost
significantly. For the other two steps, the CPU cost is around 15%. In Figure 3.18, we measure
the peak CPU usage (in %) consumed by different steps while verifying the common owner-
ship property. Accordingly, the CPU usage grows almost linearly with the number of users and
tenants. We observe a significant reduction in the increase rate of CPU usage for datasets with














Grant role Delete role Delete user Delete tenant
Figure 3.20: Peak CPU usage (left) and peak memory usage (right) to perform the runtime
phase of the common ownership property for different events, by varying the number of tenants
with 10 users per tenant. In all cases, the number of domains is 500.
the CPU cost is mainly influenced by the data collection step. Figure 3.20 shows that runtime
phase expectedly requires negligible CPU (i.e., up to 4.7%) in comparison to the initialization
phase.
Our final experiment (Figures 3.17, 3.19 and 3.21) measures the memory usage during
the initialization and runtime phases. Figure 3.17 shows that the data collection step is the
most costly in terms of memory usage. However, the highest memory usage observed during
this experiment is only 0.2%. Figure 3.19 shows that the rise in memory consumption is only
observed beyond 50,000 users (left) and 8,000 tenants (right). We investigated the peak in the
memory usage for 50,000 users and it seems that this is due to the internal memory consumption
by Sugar. Figure 3.21 depicts the memory usage by our runtime phase and further supports that
the runtime phase deals with significantly smaller data set (as also shown in Figure 3.9).
Although we report results for a limited set of security properties, the use of formal methods
for verifying these properties shows very promising results. Particularly, we show that the time
required for our solution grows very slowly with the number of security properties. As seen in
Figure 3.11, an additional security property adds only about three seconds to the initial effort.
Therefore, we anticipate that verifying a large list of security properties would still be practical.
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Grant role Delete role Delete user Delete tenant
Figure 3.21: Peak CPU usage (left) and peak memory usage (right) to perform the runtime
phase of the common ownership property for different events, by varying the number of tenants
with 10 users per tenant. In all cases, the number of domains is 500.
3.6 Discussion
Adapting to Other Cloud Platforms. Our solution is designed to work with most popu-
lar cloud platforms (e.g., OpenStack [89], Amazon EC2 [5], Google GCP [38], Microsoft
Azure [77]) with a minimal one-time effort. Once a mapping of the APIs from these platforms
to the generic event types are provided, rest of the steps in our auditing system are platform-
agnostic. Table 3.6 enlists some examples of such mappings.
Handling Extreme Situations. There might be some extreme cases where our solution may
act differently. For instance, if the cloud logging system fails resulting from any disruption
or failure in the cloud, then our auditing system will be affected. As in our threat model (in
Section 3.2.3), we assume that our solution relies on the correctness of the input data (including
the logs) from the cloud. Any other failure or disruption in the cloud must be detected by our
system. Also, if our system including the formal verification tool (e.g., Sugar) fails, till now
there is no self-healing or self-recovery feature. Therefore, in this extreme case, the efficiency
of the system will be affected and a full (instead of incremental) verification will be required to
recover from this failure.
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Table 3.6: Mapping event APIs of different cloud platforms to generic event types.
security property involves instantiating and solving the security property predicates for the af-
fected elements in the supports of the involved relations (as stated in Section 3.3.4). Therefore,
any modification to the system data resulted from cloud events (e.g., grant role, delete role, etc.)
would not directly change the security property expression itself although the corresponding
support may need to be changed. For example, if a role is granted, the only change is that
the relationships involving the entity role in the model would include a new element in their
supports.
3.7 Related Work
Table 4.6 compares existing related works for the cloud. Firstly, the existing approaches are
categorized into: retroactive, intercept-and-check and proactive. Secondly, these works mainly
cover three major levels: user, network and virtual infrastructure. Thirdly, we identify several
features to differentiate our work from others. The no-future-plan feature is checked when a
proactive or intercept-and-check approach does not require any future change plan; for retroac-
tive approaches this feature is not applicable (N/A). The first-order-logic feature is checked
when a work can verify any security property that is expressed in first order logic. We also
identify the works that support verification on RBAC, ABAC and SSO. Finally, the most works
are specifically designed for a particular cloud platform. In summary, our work differs from
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the existing works as follows. First, this work offers an intercept-and-check approach to audit
the user-level at runtime. Second, only our work supports security properties related to RBAC,
ABAC and SSO. Thirdly, our approach requires no future change plan for the verification pro-
cess. Finally, this work explains how it can be adapted to other cloud platforms.
Verifying security compliance in the cloud has recently been explored. For instance, in [70,
73], formal auditing approaches are proposed for retroactive security compliance checking in
the cloud. The works in [108, 24] also support retroactive auditing. Unlike our proposal, those
approaches can detect violations only after they occur, which may expose the system to high
risks. There are several works (e.g., [62, 60, 96]) offering runtime security check in the cloud.
VeriFlow [62] and NetPlumber [60] monitor network events and check network policies at run-
time to capture bugs before or as soon as they occur. Designing cloud monitoring services based
on security service-level agreements have been discussed in [96]. There are several other works
that target auditing data location and storage in the cloud (e.g., [110, 58, 51, 112]) and others
target infrastructure change auditing (e.g., [108, 25]).
Several existing efforts (e.g., [30, 2, 7, 47]) verify access control policies at the design time.
In most of these works, cloud-related user-level security properties are not considered. There
are some efforts (e.g., [36, 107, 3, 40]) towards proposing multi-domain/tenant access control
models. Gouglidis et al. [41] utilize model-checking to verify custom extensions of RBAC
with multi-domain against security properties. Lu et al. [68] use set theory to formalize policy
conflicts in the context of inter-operation in the multi-domain environment. In contrast to those
works, we are dealing with the verification of not only the policies but also their implementa-
tions, which involve efficient techniques to collect, process, and verify large amount of data at
runtime.
There are few other works (e.g., [71, 16, 88]) offering runtime security policy checking in
the cloud. Our previous work in [71] proactively verifies security compliance very efficiently
through pre-computation by utilizing dependency models. However, there are several proper-
ties (e.g., minimum exposure, proper constraint checking, session time-out) which cannot be
captured through the dependency models. On the other hand, this work is capable of verifying a
wider range of properties. Weatherman [16] aims at mitigating misconfigurations and enforcing
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CloudRadar [15] - • - - - • N/A - - - - - - • -
Weatherman [16] - • • - - • - - - - - - - • -
Majumdar et al. [73] • - - • - - N/A • • - - • - - -
Madi et al. [70] • - - - • • N/A • - - - • - - -
Majumdar et al. [71] - • • • • • • - • - - • - - -
Doelitzscher et al. [25] • - - - - • N/A - - - - • - - -
Ullah et al. [108] • - - - - • N/A - - - - • - - -
Congress [88] • • • • • • - - - - - • - - -
SecGuru [12] • - - - • - N/A • - - - - • - -
QRadar [49] • - - • • • N/A - - - • - - • -
This work - • - • - - • • • • • • - - •
Table 3.7: Comparing different existing solutions. The symbol (•) indicates that the proposal offers the corresponding feature.
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security policies in a virtualized infrastructure. However, expensive computations after each
critical event causes significant delay. Our work overcomes this limitation by using incremental
verification. Congress [88] is an OpenStack project offering similar features as Weatherman.
Several industrial efforts include solutions to support auditing in specific cloud environments.
For instance, SecGuru [12] audits Microsoft Azure datacenter using the SMT solver Z3. IBM
provides a monitoring tool integrated with QRadar [49], to collect and analyze events in the
cloud. Amazon offers web API logs and metric data to their AWS clients by AWS CloudWatch
& CloudTrail [6] to facilitate auditing. Although those efforts may assist auditing tasks, we
support a wider set of user-level security properties.
3.8 Conclusion
Despite existing efforts, runtime security auditing in cloud still faces many challenges. In this
work, we proposed a runtime security auditing framework for the cloud with special focus on
the user-level including different access control and authentication mechanisms e.g., RBAC,
ABAC and SSO, and we implemented and evaluated the framework based on OpenStack, a
popular cloud management system. Our experimental results showed that our incremental ap-
proach in runtime verification reduces the response time to a practical level (e.g., less than 500
milliseconds to verify 100,000 users). This response time is satisfactory when the management
operations are manually done by the administrators. The current approach would be insufficient
to provide the same response time in the case of batch execution for management operations,
when these operations are executed in short intervals and if the subsequent operations impact the
same property. As future work, to address this use case, we consider maintaining a scheduler
including an event queue with different threads for different tasks in order to verify proper-
ties concurrently and therefore reduce the response time in this case. Also, verifying sequence
of events, in addition to our current method of verifying single event, may further reduce the
impact of this concern. Furthermore, currently we do not consider any incorrectness in the
formalization of the security properties. In out future work, we intend to address this concern
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by validating these formalizations through unit-test-like approaches. Additionally, in our cur-
rent method, an update in the security property requires to re-launch the auditing process from




Proactive Security Auditing through
Caching and Pre-Computation
4.1 Introduction
The multi-tenant and self-service nature of clouds usually implies significant operational com-
plexity, which may prepare the floor for misconfigurations and vulnerabilities leading to viola-
tions of security compliance. Therefore, the security auditing w.r.t. security standards, policies,
and properties, is desirable to both cloud providers and users. Evidently, the Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) has recently introduced the Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) for
security assurance in clouds, which defines three levels of certifications (self-auditing, third-
party auditing, and continuous, near real-time verification of security compliance) [19]. How-
ever, above-mentioned complexities coupled with the sheer size of clouds (e.g., a decent-size
cloud is said to have around 1,000 tenants and 100,000 users [92]) implies one of the main
challenges in cloud security auditing, specifically the scalability and response time, especially
in near real-time verification of security compliance.
To this end, existing approaches can be roughly divided into three categories (a more de-
tailed review of related work will be given in Section 4.7). First, the retroactive approaches
(e.g., [70, 73]) catch compliance violations after the fact by verifying different configurations
and logs of the cloud. As a result, they cannot prevent security breaches from propagating or
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causing potentially irreversible damages (e.g., leaks of confidential information or denial of
service). Second, the intercept-and-check approaches (e.g., [16, 88]) verify the compliance of
each user request before either granting or denying it, which may lead to a substantial delay to
users’ requests, as will be further illustrated later in this section. Third, the proactive approaches
in [16, 88] verify user requests in advance, and somewhat overcome the limitations of first two
approaches.
However, existing proactive solutions still pose following limitations. i) To avoid the sig-
nificant delay at runtime, existing works (e.g., Weatherman [16]) alternatively require a future
change plan (which means configuration changes scheduled in near future) in advance from the
tenant admins; however, this requirement is not always practical for cloud due to its dynamic
and ad-hoc nature. ii) Moreover, non-optimization of the verification effort (e.g., repeated com-
putation for recurrent events) results longer response time for the existing methods. iii) Fur-
thermore, current proactive solutions (e.g., [16, 71]) fully rely on cloud tenants in providing a
complete list of security critical events (i.e., events that potentially may lead to a violation) to
ensure accurate proactive auditing; which lacks adaptability and may be error-prone and tedious
for tenants. iv) Finally, concurrent event instances at runtime may cause malfunctions in some
proactive auditing methods (e.g., [71]).
Motivating Example. Through this example, we further illustrate the above-mentioned limi-
tations and motivate our solution. Fig. 4.1 depicts three timelines (showing different steps of
typical retroactive and intercept-and-check approaches, and our proactive solution, respectively)
with a sequence of three cloud events. Among those events, the update port is the critical event,
which can potentially breach a security property. Here, we consider the “no bypass” security
property for the anti-spoofing mechanisms in the cloud, which can be violated by real world
vulnerabilities (e.g., OpenStack vulnerability [86] 1). We highlight the major limitations of the
existing approaches and position our solution as follows.
• A typical retroactive auditing is conducted periodically (e.g., at time t2 and t3) within a cer-
tain interval, and such auditing usually takes several seconds (e.g., eight seconds for auditing
1OpenStack [89] is an open-source cloud management platform.
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10,000 tenants as reported in [70, 73]); which allow attackers to exploit the vulnerable sys-
tems for a considerable amount of time with irreversible damages (e.g., DoS and leakage of
sensitive information).
• A typical intercept-and-check approach overcomes the above-mentioned limitation of retroac-
tive auditing, however, it starts the verification only after the update port event occurs, and
thus results in a significant delay (e.g., four minutes as reported in [16]).
• To avoid such runtime delay, existing proactive approaches (e.g., [16, 88]) require a future
change plan (e.g., create port, create VM (2) and update port) before time t0. However,
providing such a concrete future plan in advance is not always practical considering the
dynamic and ad-hoc nature of cloud.
• Moreover, previous proactive solutions assume that a comprehensive list of critical events
(e.g., update port) are known in advance. This assumption might not be practical, and it
does not adapt to dynamically changing security requirements. Also, current solutions do
not provide any practical method to identify such critical events (out of more than 400 cloud
event types [89]); This limitation may lead to an incomplete list of critical events which later
may affect the accuracy of the proactive auditing.
• Finally, current solutions would treat the two consecutive occurrences of the VM creation
event (denoted as create VM (2) event in Fig. 4.1) as independent events and repeat almost
the same pre-computation tasks.
In this work, we propose a proactive security auditing system, namely, ProSAS, which ad-
dresses above-mentioned limitations and hence, provides significant improvements in both ef-
ficiency and accuracy of runtime auditing. The efficiency improvement is mainly achieved by
performing costly verification steps proactively, as soon as the system is a few steps ahead of
a critical event. The efficiency is further improved by reducing the efforts for recurrent events
with the use of a caching mechanism, which keeps track of our proactive steps on recently oc-
curred events. Additionally, unlike existing proactive solutions, ProSAS can handle concurrent
events in a sequential manner using a locking mechanism. On the other hand, the better accu-
racy of ProSAS is possible as we no longer only rely on initial identification of security critical


























Figure 4.1: Comparison of the execution time of our solution with the typical intercept-and-
check and retroactive approaches.
using cloud states (e.g., configurations) to progressively improve the list of critical events.
The main contributions of our work are as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first pre-computation-based proactive security audit-
ing approach for clouds. As demonstrated by our implementation and experimental results,
the proposed system, ProSAS, provides an automated, efficient, and scalable solution for
different cloud platforms to increase their transparency and accountability to tenants.
• ProSAS requires significantly less time than any existing proactive solutions to audit. First,
our dependency models help to identify the relationship between cloud events, and to dis-
tribute the verification overhead over the chain of events to improve the efficiency of the sys-
tem. Second, the ProSAS caching mechanism significantly optimizes the pre-computation
and verification efforts in case of recurrent events.
• Unlike existing proactive approaches, ProSAS provides a higher rate of accuracy by using an
adaptive and more comprehensive way of critical event identification. To this end, ProSAS
provides a hybrid solution where a proactive auditing system is supported by a retroactive
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auditing tool at the backend to more accurately identify critical events over time.
4.2 Models
This section defines our threat model and presents the dependency models.
4.2.1 Threat Model
We assume that the cloud infrastructure management systems i) may have implementation
flaws, misconfigurations and vulnerabilities that can be potentially exploited to violate security
properties specified by the cloud tenants, and ii) may be trusted for the integrity of the API
calls, event notifications, logs and database records (existing techniques on trusted computing
and remote attestation may be applied to establish a chain of trust from TPM chips embedded
inside the cloud hardware, e.g., [10, 64, 101, 102]). Though our framework may assist to avoid
any violation of specified security properties due to either misconfigurations or exploits of vul-
nerabilities, our focus is not to detect specific attacks or intrusions. We focus on attacks directed
through the cloud management interfaces (e.g., CLI and GUI), and any violation bypassing such
interfaces is beyond the scope of this work. Our proactive solution mainly targets certain secu-
rity properties, which would require a sequence of operations. To make our discussions more
concrete, the following shows an example of in-scope threats based on a real vulnerability.
Running Example. Real world vulnerabilities, such as the one in OpenStack [86]1, can be
exploited to bypass anti-spoofing mechanisms. These mechanisms are implemented in Open-
Stack using firewall rules enforcing tenants’ layer 3 network isolation. Fig. 4.2 shows the attack
scenario to exploit this vulnerability. The exploit consists in changing the device owner (step 3
in Fig. 4.2) of an instance’s port to a string starting with the word network, right after the in-
stance is created (steps 1 & 2) and just before security group gets attached to it (race condition).
As a result, the firewall rules of the compute node are not applied to that port, since it is treated
as a network owned port. Consequently, a malicious tenant can launch IP, MAC, and DHCP
spoofing attacks (step 4).
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Figure 4.2: An exploit of a vulnerability in OpenStack [86], leading to bypassing the anti-
spoofing mechanism.
4.2.2 Dependency Models
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the two dependency models that we derive for an OpenStack-
managed cloud covering virtual infrastructure (Fig. 4.3) and user access control (Fig. 4.4). Each
dependency model can be used for proactively auditing multiple security properties. We vali-
date these dependency models based on extensive study of OpenStack APIs [91] from different
related OpenStack services (e.g., Neutron, Nova, and Keystone) and Open vSwitch [32]. For
the user access control model, we are inspired by the OSACmodel by Tang et al. [107]. To build
intuitions of these models, we start by providing an example on how the cloud infrastructure
dependency model (see Fig. 4.3) allows us to relate actual management operations or events
happening in the cloud to the “no bypass” security property presented in Section 4.2.1.
Example 8 According to the attack scenario presented in Fig. 4.2, the critical management
operation that leads to the violation of the “no bypass” security property is update port.
The model in Fig. 4.3 includes port (vertex 15) and VM (vertex 17). The vertex
16 is a specific vertex grouping a port and a subnet pair. The update port operation is
related to the entity port (vertex 15 in Fig. 4.3). As it can be seen in Fig. 4.3, update
port depends on other operations, such as create port (edge (12,15)) and create
VM (edge 16, 17). More precisely, create VM attaches a port (vertex 15) on a subnet





































Figure 4.3: Dependency model of cloud infrastructure
As the create port and create VM operations are closely related to the actual crit-
ical operation (update port), our model captures this dependency relationship and aids to
avoid the security violation by starting preparation from the create port operation. Fur-
thermore, these operations in turn depend on the existence or creation of a subnet, a network
and a tenant. This induces a chain of dependencies between a set of events that could be related
to this security property.
Formally, the dependency model is a graph, G = (V,E), where vertices Vi are individual
cloud entities (e.g., user, role, tenant, port, VM, etc.) or groups of entities (e.g., (port, subnet)
pair) and edges Ei j are dependency relationships between connected vertices. These relation-

























Figure 4.4: Dependency model of access control management
(port, subnet) pair, etc.). We use edges’ attributes to store information on which security prop-
erty are associated with the events that are related to the edge and on the type of this event
per property. We define four kinds of relationships. We use different types of edges (unidi-
rectional, bidirectional, or non-directional) to differentiate the following relationships based on
their semantics.
• Precedence relation, represented by a unidirectional edge, such that Ei j = (Vi,Vj) denotes
that the entity Vi must exist before creating entity Vj withinVi.
• Association relation, represented by a bidirectional edge, such that Ei j = (Vi,Vj) denotes that
entities Vi and Vj should both exist (i.e., created) to be able to make any association between
them.
• Mapping relation, represented by a non-directional edge, such that Ei j = {Vi,Vj} denotes
a correspondence relationship between entities Vi and Vj existing in different layers in the
cloud.
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• Reflexive relation (omitted in the graph), representing a relation from a node to itself such as
updating attributes of the node.
We leverage the knowledge captured by these dependencies to appropriately identify the
intercepted events, relate them to the security property, identify their roles in the context of
proactive compliance verification, and determine the distance to a critical state. More details
are provided in Section 4.3. It is worth noting that these models are static and do not depend on
the execution context of the cloud. They consist of a relatively small set of entities and relation-
ships. For example, for Neutron, Nova, and Keystone services, we enumerated only 86 different
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Table 4.1: An excerpt of the security properties supported by the cloud infrastructure model
with their corresponding critical and watchlist events, and the watchlist contents.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 enlist excerpts of the security properties supported by the cloud infras-
tructure dependency model. Here, we categorize events mainly into two types: critical event
(CE) and watchlist event (WE). A CE (e.g., update port) potentially leads to the violation
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of the associated property. A WE corresponds to an event that impacts the content of the watch-
list associated with the security property (e.g., create port and create VM). The third
type of event is the trigger event (TE), which is neither critical nor watchlist-related, however is
useful to determine the distance to a critical state. Note that an event may have multiple types
considering different security properties. For example, create VM is a WE event for the no
bypass property, but it is of type CE for the no co-residency property.
4.3 Proactive Security Auditing System (ProSAS)
This section details our proactive security auditing system.
4.3.1 Overview
The security auditing process of ProSAS involves following major steps. First, we intercept
every cloud management event instance at runtime, and identify the type (i.e., critical or non-
critical) of the intercepted event. Second, for a non-critical event, (without holding the inter-
cepted event blocked) we consult the pre-computation cache, which stores recently occurred
event types for which pre-computation is required and their corresponding actions to be per-
formed, so that ProSAS can pre-compute the necessary conditions and build the watchlist in-
crementally. In case, the intercepted event type is not in the cache, the pre-computation is only
performed, if the distance of this event type from a critical event is less than a user-defined
threshold (how to set this threshold is discussed later). Third, for a critical event, (while holding
the intercepted event blocked) ProSAS verifies the parameters of the intercepted event consult-
ing the verification cache, which stores recently updated entries of the watchlist, and enforces
the decision (e.g., allow or deny) accordingly. In case the event type is not in the cache, we
check the whole watchlist and enforces the result. Fourth, we identify new critical events (if
any) mainly by periodically verifying the cloud configurations using a state-based verification
tool (e.g., [70, 73]) and analyzing cloud logs so that ProSAS can progressively improve its
accuracy.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates an overview of ProSAS. The inputs to ProSAS are security properties and
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Table 4.2: An excerpt of the security properties supported by the access control management
dependency model shown in Fig. 4.4 with their corresponding critical events, watchlist-related
events, and the content of the watchlists.
their corresponding critical events, and the output is the decision (allow/deny/warn) for each
intercepted cloud events to enforce the compliance. In ProSAS, there exist four major compo-



































Figure 4.5: An overview of ProSAS
situates as a middleware within the cloud platform to intercept each cloud event instance for
different cloud services, e.g., compute, network, storage, etc., to identify the type of the inter-
cepted event, and after the verification process, to enforce the decision (e.g., allow or deny). The
caching manager is mainly responsible to maintain two different caches for pre-computation and
verification, respectively. In case the intercepted event type is found in the cache, ProSAS skips
the steps in the proactive module, and responds more quickly. Otherwise, the caching manager
forwards the intercepted event type and its parameters to the proactivemodule. Additionally, the
caching manager manages a queue in cases an event occurs before the previous one is processed
by ProSAS. The proactive module contains initializer, pre-computation manager and proactive
verifier. First, the initializer takes a one-time effort to process the ProSAS inputs and initialize
the conditions for verification. Second, the pre-computation manager incrementally updates the
required conditions to preserve the security compliance. Third, the proactive verifier verifies
the parameters of a critical event based on the pre-computed results and provides a decision
to enforce compliance. The feedback manager is responsible to identify new critical events
by leveraging existing state-based auditing methods (e.g., [70, 73]) to progressively enrich and
update the initial inputs of critical events to ProSAS.
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4.3.2 Interceptor
At runtime, our system intercepts all event instances performed in the cloud. The interceptor is
implemented as a middleware, which is placed between the tenants and different cloud services,
e.g., compute, network, storage, identity, etc. Usually, the intercepted event instances provide
implementation specific details. Therefore, with the help of the Event-operation table,
we identify the corresponding event type (so that the remaining steps in ProSAS become cloud-
platform-agnostic). Table 4.3 shows an excerpt of such mapping. We also identify the criticality
(i.e., CE, WE or TE) of the intercepted event type from the Model-event table. Only if the
intercepted event is critical, then we halt the event request till the verification is performed.
Otherwise, the event request is immediately processed. Additionally, the position of the event
type in the dependency model is identified so that the next step can measure the distance from
a critical event.
OpenStack Event Instances Event Types of ProSAS
POST /v2/servers HTTP/1.1 Create VM
POST /v2/os-security-groups HTTP/1.1 Create security group
GET /v2/os-security-groups HTTP/1.1 Eliminated
Table 4.3: Examples of OpenStack event instances and converted event types in ProSAS.
4.3.3 Caching Manager
The main responsibility of the caching manager is to prescribe necessary actions (if possible)
through a caching mechanism to both proactive verifier and pre-computation manager. Main-
taining the caching is performed in three steps: i) to build a cache storing actions performed
by ProSAS for recent cloud events during the pre-computation and verification steps, ii) to
consult the cache for the currently intercepted event, and iii) based on the cache search result,
either to perform the actions (e.g., deciding verification result) by itself, or to trigger the nec-
essary module (e.g., pre-computation manager or proactive verifier) to perform certain actions
(e.g., inserting into the watchlist or verifying the watchlist). To this end, the caching man-
ager maintains two kinds of cache: one for pre-computation and another for verification. The
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pre-computation cache has three attributes: recent events, the condition to check whether the
distance is less than the threshold (i.e., N-cp < N-th), and how a watchlist update (add or re-
move) is performed. If the condition is false (i.e., N-cp > N-th), then obviously no action has
been taken for the event. In case of a miss of the cache, all steps of the n-step evaluator are
performed. On the other hand, the verification cache stores the recent critical events and re-
cently added or removed watchlist contents for the corresponding critical event. A hit in the
cache allows the caching manager to provide the verification result without the involvement of
the proactive verifier. Otherwise, the caching manager triggers the proactive verifier to perform
the verification step. The efficiency improvement due to our caching manager is evaluated in
Section 4.5. Additionally, the caching manager includes a first in first out (FIFO) event queue
to sequentially process concurrent events.
Recent Events N-cp < N-th Actions Taken
Create VM No -
Update Port Yes Insert into no_bypass watchlist
Delete VM Yes Remove from no_downgrade watchlist
Table 4.4: An excerpt of a pre-computation cache
Example 9 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show excerpts of pre-computation and verification caches, re-
spectively. Table 4.4 depicts three different cases in the pre-computation caching. First, the
create VM event is further than the threshold, and no pre-computation has been performed.
Second, the update port event is close enough to perform an insert into the watchlist for
the no bypass security property. Third, similarly for the delete VM event, the content from
the watchlist of the no downgrade property is removed. Table 4.5 shows an excerpt of the ver-
ification cache, which stores the recently added and removed contents to/from the no_bypass
and no_downgrade watchlists for the update port, add/delete security group
rule events. To project the functionality of the verification cache, we depict three intercepted
events: add security group rule (2537), update port (1321) and delete
security group rule (2115) as follows. First, LeaPS allows the add security
group rule (2537) event just by checking the verification cache, as the VM ID 2537 is
present in the recently added attribute. Second, LeaPS denies the update port (1321)
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event similarly, as the port ID 1321 is found in the recently removed list. Third, LeaPS re-
quires to check further in the full watchlist to verify the delete security group rule
(2115) event, as the VM ID 2115 is not in the cache.
Recent Events Recently Added Recently Removed
Update Port Port IDs: 1257, 1421, 1109 Port IDs: 2311, 1765, 1321
Add Security Group Rule VM IDs: 1788, 2537, 1733 VM IDs: 1921, 2139, 1165
Delete Security Group Rule VM IDs: 1921, 2139, 1165 VM IDs: 1788, 2537, 1733
Table 4.5: An excerpt of a verification cache
4.3.4 Proactive Module
The proactive module is mainly responsible for the proactive verification steps including initial-
ization and incremental update of the pre-computed results (including watchlists), and verifica-
tion of watchlists. In the following, we elaborate its different modules.
Initializer. The role of the initializer module is to process the ProSAS inputs, to collect neces-
sary data from different cloud services (e.g., compute, network and storage), and to pre-process
the data in order to initialize the conditions for the verification. More specifically, this module
initializes following tables.
• Event-operation: maps event types to operations in different cloud environment to
easily integrate different cloud implementations.
• Model-event: relates each security property with the elements of the dependency
models and tenant inputs including the types of events.
• Property-WL: stores the specification of the contents in a watchlist for each security
property.
• Property-N-thresholds:maps security properties and their associated thresholds
(denoted as N-th), where thresholds are security-property-specific and inputs from the
administrators. A brief guideline on choosing this threshold is provided in Section 4.6.
• Model-N-property: stores all possible values of N (denoted as N-cp) for each prop-
erty.
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Furthermore, this module initializes the watchlist content with the current cloud context.
    Property                        Event   Model   Type         
No anti-spoofing bypass  create port  12->15  WE  
No anti-spoofing bypass  create vm   16->17  WE       
No anti-spoofing bypass  update port    15      CE     
                              Model-event
 Event          OP-OpenStack     OP-VMWare  
create port  neutron port-create  AddPortGroup               
update port neutron port-update UpdatePortGroup
create vm   nova boot                 CreateVM_Task
        Event-operation
 Security Property           N-th         
 No anti-spoofing bypass   3  
Property-N-thresholds
  Property    Path        N         
No bypass       3            4     
No bypass     3-12         3       
No bypass  3-12-15       2













Figure 4.6: The output of the initializer module for the no bypass property.
Example 10 Figure 4.6 shows the outcome of the initializer module for the no bypass prop-
erty. The Event-operation table shows that the create port event corresponds to the
neutron port-create operation in OpenStack. The Model-event table stores that the
create port event is the watchlist event (WE) for the no bypass property and situates at
the edge between nodes 12 and 15 in the dependency model. Also, the critical event update
port for the property with its position (i.e., the node 15) in the dependency model is stored
in this table. Other events of type TE, such as create network and create subnet,
are not shown in the figure. The minimal distance from the critical event at which our so-
lution should react is (N-th = 3), as shown in the Property-N-thresholds table. The
Model-N-property table stores all possible computed values of N taking into account the
security property and the dependency model. Finally, the watchlist is initialized for the no
bypass property based on data collected from the cloud. For each tenant, the watchlist is pop-
ulated with the list of virtual ports that are not attached to a VM as in the Property-WL
table.
Pre-Computation Manager. This module is in charge of pre-computing N, which consists
in traversing the dependency graph for each security property from the edge corresponding to
its critical event backward until reaching the root node of the graph, finding out all dependent
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events and entities and storing pre-computed values of N for each possible configuration in
the Model-N-property table. A configuration is an abstract state that allows to determine,
whether the entities that the security properties depend on, actually exist. The minimal distance
to the critical event from the root node is the total number of events that the critical event
depends on. This distance represents N-max, the maximal value of N from which we can apply
our proactive approach for this property. The minimum value of N is 1 and it corresponds to the
configuration where the next event to be observed is possibly the critical event.
Example 11 For the no bypass property, the Model-N-property table stores five entries
that cover all possible values of N and the associated configuration (see Fig. 4.7). For instance,
if only a tenant already exists (vertex 3) without yet any network, subnet, ports, and VMs, we
need to observe at least five events before being able to intercept the critical event update
port. If we observe an event for the creation of network within this tenant (i.e., edge (3,12))
without yet any subnet, ports, and VMs, the minimal distance to see the update port event
would be N = 4. The event preceding update port is the create VM (i.e., edge (16,17))

































Figure 4.7: A part of the cloud infrastructure dependency model annotated with all possible
values of N that is relevant to the no bypass property.
77
N-Step Evaluator. The N-step evaluator evaluates at runtime the value of N-cp, which is
the estimated minimal distance from the current event to a violation, whenever the intercepted
event type is a non-critical event (i.e., WE or TE) concerning a given security property. To this
end, the related contextual data (e.g., corresponding tenant, network, subnet, etc.) is gathered
from the cloud to determine the path to be selected from the Model-N-property table.
Thus, we can measure the distance (i.e., N-cp) considering the current context. When the N-
cp becomes equal to the threshold value (N-th), ProSAS starts being proactive and updates
the pre-computation results corresponding to the security property with the current state of the
cloud. Afterwards (i.e., N-cp < N-th), whenever a WE event type is encountered, some pre-
computation (e.g., updating watchlist using the values of the parameters of the intercepted event
instance) is incrementally performed to ensure that the pre-computation result is up-to-date.
Proactive Verifier. The verifier is designed in a way so that by leveraging the pre-computed re-
sults it can perform the verification fast and provides the verification result in a practical time, as
ProSAS halts the requested critical event. The verification of ProSAS mainly involves search-
ing a set of values (e.g., values of the event parameters) in the corresponding watchlist. The
verification decision is either to allow the operation to continue or apply the planned enforce-
ment approach as specified by the administrator. The possible enforcement could be denying
the request or requiring an approval from the admin to execute the event.
Example 12 Figure 4.8 illustrates the runtime workflow for the no bypass property assuming
that a tenant, a network and a subnet already exist. To rectify the situation described in the
running example, our solution incrementally builds a watchlist with ports that are not attached
to VMs, and verifies the update port operation with this watchlist. Firstly, we intercept the
create port ID 1187 operation, identifies the event type (which is WE), and measure
the value of N (= 3), respectively, from the Model-event and Property-N-threshold
tables. Since the create port event is a WE event for the no bypass property and evaluating
N results in N-cp = N-th = 3, we add port ID 1187 to the watchlist without blocking it.
Secondly, we intercept create VM ID 127 attached to port ID 1187 operation
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Figure 4.8: An excerpt of runtime verification of the no bypass property.
attached to VM ID 127. Finally, after intercepting the update port(port ID 1187,
deviceOwner, network) operation and measuring N, we identify that this is a CE event.
Therefore, we verify with the watchlist with blocking the operation, find that port ID 1187
is not in the watchlist, and hence, ProSAS recommends denial of this operation to preserve the
no bypass property.
4.3.5 Feedback Manager
The feedback manager is an interactive process in ProSAS to improve the list of critical events
progressively over time; which mainly follows four major steps.
Step 1: The first step is to run a retroactive auditing tool (e.g., [70, 73]), periodically. Note that
these retroactive auditing tools are state-based, and therefore, do not rely on a list of critical
events. A violation detected at this step means that the corresponding critical event to the
violation is not yet included to ProSAS.
Step 2: The next step is to collect data from a specific service(s) based on the detected violation
of a security property in Step 1. During this step, ProSAS collects event logs from the specific
cloud service(s) (e.g., network, compute and storage).
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Step 3: The third step is to filter out irrelevant events from the collected logs to prepare a
shortlist of candidate critical events for the violation detected in Step 1. This step first keeps only
those events that occurred between last two verifications in Step 1, because the critical event
must have occurred within this period. Furthermore, the irrelevant events such as generated by
interfaces and not by cloud users are also eliminated from the logs. Thus, we prepare a shortlist
for the next step.
Step 4: The final step is to identify the responsible critical event for the violation. This final
step involves an expert, who identifies the critical event that violates a security property from


















Figure 4.9: The steps of the feedback manager module
Example 13 Figure 4.9 depicts the steps of our feedback manager. First, ProSAS periodically
collects cloud snapshots (e.g., at time t1 and t2), and verifies the no bypass property using one
of our retroactive auditing tools (e.g., [70, 73]). At time t1, there is no violation of the property,
however, at time t2, our retroactive auditing tool finds a violation. Second, the feedback manager
collects logs from the network service of the cloud for the period of t1− t2; as we are sure that
the critical event that caused this violation happens within this period. Third, ProSAS filters out
all events with the GET requests, because these events are interface generated to show lists of
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different resources on the interface. Finally, ProSAS presents a shortlist of events to an expert,
who finally identifies update port as the responsible critical event for the violation of the
no bypass property.
4.4 Implementation
This section describes how we integrate ProSAS into OpenStack.
4.4.1 Architecture
Figure 4.10 shows a high-level architecture of ProSAS. ProSAS consists of four major compo-
nents: dashboard & reporting engine, interceptor, verification engine and pre-computation en-
gine. The dashboard & reporting engine provides an interface to ProSAS users. The main users
of ProSAS are cloud tenants, who provide customized security properties and other ProSAS
configurations (e.g., a list of critical events and watchlist attributes) through the dashboard.
ProSAS maintains a repository to provide auditing reports to its users. The ProSAS interceptor
is placed within the cloud as a middleware, in between the cloud dashboard or command line
ProSAS Inputs (tenant-specific security properties, critical events and 
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Figure 4.10: A high-level architecture of ProSAS
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interface and different services (e.g., Nova, Neutron, Swift, etc. in OpenStack). This module
intercepts all tenant initiated events and forwards them to ProSAS for a runtime verification,
and enforces the verification results (e.g., allow or deny). In the verification engine, the caching
manager contains caches and event queue, N-step evaluator measures N for each critical event
from the intercepted event using cloud context, which is actually populated from the current
cloud configurations (e.g., OpenStack database), and the proactive verifier queries watchlist
databases to verify the parameters of the intercepted events. The pre-computation engine first
initializes all watchlist databases for different databases storing the cloud configurations (e.g.,
OpenStack databases), then incrementally updates those watchlists based on the parameters
of intercepted events, and also progressively learns new critical events by executing a formal
verification tool (e.g., Sugar [106]) on cloud configurations (e.g., OpenStack databases).
4.4.2 Integration into OpenStack
Background. OpenStack [89] is an open-source cloud infrastructure management platform
that is being used almost in half of private clouds and significant portions of the public clouds
(see [21] for detailed statistics). Keystone [89] is the OpenStack identity service for authenti-
cation and authorization. Keystone implements the RBAC model [100]. Neutron [89] provides
tenants with capabilities to build networking topologies through the exposed APIs. Nova [89] is
the OpenStack project designed to provide on-demand access to compute resources, and relies
on VMs.
Interceptor Middleware. The interceptor module, which is implemented in Python, intercepts
operations based on the existing intercepting methods (e.g., audit middleware [90]) supported
in OpenStack. We intercept event instances requested to the Nova service as they are passed
through Nova pipeline, having the ProSAS middleware inserted in the pipeline. The body
of requests, contained in the wsgi.input attribute of the intercepted requests, is scrutinized to
identify the type of requested events. Also, we map all operations in OpenStack API [91]
corresponding to the events that are relevant to the monitored security properties. Finally, the
interceptor determines the criticality of the current event, and forwards the intercepted event
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details (e.g., type and parameters) to the caching manager.
Caching Manager. The caching manager, which is mainly implemented in Python, consults
any of the pre-computation and verification caches. We implement two types of caching mech-
anisms: least recent update (LRU) and most recent update (MRU). Both cache memories are
implemented as hash maps, and the management of caches is maintained using doubly linked
list. Hash map maintains records of data in form of key value pairs in which data is stored in
value, and key is the hash value. If it is a hit in the cache, then we either perform the veri-
fication based on the cache entry or at least obtain information about the pre-computation to
skip the N-step evaluator, and directly conduct the pre-computation (if necessary). To handle
the concurrent events, we leverage the Python library EventQueue1 so that events are handled
sequentially (in case). Algorithm 2 shows the steps of the caching manager.
Algorithm 2 Event Manager
procedure BUILDCACHE(cache-type, event, cache-algo)




if cache-type is “verification” then
if event.type in cache & event.params in recently added then
return “allow”




else if cache-type is “precompute” then
if event.type in cache & N-cp > N-th then
return
else if event.type in cache & N-cp <= N-th then
perform actions mentioned in cache
else
Pre-Compute-Update(WL, Properties, event.params)
Proactive Verification Engine. Our pre-computation is mainly implemented in Python, and
our pre-computed results and tenant-specific watchlists are in a MySQL database, which al-
lows us to efficiently query OpenStack cloud data. The initializer module first populates all
1https://m7i.org/tutorials/python-event-queue-concurrency-modeling/
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watchlist tables from Neutron, Nova and Keystone databases; this step allows to capture the
initial configurations into the watchlists. Our Python scripts derive the association between the
model provided in Fig. 4.3 and the security properties, and populate our database by adding the
dependency information and the values of the pre-computed N. After one-time initialization,
ProSAS incrementally updates these watchlists through the pre-computation manager, which is
triggered by the runtime modules, such as N-step evaluator and inserts/deletes watchlist con-
tents based on the parameters of the intercepted event. Algorithm 2 further explains the steps
during the pre-computation phase.
The N-step evaluator is implemented as MySQL stored procedures to measure the distances
from each critical event. Based on the outcome of both the caching manager and N-step evalua-
tor modules, any of the following is performed: i) the pre-computation manager is triggered to
update the watchlists, or ii) the proactive verifier searches the current values of the parameter(s)
in the corresponding watchlist, and accordingly takes a decision (e.g., allow or deny) through
the interceptor. Algorithm 3 further details the steps of the verification engine.
Feedback Engine. The feedback manager periodically invokes the formal verification tool
(e.g., [70, 73]) to verify OpenStack configurations for the requested security properties. When-
ever, the verification tool finds any violation, the feedback manager collects event logs from
the corresponding OpenStack service (e.g., Neutron, Nova and Swift). Finally, the feedback
engine filters out all system-initiated events (i.e., GET requests) and identify event type of other
requests (i.e., PUT, POST and DELETE) based on its request body. Algorithm 4 shows the
steps of the feedback engine.
Dashboard & Reporting Engine. We further implement the web interface (i.e., dashboard)
in PHP to place audit requests and view audit reports. In the dashboard, tenant admins can
initially select different standards (e.g., ISO 27017, CCM V3.0.1, NIST 800-53, etc.). After-
wards, security properties under the selected standards can be chosen. Additionally, admins
can select any of the following verification options: i) proactive verification ii) runtime ver-
ification, or iii) retroactive verification. Apart from the proactive enforcement of compliance
through the interceptor, the reporting engine of ProSAS provides a detailed report on recent
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Algorithm 3 Proactive Verification
1: procedure INITIALIZE(DependencyModels, SecPropertyNth,CloudOS)
2: Events=GetEvents(DependencyModels)
3: Mapping=ReadEventOperationMapping(Events,CloudOS)
4: for each event e ∈ Events do
5: Populate Event-operation
6: for each property p ∈ SecPropertyNth do
7: Populate Property-N-thresholds
8: for each property p ∈ SecPropertyNth do
9: criticalRelation = getCriticalEdge(p, DependencyModels)
10: Allpaths = ComputeN-allpaths(DependencyModels, criticalRelation)
11: for each path in Allpaths.paths do
12: Populate Model-N-property
13: Edges = getEdges(DependencyModels)
14: for each ed ∈ Edges do
15: (event, model, type) =ReadAtributes(ed, DependencyModels)
16: Populate Model-event from DependencyModels
17: procedure PRE-COMPUTE-INITIALIZE(CloudOS, Property-WL)
18: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
19: WLi= initializeWatchlist(pi, Property-WL, CloudOS)
20: procedure PRE-COMPUTE-UPDATE(WL, property, parameters)
21: updateWatchlist(WL, property, parameters)
22: procedure EVALUATENSTEP(Event e, Property p, Params opparams)
23: Find N-th for p from Property-N-thresholds
24: Find entities in the model related to p
25: context = CollectCloudData(entities)
26: Find N-cp for p and context from Model-N-property
27: if N-cp=N-th then
28: updateWatchlist(p, opparams)
29: else if N-cp < N-th and e.type=WE then
30: updateWatchlist(p, opparams)
31: procedure PROACTIVEVERIFY(Event, Properties)
32: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
33: if Event.parameters in pi.watchlist then
34: Allow Event in the cloud
35: else
36: Deny Event in the cloud
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for each property pi ∈ Properties do
results= verifyOffline(CloudOS, pi)
if results= “Violated” then




intercepted events. Also, ProSAS dashboard provides a near real-time monitoring interface
showing most recent user-initiated events and their corresponding verification decisions taken
by ProSAS. Moreover, our reporting engine archives all the verification reports for a certain
period. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show screenshots of the ProSAS dashboard.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we first describe the experiment settings, and then present ProSAS experimental
results with both synthetic and real data.
4.5.1 Experiment Settings
Our conducted experiments on ProSAS involve datasets collected from both our testbed and the
real cloud. In the following, we describe both environmental settings.
Testbed Cloud Settings. Our testbed cloud OpenStack version is Mitaka with Keystone API
version v3 and Neutron API version v2. There are one controller node and 80 compute nodes,
each having Intel i7 dual core CPU and 2GB memory running Ubuntu 16.04 server. Based
on a recent survey [92] on OpenStack, we simulated an environment with maximum 100,000
users, 10,000 tenants, 500 domains, 100,000 VMs, 40,000 subnets, 20,000 routers and 100,000
ports. We conduct the experiments for 10 different datasets varying the most important factors
and fixing others to the largest values, e.g., for the no bypass property, both the number of
ports (from 10,000 to 100,000 with the gap of 10,000) and the number of tenants (from 1,000
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Figure 4.11: Screenshots of the ProSAS monitoring dashboard.
8
7
Figure 4.12: Screenshots of the ProSAS audit report dashboard.
8
8
to 10,000 with the gap of 1,000) are varied, as the watchlist related to our example security
property contains a list of ports belonging to different tenants. For the common ownership1
property, the number of tenants is varied from 1,000 to 10,000 with the gap of 1,000 having five
roles in each tenant. We repeat each experiment 100 times.
Real Cloud Settings. We further test ProSAS using data collected from a real community
cloud hosted at one of the largest telecommunications vendors. To this end, we analyze the
management logs (size more than 1.6 GB text-based logs) and extract 128,264 relevant log
entries for the period of more than 500 days. As Ceilometer is not configured in this cloud, we
utilize Nova and Neutron logs that increases the log processing efforts.
4.5.2 Experimental Results with Testbed Clouds
The objective of the first set of experiments is to measure the effect of the ProSAS caching
system. Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 show the hit ratio (i.e., number of hits
total number of tries
) and the effects of
our caching system applying two different caching mechanisms, i.e., least recent update (LRU)
and most recent update (MRU), by varying the size of the cache. Figure 4.13 illustrates the hit
ratio for both LRU and MRU caches while increasing the size of the cache. Expectedly, the hit
ratio increases with the size of the cache and reaches up to 0.93 for the 45,000 cache entries.
Figure 4.14 shows the average response time (in nanoseconds) required when there is a hit (i.e.,
intercepted event is found in the cache). In such cases, ProSAS responds in maximum 4,000
nanoseconds for the smallest cache size. Even though the response time for the MRU cache
drops significantly for two cache sizes (10K and 25K), otherwise the response time for both
cache types remains quite similar. Figure 4.15 illustrates the delay (in nanoseconds) incurred to
ProSAS due to a miss (i.e., intercepted event type is not present in the cache). The delay remains
quite similar over the different cache sizes, and the maximum delay is 2,000 nanoseconds for
the largest cache size. As similar as in Figure 4.14, the cache with 25K entries results the lowest
delay.
The second set of experiments is to compare the time required to process a user request
1This property allows users to hold only the roles that are defined within their domains [53, 18].
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Figure 4.13: Evaluation of caching: hit ratio ( number of hits
total number of tries
) for both least recently used
(LRU) and most recently used (MRU) caches. In all cases, we vary cache size (in number of
entries) from 1,000 to 45,000, and verify the no bypass security property.











Figure 4.14: Evaluation of caching: average response time (in nanoseconds) by ProSAS when
the intercepted event is found in the cache for both LRU and MRU caches. In all cases, we
vary cache size (in number of entries) from 1,000 to 45,000, and verify the no bypass security
property.
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Figure 4.15: Evaluation of caching: delay (in nanoseconds) caused by a miss for both LRU and
MRU caches. In all cases, we vary cache size (in number of entries) from 1,000 to 45,000, and















OpenStack Processing Time Our Auditing Time
Figure 4.16: Time (in seconds) required to process different requests by OpenStack and
ProSAS.
individually by OpenStack and ProSAS. Figure 4.16 shows the time (in seconds) to process
different event types by OpenStack and ProSAS. Note that the processing time measured for
OpenStack remains unaffected with or without ProSAS. The obtained results show that Open-
Stack requires seven to ten seconds to process the considered event types. In contrast, ProSAS
takes maximum 0.0082 second to process the delete security group rule event type. We observe
two major findings from this set of experiments. Firstly, Figure 4.16 shows that ProSAS causes
a negligible delay in comparison to the response time of OpenStack. Secondly, the period when
OpenStack processes a request may be utilized to handle single-step violation without resulting
















Common Ownership No Bypass
Figure 4.17: The coverage gain (measured in terms of number of new violations detected) by
ProSAS feedback module over 100 days with the 10,000 tenants for the common ownership











Common Ownership No Bypass
Figure 4.18: Time (in seconds) required to prepare feedbacks to improve the list of critical
events while varying the number of events for the common ownership and no bypass security
properties.
The objective of the third set of the experiments is to measure the coverage gain and time
requirement of our feedback manager. Figure 4.17 shows the number of new violations ProSAS
catches over 100 days after introducing the feedback manager in it for both common ownership
and no bypass security properties. During the first two months, we observe the highest gain. In
the last 20 days, there is no new security violation. Figure 4.18 measures the time (in seconds)
to prepare the feedback for the common ownership and no bypass security properties while
varying the number of tenants up to 10,000. Note that the reported time only includes the time
to perform automatic steps (e.g., executing verification tool and filtering logs). The feedback
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preparation for the common ownership and no bypass properties takes maximum 5.55 seconds
and 7.88 seconds, respectively, for our largest dataset.
The fourth set of experiments is to demonstrate the time efficiency of our proactive verifica-
tion steps. Intercepting operations to identify the type of operation, which is the minimum time
we need to block for all operations (CE and WE, and all others), is taking constant time (0.266
ms) (INT in Fig. 4.19). Moreover, calculating N-step (NSE in Fig. 4.19) completes in constant
time (i.e., 0.133 ms) for the no bypass (NB) property, and in quasi constant time (varying from
0.773 ms to 0.794 ms) for the common ownership (CO) property. The violation detector blocks
only critical operations for a maximum extra delay of 8.2 ms (VD in Fig. 4.20) for the largest
dataset. Fig. 4.21 shows that pre-computing the watchlists for both no bypass and common own-
ership properties take 5,000 ms and 5,400 ms, respectively, for our largest dataset. As expected,
the watchlist pre-computation step, which involves access to the cloud databases, requires com-
paratively longer time. However, this step is performed only during the initialization phase. Any
later update of the watchlist is performed incrementally, and takes few milliseconds. Fig. 4.21
depicts the execution time for the largest dataset (10,000 tenants and 100,000 ports), and shows
that preparing watchlist is comparatively time consuming and beneficial to perform proactively,
as we spend about 5,400 ms in preparing watchlist during initialization. On the other hand, the
subsequent enforcement takes only eight milliseconds per critical operation call at runtime.
In the fifth part of the experiments, we measure the memory cost for the watchlists. Fig. 4.22
depicts that the memory requirement increases quasilinearly with the dataset size. We are able
to restrict the watchlist size in few MBs by choosing the content of the watchlist carefully.
Therefore, we show that our approach improves the execution time without excessive memory
costs. We store role names and corresponding tenants for the common ownership property, and
only port IDs for the no bypass property.
Finally, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 compare the execution time of ProSAS and our alternative imple-
mentation of intercept-and-check, in which after detecting a critical event we collect data from
the cloud and start verifying security properties using a SAT solver (e.g., Sugar [106]). We
observe that verifying with the intercept-and-check approach including data collection takes 15
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CO-INT CO-NSE NB-INT NB-NSE
Figure 4.19: Time duration (in ms) for different modules (INT: Interceptor and NSE: N-step
evaluator) of ProSAS for the common ownership (CO) and no bypass (NB) security properties
by varying the number of tenants. The number of ports is also varied from 10,000 to 100,000,
and each tenant contains five roles. Time required for the steps: intercepting operations and
evaluating N-step.
Number of Ports 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
Intercept-and-check 60,200 107,209 184,230 237,245 317,252
ProSAS 5.928 6.09 6.916 7.016 7.496
Table 4.6: Comparing execution time (in ms) between ProSAS and our alternative implemen-
tation of intercept-and-check for the common ownership and no bypass security properties for
the first set of dataset.
seconds (for common ownership) to 8 minutes (for no bypass) for our largest dataset. There-
fore, each critical operation would experience long response time. In contrast, LeaPS experi-
ences maximum response time of 8.5 ms. Our solution only permits allowed actions, hence any
further accuracy evaluation is irrelevant.
Number of Ports 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000
Intercept-and-check 357,261 407,268 437,271 455,276 480,277
ProSAS 7.815 8.024 8.14 8.453 8.501
Table 4.7: Comparing execution time (in ms) between ProSAS and our alternative implemen-
tation of intercept-and-check for the common ownership and no bypass security properties for















Figure 4.20: Time duration (in ms) for the Violation detector (VD) of ProSAS for the common
ownership (CO) and no bypass (NB) security properties by varying the number of tenants. The
number of ports is also varied from 10,000 to 100,000, and each tenant contains five roles. Time
required for detecting violations.
Properties Hit Ratio Pre-Compute Feedback Verification (W) Verification (C) Delay
No bypass 0.71 2500ms 5270ms 6.2ms 1250ns 890ns
Common
ownership
0.721 1700ms 3150ms 5.5ms 1000ns 810ns
Table 4.8: Summary of the experimental results with real data. The reported delay is the addi-
tional time required in LeaPS verification for a miss in the cache. Note that Verification (W)
and Verification (C) indicate the time required for verification through watchlist and verification
through cache, respectively.
4.5.3 Experimental Results with Real Clouds
Table 4.8 summarizes the obtained results for the real cloud dataset, which logs of total 5,279
event instances for the period of 506 days. For all experiments with real data, the cache size
remains 25K, and we utilize the MRU caching technique. In these experiments, we measure
the time for different steps of ProSAS and the hit ratio of the cache. Note that the obtained
results are shorter due to the smaller size of the community cloud compared to our much larger
simulated environment.
4.6 Discussions












Common Ownership No Bypass
Figure 4.21: (a) Time required (in ms) for preparing watchlist for different properties varying
the number of tenants at the initialization step. The number of ports is also varied from 10,000
to 100,000 , and each tenant contains five roles.
Effects of Change in Cloud Design. As our experiment results shown in Section 4.5, ProSAS
can verify security properties for large size cloud in only few seconds at runtime. There could
be certain cases where the pre-computed information used at runtime needs to be updated. For
instance, when a change in the cloud dependency or in the cloud management API specifications
occurs, or when extending verification to new security properties, the ProSAS initializationmust
be repeated. Even though the initialization can take several minutes, this task can be executed
in parallel with run time verification and the pre-computed information updated instantly to
minimize the impact on verifications at runtime. Note that there are few cases where the pre-
computation needs to be repeated and those cases regarding management API changes in the
cloud are by nature not frequent.
Supporting Operational Properties. In this work, we cover structural properties involving
cloud management operations (e.g., creating a tenant, granting a role, assigning instances to
physical hosts and configuring virtualization mechanisms). The properties involving session/-
context specific data are not yet considered. In our running example, if the malicious tenant can
somehow successfully bypass the firewall rules and launch a spoofing attack, our solution can-
not yet detect such spoofing attacks. As our solution relies on the information reported through
the management interface, any verification by extracting the information from the actual infras-
tructure components (e.g., virtual or hardware) is not covered in this work and considered as a
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Common Ownership No Bypass
Figure 4.22: Time required (in ms) for preparing watchlist for different properties varying the
number of tenants at the initialization step. The number of ports is also varied from 10,000 to
100,000 , and each tenant contains five roles.
Cloud Platform Interception Support
OpenStack WSGI Middleware [113]
Amazon EC2-VPC AWS Lambda Function [5]
Google GCP GCP Metrics [38]
Microsoft Azure Azure Event Grid [77]
Table 4.9: Interception supports in major cloud platforms
potential future work.
Adapting to Other Cloud Platforms. ProSAS is designed to work with most popular cloud
platforms (e.g., OpenStack [89], Amazon EC2 [5], Google GCP [38] and Microsoft Azure [77])
with a one-time effort for implementing a platform-specific interface. More specifically, ProSAS
interacts with the cloud platform (e.g., while collecting logs and intercepting runtime events)
through two modules: log processor and interceptor. These two modules require to interpret im-
plementation specific event instances and intercept runtime events. First, to interpret platform-
specific event instances to generic event types, we currently maintain a mapping of the APIs
from different platforms. Table 4.10 enlists some examples of such mappings. Second, the in-
terception mechanism may require to be implemented for each cloud platform. In OpenStack,
we leverage WSGI middleware to intercept and enforce the proactive auditing results so that
compliance can be preserved. Through our preliminary study, we identified that almost all



























































Table 4.10: Mapping event APIs from different cloud platforms to ProSAS event types.
functions, developers can write their own code to intercept and monitor events. Google GCP
introduces GCP Metrics to configure charting or alerting different critical situations. Our un-
derstanding is that ProSAS can be integrated to GCP as one of the metrics similarly as the
dos_intercept_count metric, which intends to prevent DoS attacks. The Azure Event Grid is an
event managing service from Azure to monitor and control event routing which is quite similar
as our interception mechanism. Therefore, we believe that ProSAS can be an extension of the
Azure Event Grid to proactively audit cloud events. Table 4.9 summarizes the interception sup-
port in these cloud platforms. The rest modules of ProSAS deal with the platform-independent
data, and hence, the next steps in ProSAS are platform-agnostic.
Dealing withOne-Step Security Breaches. The proactive auditing mechanisms fundamentally
leverage the dependency in a sequence of events. In other words, proactive security auditing
is mainly to detect those violations which involve multiple steps. However, there might be
violations of the considered security properties with a single step. Such violations cannot be
detected by the traditional steps of proactive auditing with the same response time as reported
in Figure 4.20, and may be detected by performing all steps at a single point in several seconds
(e.g., around six seconds for a decent-sized cloud with 10,000 tenants as shown in Figure 4.21);
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which is still faster than any other existing works (which respond in minutes). However, this
response time might not be very practical. To reduce the response time or at least not to cause
any significant delay, we perform a preliminary study as follows. Our initial results conducted
in the testbed cloud show that OpenStack takes more than six seconds to perform almost all user
requests; which implies the possibility of not resulting in any additional delay by ProSAS even
for a single-step violation. Additionally, during our case studies, we observed that OpenStack
performs several internal tasks to complete a user request. We may leverage this sequence of
system events corresponding to a single user request to proactively perform ProSAS steps. We
elaborate those two ways of tackling single-step violations in our future work.
Choosing the Value ofN−th. As described in Section 5.5, ProSAS schedules the pre-computaiton
based on a threshold value (N−th), and the distance (N−cp) from the current intercepted event
to a critical event. The ProSAS users (e.g., tenants) choose the value of N− th. The possible
values of N− th are in the range of {Nmax:1}, where Nmax is the longest possible distance be-
tween two events in the dependency model. Within this range, choosing a larger value may
allow ProSAS more time to perform the pre-computation. However, at the same time it might
not be much effective, as it requires more watchlist updates over the time. On the other hand,
choosing a smaller N− thmay allow a precise watchlist content. However, in that case, ProSAS
may not get enough time to perform necessary pre-computation steps before the critical event
occurs.
4.7 Related Work
In this section, we first compare existing solutions with ProSAS, and then discuss several cate-
gories of related works.
4.7.1 Comparison between Related Works
Table 5.13 summarizes the comparison between existing works and ProSAS. The first and sec-
ond columns enlist existing works and their verification methods. The next two columns com-
pare the coverage such as supported environment (cloud or non-cloud) and cloud layers (virtual
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Doelitzscher et al. [25] Custom Algorithm Cloud Virtual Infr. - - N/A N/A - • • - - •
Ullah et al. [108] Custom Algorithm Cloud Virtual Infr. - - N/A N/A - • • - - -
Majumdar et al. [73] CSP Solver Cloud User-level - - N/A N/A • • • - - -
Madi et al. [70] CSP Solver Cloud Virtual Infr. - - N/A N/A • • • - - -
Majumdar et al. [74] CSP Solver Cloud User-level - • - - • • • - - -
Ligatti et al. [66] Model Checking Non-Cloud N/A • • - - • • N/A N/A N/A N/A
PVSC [71] Custom Algorithm Cloud Both • • - - - - • - - -
LeaPS [72] Custom + Bayesian Cloud Both • • - - - - • - - •
Weatherman [16] Graph-theoretic Cloud Virtual Infr. • - N/A N/A - - - - • -
Congress [88] Datalog Cloud Both • - N/A N/A • - • - - -
Patron [69] Custom Algorithm Cloud User-level - • • - • • • - - -
ProSAS Custom Algorithm Cloud Both • • • • - ◦ • - - •
Table 4.11: Comparing existing solutions with LeaPS. The symbols (•), (◦)a, (-) and N/Amean fully supported, partially supported, not supported
and not applicable, respectively.




infrastructure and/or user-level). We mark ‘both’, if a work supports both virtual infrastructure
and user-level cloud layers. The next six columns compare these works according to differ-
ent features. The proactive feature is checked when a solution supports proactive verification.
When a solution enforces the verification results to the cloud at runtime, we check the enforcive
feature. The caching feature is checked, when a work optimizes its verification computation
by storing previous results. The queuing feature refers to handling concurrent events for an
enforcive solution. We mark both caching and queuing features as ‘N/A’ for the works that do
not support the enforcive feature. The expressive feature is checked for the works, which utilize
well-known expressive policy languages (e.g., first order logic) to express security properties.
By the self-reliant feature, we mean the works which only depend on the user-provided security
properties for the accuracy of the verification. In the last four columns of the table, we compare
the works based on their supporting cloud platforms. The adaptable field is checked for those
works which support multiple cloud platforms or describe how their works can be ported to
other platforms.
In summary, ProSAS mainly differs from the state-of-the-art works as follows. Firstly,
ProSAS is the first proactive auditing approach, which captures dependencies among cloud
events. Secondly, ProSAS is the only proactive auditing solution, which supports caching
of recent verification computations and results to more efficiently (e.g., in nanoseconds) au-
dit clouds. Thirdly, unlike other proactive solutions, ProSAS can handle concurrent events by
maintaining an event queue. Fourthly, even though ProSAS is not as self reliant as most retroac-
tive approaches (e.g., [25, 108, 73]), ProSAS improves the current state-of-the-art for proactive
solutions by adding a feedback loop to progressively reduce the reliance on a list of critical
events. Finally, the ProSAS methodology is cloud-platform agnostic. However, there are still
few limitations in ProSAS. ProSAS is less expressive than other general purpose formal verifi-
cation approaches. ProSAS partially relies on an initial list of critical events provided by tenant
admins or security experts. In the following, we discuss existing works from several related
categories.
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4.7.2 Cloud Security Auditing
The existing solutions in cloud security auditing can be categorized into three major approaches:
retroactive, intercept-and-check, and proactive. We discuss related works under these categories
as follows.
Retroactive Auditing Approach. Auditing security compliance in the cloud has recently been
explored. For instance, Solonas et al. [104] detect illegal activities in the cloud only based on
collected billing data in order to preserve privacy. In [73, 70], formal auditing approaches are
proposed for security compliance checking in the cloud. Unlike our work, those approaches can
detect violations only after they occur, which may expose the system to high risks.
VeriFlow [61] and NetPlumber [59] monitor network events and check network properties
and policies at runtime to capture bugs before or as soon as they occur. They rely on incremental
calculations to achieve the runtime verification. These works focus on operational network
properties (e.g., black holes and forwarding loops) in traditional networks, whereas our effort is
oriented toward preserving compliance with structural security properties that impact isolation
in cloud virtualized infrastructures.
Various mechanisms and concepts for designing security service-level-agreement-based
cloud monitoring services have been discussed in [96]. CloudSec [50] and CloudMonatt [116]
propose VM security monitoring. In contrast, our work covers a larger spectrum of properties
(beyond the scope of VMs) that require collecting data from various sources. In addition, un-
like intercepting security measurements, we intercept multiple kinds of events and assess their
impact on the cloud system before applying them. In [93], a host-based secure active monitor-
ing mechanism, where protected hooks into untrusted VMs are installed to intercept malicious
events, is proposed. Once a malicious action is intercepted, the control is transferred to se-
curity tools running on a trusted VM. They detect unwanted operations initiated by malicious
softwares; whereas, our contribution is at a higher level covering events initiated by potentially
untrusted users.
Intercept-and-Check Approach. Existing intercept-and-check approaches (e.g., [16, 88]) per-
form major verification tasks while holding the event instances blocked, and usually cause
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significant delay to a user request. There are several other works (e.g., [61, 59]) monitoring
network events and checking network policies at runtime. Weatherman [16] and OpenStack
Congress [88] offer security verification of virtual infrastructure using the intercept-and-check
approach. These works focus on operational network properties (e.g., black holes and forward-
ing loops) in traditional networks, whereas our effort is oriented toward preserving compli-
ance with structural security properties that impact isolation in cloud virtualized infrastructures.
Cloud monitoring services based on security service-level agreements are discussed in [96].
Proactive Auditing Approach. Weatherman [16] is the most closely related work to ours.
Aiming at mitigating misconfigurations and enforcing security policies in a virtualized infras-
tructure, Weatherman has both online and offline approaches. Their online approach intercepts
management operations for analysis, and relays them to the management hosts, only if Weath-
erman confirms no security violation caused by those operations. Otherwise, they are rejected
with an error signal to the requester. The work defines a realization model, that captures the
virtualized infrastructure configuration and topology in a graph-based model. The latter is syn-
chronized with the actual infrastructure using the approach in [14]. Two major limitations of
this proposition are: i) the model capturing the whole infrastructure causes a scalability issue
for the solution, and ii) the time consuming operation-checking that should be performed on the
emergence of each event, makes security enforcement not feasible for large size data centers.
Our work overcomes these limitations by proposing a proactive auditing approach by leveraging
the dependency relationships among cloud events.
Congress [88] is an OpenStack project offering both online and offline policy enforcement
approaches. The offline approach requires submitting a future change plan to Congress, so that
the changes can be simulated and the impacts of those changes can be verified against specific
properties. In the online approach, Congress first applies the operation to the cloud, then checks
its impacts. In case of a violation, the operation is reverted. However, the time elapsed before
reverting the operation can be critical to perform some illicit actions, for instance, transferring
sensitive files before loosing the assigned role. Foley et al. [31] provide an algebra to assess the
effect of security policies replacement and composition in OpenStack. Their solution can be
considered as a proactive approach for checking operational properties violations, whereas our
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work targets the runtime verification of structural security property violations.
4.7.3 Other Proactive Security Approaches
Proactive security analysis has been explored for software security enforcement through moni-
toring programs’ behaviors and taking specific actions (e.g., warning) in case security policies
are violated. Many state-based formal models are proposed for those program monitors over
the last two decades. First, Schneider [103] models program monitors using an infinite-state-
automata model to enforce safety properties. Those automata recognize invalid behaviors and
halt the target application before the violation occurs. Ligatti et al. [65] build on Schneider’s
model and defines a more general program monitors model based on the so called edit/security
automata. Rather than just recognizing executions, edit automata-based monitors are able to
suppress bad and/or insert new actions, transforming hence invalid executions into valid ones.
Mandatory Result Automata (MRA) is another model proposed by Ligatti et al. [66, 26] that
can transform both actions and results. Narain [80] proactively generates correct network con-
figurations using the model finder Alloy. Our work further expands the proactive monitoring
approach into cloud environments differing in scope and approach.
4.8 Conclusion
The continuous auditing with scalability and practical response time is important to both cloud
providers and their tenants. In this work, we proposed a proactive security auditing system,
namely, ProSAS, which significantly reduces the response time and enforces the auditing re-
sults on the cloud before any violation can take effect. More specifically, ProSAS first built a
dependency model of the relationships between cloud events so that the auditing process can be
launched proactively by leveraging this model. Second, we intercepted each runtime event in-
stances and built the watchlists for each security property incrementally. Third, when a critical
event occurs, we performed a light-weight verification by simply checking the intercepted event
parameters with the watchlists to decide whether to allow or deny the critical event. Fourth,
ProSAS stored the recent results in the cache from the verification and pre-computation steps
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to further improve the response time on average. Finally, we prepared a feedback to progres-
sively improve the list of critical events, which directly impacts the accuracy of our solution,
by using a state-based verification tool. We integrated ProSAS to OpenStack, one of the most
popular cloud management platforms, and provided guidelines to port it to other cloud plat-
forms. Furthermore, we evaluated the efficiency and accuracy of our method, and showed that
the response time is reduced to a practical level (e.g., 1,041 nanoseconds and 8.2 milliseconds
to audit 10,000 tenants with and without caching, respectively), and the accuracy is improved
(19 new violations detected).
However, there exist several limitations in ProSAS, which we consider as future works.
First, the current method of improving the critical events involves manual inspection, which
could be error-prone. We intend to automate this step by using machine learning techniques to
build a comprehensive critical event list. Second, single-step violations are not yet efficiently
handled in ProSAS. An efficient runtime approach might help to address this concern. Third,
concurrent critical management operations may affect the performance of ProSAS. A parallel




among Events for Proactive Security
Auditing in Clouds
5.1 Introduction
Security threats such as isolation breach in multi-tenant clouds cause persistent fear among ten-
ants while adopting clouds [98]. To this end, security auditing in clouds can possibly ensure the
accountability and transparency of a cloud provider to its tenants. However, the traditional ap-
proach of auditing, a.k.a. retroactive auditing, becomes ineffective with the unique nature (e.g.,
dynamics and elasticity) of clouds, which means the configurations of a cloud is frequently
changed and hence, invalidates the auditing results. To address this limitation and offer contin-
uous auditing, the intercept-and-check approach verifies each cloud event at runtime. However,
the sheer size of the cloud (e.g., 1,000 tenants and 100,000 users in a decent-sized cloud [92]),
can usually render the intercept-and-check approach expensive and non-scalable (e.g., over four
minutes for a mid-sized cloud [16]). Since the number of critical events (i.e., events that may
potentially breach security properties) to verify usually grows with the number of security prop-
erties supported by an auditing system, auditing larger clouds could incur prohibitive costs.
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To this end, the proactive approach (e.g., [71]) is a promising solution and specifically de-
signed to ensure a practical response time. Such an approach prepares for critical events in
advance based on the so-called dependency models that indicate which events lead to the criti-
cal events [117, 71]. However, a key limitation of existing proactive approaches (including our
previous work [71]) is that their dependency models are typically established through manual
efforts based on expert knowledge or user experiences, which can be error-prone and tedious
especially for large clouds. Moreover, existing dependency models are typically static in nature
in the sense that the captured dependencies do not reflect runtime patterns. A possible solution
is to automatically learn probabilistic dependencies from the historical data (e.g., cloud logs).
However, the log formats in current cloud platforms (especially, in OpenStack [89], which is
one of the most popular cloud management platforms) are unstructured and not ready to be fed
into different learning tools. Furthermore, due to the diverse formats of logs in different versions
of the cloud platform, the log processing task becomes more difficult. Therefore, to enable log
analysis (e.g., learning dependency models for proactive auditing), the need of a log processing
approach addressing different real-world challenges (which are discussed in Section 5.3.2) and
preparing raw logs for different learning tools is evident.
To address those limitations, our key idea is to design a log processor, which prepares the
inputs for different learning techniques, to learn probabilistic (instead of deterministic) depen-
dencies, and to automatically extract such a model from processed logs. Specifically, we first
conduct case studies on cloud log formats in different OpenStack deployments including a real
community cloud, and enumerate all challenges related to raw log processing to automate differ-
ent learning mechanisms. Second, we design a log processor that addresses all challenges iden-
tified in our investigation, and provides inputs for different learning techniques (e.g., Bayesian
network and sequence pattern mining). Third, we propose a new approach to automatically gen-
erate the probabilistic dependency models from the processed logs. Fourth, we provide detailed
methodology and algorithms for our learning-based proactive security auditing system, namely,
LeaPS, including the log processor, learning component and proactive verification component.
We describe our implementation of the proposed system based on OpenStack [89], and demon-
strate how the systemmay be ported to other cloud platforms (e.g., Amazon EC2 [5] and Google
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GCP [38]). Finally, we evaluate our solution through extensive experiments with both synthetic
and real data. The results confirm our solution can achieve practical response time (e.g., 6ms to
audit a cloud of 100,000 VMs) and significant improvement over existing proactive approaches
(e.g., about 50% faster), and our log processor can be adopted by different learning techniques
efficiently (e.g., only 18ms to execute different sequence pattern mining algorithms for 50,000
events).
In summary, our main contributions are threefold.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach for processing OpenStack logs
for identifying event sequences to learn dependencies. First, our study investigates cloud
logs from both real and testbed clouds, and enumerates all challenges in log processing.
Second, our log processing technique addresses these challenges, and supports different
learning techniques (e.g., Bayesian network and sequence pattern mining).
• We propose an automated learning-based proactive auditing system, namely, LeaPS,
which automatically learns probabilistic dependencies using the proposed log processor
to allow handling the uncertainty that is inherent to runtime events, and hence, addresses
the major limitations of existing proactive solutions. As demonstrated by our imple-
mentation and experimental results, LeaPS provides an automated, efficient, and scalable
solution for different cloud platforms to increase their transparency and accountability to
tenants.
• Unlike most learning-based security solutions, since we are not relying on learning tech-
niques to detect abnormal behaviors, we avoid the well-known limitations of high false
positive rates; any inaccuracy in the learning phase would only affect the efficiency, as
will be demonstrated through experiments later in this chapter. We believe this idea of




In this section, we present a motivating example, describe the threat model, and provide an
overview of our proposed solution.
5.2.1 Motivating Example
The upper part of Figure 5.1 depicts several sequences of events in a cloud (from Session N
to Session N+M). The critical events, which can potentially breach some security properties,
are shown shaded (e.g., E2, E5 and E7). The lower part of the figure illustrates two different
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Figure 5.1: Identifying the main limitations of both traditional runtime verification and existing
proactive solutions, and positioning our solution.
• With a traditional runtime verification approach, most of the verification effort (depicted
as boxes filled with vertical lines) is performed after the occurrence of the critical events,
while holding the related operations blocked until a decision is made; consequently, such
solutions may cause significant delays to operations.
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• In contrast, a proactive solution will pre-compute most of the expensive verification tasks
well ahead of the critical events in order to minimize the response time. However, this
means such a solution would need to first identify patterns of event dependencies, e.g.,
E1 may lead to a critical event (E2), such that it may pre-compute as soon as E1 happens.
• Manually identifying patterns of event dependencies for a large cloud is likely expensive
and non-scalable. Indeed, a typical cloud platform allows more than 400 types of oper-
ations [89], which implies 160,000 potential dependency relationship pairs may need to
be examined by human experts.
• Furthermore, this only covers the static dependency relationships implied by the cloud
design, whereas runtime patterns, e.g., those caused by business routines and user habits,
cannot be captured in this way.
• Another critical limitation is that existing dependency models are deterministic in the
sense that every event can only lead to a unique subsequent event. Therefore, the case
demonstrated in the last two sessions (N+2, N+M) where the same event (E3) may lead
to several others (E4 or E6) will not be captured by such models.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that the cloud infrastructure management systems i) may have implementation
flaws, misconfigurations and vulnerabilities that can be potentially exploited to violate security
properties specified by the cloud tenants, and ii) may be trusted for the integrity of the API calls,
event notifications, logs and database records (existing techniques on trusted computing may be
applied to establish a chain of trust from TPM chips embedded inside the cloud hardware,
e.g., [10, 64]). Though our framework may assist to avoid any violation of specified security
properties due to either misconfigurations or exploits of vulnerabilities, our focus is not to detect
specific attacks or intrusions. We focus on attacks directed through the cloud management
interfaces (e.g., CLI, GUI), and any violation bypassing such interfaces is beyond the scope
of this work. We assume a comprehensive list of critical events are provided upon which the
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accuracy of our auditing solution depends (however, we provide a guideline on identifying
critical events in Section 5.8). Our proactive solution mainly targets certain security properties
which would require a sequence of operations. To make our discussions more concrete, the
following shows an example of in-scope threats based on a real vulnerability.
VMA1 VMA2 VMA3 VMA3 VMB1 VMB2 VMB3 VMB3
VMB1: 1.10.0.7 Tenant BVMA1: 1.10.1.117 Tenant A
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Figure 5.2: An exploit of a vulnerability in OpenStack [87], leading to bypassing the security
group mechanism.
Running Example. A real world vulnerability in OpenStack1, CVE-2015-7713 [87], can be
exploited to bypass security group rules (which are fine-grained, distributed security mecha-
nisms in several cloud platforms including Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure and OpenStack to
ensure isolation between instances). Figure 5.2 shows a potential deployment configuration
which might be exploited using this vulnerability. The pre-requisite steps of this scenario are to
create VMA1 and VMB1 (step 1), create security groups A1 and B1 with two rules (i.e., allow
1.10.0.7 and allow 1.10.1.117) (step 2), and start those VMs (step 3). Next, when Tenant A
tries to delete one of the security rules (e.g., allow 1.10.0.7) (step 4), the rule is not removed
from the security group of the active VMA1 due to the afore-mentioned vulnerability. As a
result, VMB1 is still able to reach VMA1 even though Tenant A intends to filter out that traffic.
According to the vulnerability description, the security group bypass violation occurs only if
this specific sequence of event instances (steps 1-4) happens in the mentioned order (namely,
event sequence). In the next section, we present an overview of our approach and show how
we automatically capture probabilistic dependencies among cloud events for proactive security




In the following, we briefly describe our learning-based proactive auditing techniques used by
LeaPS.
• First, it parses raw cloud logs into a structured format after marking each field of log
entries so that log processing in the next step can be efficient.
• Next, it processes these parsed logs to interpret event types, aggregate log entries from
different services (e.g., compute and network), and prepare inputs (as event sequences)
for learning techniques.
• Then, it learns probabilistic dependencies between different event types captured as a
Bayesian network from sequences of events processed from different cloud logs.
• Afterwards, based on the decreasing order of critical events’ conditional probabilities
in these dependency models, LeaPS incrementally prepares the ground for the runtime
verification.
• Finally, once one of these critical events is about to occur, we simply verify the parameters
associated with its event instance with respect to the pre-computed conditions of that
event, and enforce the security policy according to the verification result.
Figure 5.3 shows an overview of LeaPS. It consists of three major modules: log processor,
learning system and proactive verification system. The log processor is related to processing
the unstructured and incomplete raw log files, which will be detailed in Section 5.3.1, and pre-
pares the data to be used by the learning system. Our log processor consists of four major
parts. The parser is responsible to identify fields for each log entries and parse them into a
structured format. The filter extracts the relevant log entries and groups them based on tenant
IDs. The interpreter is to mark event types for each log entry. Finally, the sequence identifier is
responsible to extract the sequence out of those log entries and prepare inputs for various learn-




























Figure 5.3: An overview of LeaPS log processing, learning and auditing mechanisms.
the model. The proactive verification system consists of two major parts. The pre-computation
manager prepares the ground for the runtime verification. At runtime, a light-weight verification
tool (e.g., proactive verifier [71]), which basically executes queries in the pre-computed results,
is leveraged for the verification purpose. Based on the verification result, LeaPS provides a
decision on the intercepted critical event instance.
5.3 Case Studies and Log Processing
In this section, we detail our approach for processing unstructured raw cloud logs and present
the challenges and lessons learned from the analysis of the formats of real world cloud logs in
OpenStack [89].
5.3.1 Case Studies on Real-World Cloud Logs
As a first step, we conducted an investigation on how the executed operations at the cloud
management level are logged in OpenStack [89], one of the major cloud management systems
in today’s cloud environments. To this end, we used two different OpenStack deployments;
a real-life community cloud hosted at a real data center of a large telecommunication vendor
and a cloud testbed managed within our institution. All sensitive information in the logs is
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anonymized based on the data owner’s policies.
User ID
Same log entries can be mapped 
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deleted resource
Hashed IP addresss
Figure 5.4: Identification of useful information in one of the logs collected from the real cloud.
Background on OpenStack Logging. Logging systems can provide an essential resource for
both troubleshooting and behavior analysis of the underlying clouds. To this end, tracing back
log entries to identify the root cause of a problem and subsequent actions, respectively, are
natural solutions which motivate the processing of logs. Furthermore, the high complexity and
ever-growing nature of cloud environments further increase the need for processing logs in a
cloud. To this end, OpenStack [89] logs different user and system actions performed within the
cloud. The most commonly used log format in OpenStack services starts with the timestamp,
process ID, log level, the program generating the log, an ID, followed by a message field,
which might be divisible into smaller informative segments such as request method and URL
Path. Furthermore, different OpenStack services write their log files to their corresponding
subdirectory of the /var/log directory in the node they are installed in. For example, the log
location of Nova is /var/log/nova. Figure 5.4 depicts an excerpt of the logs collected from a real
cloud highlighting the useful information stored in these logs.
Investigated Factors. In the following, we describe different factors in the logs that are relevant
to automate the learning of dependency models in LeaPS.
i) Layouts. The first factor that we investigated is the general layout of logs. While com-
paring the layouts of the logs, we found that there are different attributes in each log entry,
and those attributes vary based on the version and the logging service of OpenStack. This
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was exasperated by the lack of detailed documentation describing the meaning of these
attributes. Through our study, we identified 11 fields that are used in OpenStack log-
ging: timestamp, process-ID, log-type, method, request-ID, user-ID,
tenant-ID, IP address, API URL, HTTP response and request-length.
Apart from common layout issues, we also observed discrepancies in layouts of the logs
collected from the two different cloud deployments as both environments were managed




Figure 5.5: Excerpts of unique fields and entries found only in either studied version of Open-
Stack in (a) real cloud or (b) testbed cloud.
Figure 5.5 shows three examples of fields that are only present in one of the studied
versions2 of OpenStack: i) The logs from the real cloud does not have any user IDs;
instead they store none; ii) the real cloud logs have entries starting with OPTIONS; and
iii) the testbed log entries contain user-ID and tenant ID.
ii) Log Entries. After identifying these differences in the layout, we scrutinize each log en-
try to enable the understanding of the meaning of these entries and their related attributes.
We observe that OpenStack logs a wide-range of system-initiated events related to the
coordination between different cloud services (e.g., compute, network and storage). Such
events are usually logged with a special tenant ID (tenant-service). The first row of
Table 5.1 shows an example of such a log entry, where the ID of the tenant-service
1We avoid disclosing the exact version details for the sake of security
2Despite that the studied versions are directly consecutive, there are multiple differences in the logging system
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is dsfre23de8111214321def6e1e834re31. Moreover, there are requests to list
resources or their corresponding details, which are made with GET in their method
field. For instance, the second row of Table 5.1 shows a logged event for the tenant ID
(77c433dsf43123edcc12349d9c16fcec) to render the Flavors (the component
to show different resource consumptions by a VM). Both resource rendering and system-
initiated logged events has no effect on changing cloud configurations, and therefore,
these events are not useful for the auditing purpose.
Additionally, we notice that user-generated requests made under different tenants, are
jointly logged into the same log file. Furthermore, their log entries could be distinguished
from each other based on the associated tenant ID field identifying the tenant initiating
the request. Figure 5.6 highlights the different tenant IDs present in some entries within
the log files of both real and testbed clouds.
???
???
Figure 5.6: Parts of log entries belonging to different tenants (highlighting corresponding tenant






Table 5.1: An excerpt of the log entries corresponding to system initiated events in the real
cloud.
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iii) Type of Events. In this part of the case studies, we investigate the process of identifying
event types from user-generated requests. Usually, OpenStack user requests are transmit-
ted to the server as REST API calls. Thus, our next step is to obtain the event type from
each log entry. However, relying only on the REST methods (e.g., POST, GET, PUT,
etc.) does not help as it does not uniquely map to a specific event type. Therefore, we
study the API documentation of OpenStack to identify specific path information along
with the REST methods (called URL path) to pinpoint each corresponding event type.
Figure 5.7 shows examples of log entries highlighting URL paths corresponding to differ-
ent event types. The URL paths in the figure actually refer to the event types create VM,
delete VM and create port, respectively. However, there are event types for which we ob-
serve the same URL paths. For instance, Table 5.2 shows three examples of such URL
paths from some log entries in the real cloud. Even though the three rows in the table cor-
respond to three different events, their URL paths look identical except the VM ID field,
which indicates that these are VM related events, but does not help to uniquely identify
the event type. As a result, using only those URL paths to identify their corresponding
event types is insufficient.
???
???
Figure 5.7: The format (highlighted URL paths as REST APIs) of OpenStack logs collected
from (a) real cloud and (b) testbed cloud, to show different cloud events (e.g., delete VM and
create VM).
iv) Correlations of Events. Once event types of different log entries are identified, we need
to investigate the relationships between these events and how they correlate. We find out
that multiple log entries in different log files of different services correspond to the same
user request; which implies that to complete certain user-requests, OpenStack internally
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Table 5.2: Examples of similar URL paths corresponding to different cloud event types.
calls multiple APIs involving different services, thus generating multiple logged events.
Table 5.3 shows an example, where the actual user request is to create a VM. However,
we observe at least two entries (create VM and create port) in nova-api.log
and neutron-server.log log files, respectively, to complete the related request.
Additionally, we notice that there are log entries in nova-api.log and neutron-server.log
with the same timestamps (2017-11-01 18:17:16.345) corresponding to two
different events (Add security group and Create port). Thus, distinguishing
the right precedence relations between events cannot only rely on logged timestamps.
OpenStack Log Entry Log File




2017-04-09 15:56:11.848 ... "POST
/v2.0/ports.json HTTP/1.1"...
neutron-server.log
Table 5.3: Multiple entries in different logs corresponding to the same user request (i.e., create
VM).
v) Session Identification. Finally, we need to split the log files into groups of events mainly
based on the contexts (e.g., same user events) or session. The main intention behind this
step is to prepare inputs for different learning techniques, many of which accept inputs
as a sequence of events. However, in OpenStack logs, we observe that there exists no
session specific information. Moreover, most log entries do not include the requestor ID,
which could have been useful to identify the context.
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5.3.2 Real-World Challenges to Log Processing
In this section, we summarize the main challenges in processing cloud logs, from the above-
mentioned study.
• Heterogeneous Formats: Our study shows that the cloud logs may have heterogeneous
formats. The log formats vary within the same cloud platforms as well as for different
versions of the management system; which includes varieties of different specifications
(e.g., fields or attributes). In most cases, the logged information (fields) is not explicitly
mentioned in the log file. As a result, it is non-trivial to interpret the log entries. Addi-
tionally, the log entries are not systematically generated. Therefore, processing such logs
efficiently and systematically is challenging. To handle this challenge, we parse logs and
store them in a structured manner by marking each attribute of logs. We will design a
method for parsing in Section 5.3.3.2.
• Ungrouped and Irrelevant Log Entries: Log entries of OpenStack jointly log all ten-
ants’ requests, and contain system initiated entries which are typically irrelevant to the
auditing system. However, to detect / prevent security concerns at the tenant-level, it is
essential to separately analyze the log entries related to each tenant and hence, current log
formats are not appropriate for this purpose. Additionally, cloud generates many inter-
nal events to process a user request and store log entries corresponding to those system-
initiated events in the same log files. As a result, the analyses requiring to distinguish user
actions from system actions can be hampered. This challenge will be tackled by grouping
tenant-specific log entries and eliminating entries related to system-initiated events. More
details are in Section 5.3.3.3.
• Difficulties in the Identification of Event Types: Identifying event types corresponding
to each log entry is non-trivial due to the following reasons. First, while most clouds
support REST APIs to request different operations (e.g., create VM, create port and up-
date port), the event types are not obvious from the API and require to check the whole
URL paths. Second, in some cases, URL paths for different events are the same, and
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hence, such paths are not sufficient to identify these events uniquely. We call this kind
of events ambiguous event. Ambiguous events will be properly identified by leveraging a
special log option called request body in OpenStack. We detail the solutions to these
challenges in Section 5.3.3.4.
• Distributed Logging for Different Services: Activities in different services (e.g., com-
pute, network and storage) are logged separately. However, for a log analysis, which
involves different services combinedly such as ours, merging logs from these services
is essential, but not trivial. There are certain requests that result in multiple log entries
distributed over different log files by different services. Additionally, due to time syn-
chronization issues between the services, multiple events may be logged with the same
timestamp, which hinders analysis tools to extract the right precedence relationships be-
tween them. However, we noticed that the synchronization issue does not concern events
related to the same tenant but concerns different concurrent tenants behaviors. As we are
tackling tenants separately, this turns out not affecting our analysis. Other challenges in
this finding will be addressed by merging logs from different services and eliminating
duplicate entries corresponding to the same user request. We provide more details of the
solution in Section 5.3.3.5.
• Need for a Sequence Identification Solution: There exists no session specific informa-
tion in the logs. Also, the requester ID for a user request is missing in most log entries.
Therefore, there is a need for a solution to identify sequences of events from these spe-
cific formats of logs fulfilling all the requirements (e.g., preserving transitions and their
relative order) for a specific or a group of analyses purposes. To this end, we have already
requested to the OpenStack community to include requestor ID (at least) within each log
entry to facilitate log analysis. Till then, we propose a custom algorithm to identify se-
quences of events, in which all transitions and their relative orders of the actual log entries
are preserved. More details on this solution are presented in Section 5.3.3.6.
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5.3.3 Our Solution: LeaPS Log Processing
In this section, we discuss our log processing approach, which addresses all of the above-
mentioned challenges, and provides more structured and meaningful processed logs for different
analyses. A high-level algorithm of our log processor is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 High-Level Algorithm of LeaPS Log Processing
Input: Predefined parsing and matching rules
Output: Sequences of events to different log analysis tools (e.g., LeaPS and sequence pattern
mining)
1: procedure PROCESSLOGS(CloudOS)
2: for each component ∈ CloudOS do
3: Parse the raw logs;
4: Group parsed logs based on tenant IDs;
5: Prune irrelevant log entries (system-initiated and UI rendering);
6: Mark event types based on information in URL path and request body;
7: Combine logs from different services (e.g., compute and network)
8: for each log entry ∈ combinedLogs do
9: Identify Sequences from the combined logs
10: return Sequences
In the following, we briefly describe main steps of the log processing algorithm.
• Line 3: parses raw logs into a structured format. This step extracts identified fields in the
log entries and uses them together with a set of pre-defined rules to parse the raw log into
a structured log (e.g., CSV) file. This allows handling the heterogeneity of log formats.
• Line 4: groups parsed logs based on tenant IDs. The latter, easily identified in the ob-
tained structured log file, allows grouping log entries based on the tenants under which
the events are being logged. This tackles the issue of ungrouped events.
• Line 5: prunes irrelevant log entries. System-initiated log entries can be grouped and
discarded easily based on the system tenant ID (i.e., tenant-service) present in each of the
related log entries. Those related to the UI rendering actions are identified by inspecting
the method used in the URL (e.g., GET) in the entries related to the logged API calls.
• Line 6: identifies the type of events for each log entry. We first identify event types from
the method and path information available from Line 3. However, there are several event
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types (a.k.a. ambiguous events), which have the same method and path information. To
tackle this, we further check the request body, which contains detailed information for
each log entry, mainly by tuning logging options to include the missing information.
• Line 7: combines logs from different services (e.g., compute and network) based on
different attributes (e.g., tenant id and request id) and timestamps. This step draws the
correlation among events logged in different services so that it can handle the challenges
mentioned in Section 5.3.2.
• Lines 8-10: construct the event sequences based on the occurrences of events in the actual
log fulfilling the requirements mentioned in Section 5.3.2. Our log processor provides
these event sequences as outputs, which can be later used by different analysis methods
(e.g., LeaPS learning system in Section 5.4 and sequence pattern mining algorithms in
Section 5.7.2).
Figure 5.8 illustrates an example of the outputs of each of these steps. In the following, we
first describe the inputs to our log processing and then provide more details on each processing
step.
5.3.3.1 Inputs to LeaPS Log Processing
Apart from raw cloud logs, our log processing algorithm requires two inputs: parsing rules to
handle different log entries into a structured format and matching rules to identify the event
types. Building these inputs is a one-time effort obtained from our investigations in the afore-
mentioned case study.
Building Parsing Rules. To build the parsing rules, we first study different formats of logs and
their corresponding structure. Next, we obtain different fields (e.g., timestamp, process ID and
tenant ID) in the log entries and their relative positions in the logs. Finally, we build rules based
on the fields and their corresponding orders in logs to support the parsing in Section 5.3.3.2.
Building Matching Rules. To identify the matching rules, we study the API documentation of
OpenStack along with the log formats. To build a relationship between those fields in the logs
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and their corresponding event types. However, there exist several events for which all these
fields are identical and hence, the event types of those events cannot be identified using this
procedure. To tackle this, we leverage the request body, which contains detailed information
for each log entry. Finally, we provide a complete mapping to identify different event types in
Section 5.3.3.4.
5.3.3.2 Parsing Logs
The main purposes of this step are to mark all useful fields of different cloud logs and
store them in a more structured way to enhance log analysis effort in terms of effi-
ciency. We achieve these purposes, by parsing logs based on the pre-defined rules so
that each identified field is marked with a meaningful name, and storing the logs in a
more structured manner (e.g., in CSV) converting from a text-based file. For example,
as shown in Step 1 of Figure 5.8, we collect OpenStack logs from compute and net-
work services. The first log entry 2017-12-03 18:50:03.410 .. [req- -
- -] 10.0.0.101 "POST /v2.1/a6627ffa0c4f4a3ebaefe05c0b93f4c6/
servers/4c886192-43ad-4f98-90dd-34e24c84fcd0/ action HTTP/1.1"
contains the fields timestamp, process ID, request ID, IP address, method,
path info, tenant ID, respectively. The next step is to parse each entry of the logs
based on these fields and their relative positions, and to store them in a table (Parsed Logs in
Figure 5.8).
5.3.3.3 Grouping and Pruning of Parsed Logs
Extracting the contextual information, and separating both system and user initiated activities
from the logs are the main goals of this step. First, we identify different contextual information
such as tenant ID and accessed resource IDs (e.g., port ID, VM ID and subnet ID). Then, we
group log entries based on the tenant ID so that we can obtain tenant specific activities together.
Next, we extract the accessed resource IDs by the activities of all log entries. Finally, we
separate log entries of user initiated activities from that of system initiated activities. Note that,
the tenant ID field of the log entries for system-initiated events contains a special value (i.e.,
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tenant-service) in OpenStack. However, there exist exceptions where system initiated events
are stored under an existing tenant. Therefore, we maintain a list of such exceptions and match
them with the log entries while separating user-initiated events.
For instance, the Parsed Logs in Figure 5.8 contain entries from tenants T-1234,
T-4567, T-6789 and T-Service. After Step 2, in the Grouped and Pruned Logs, we
first store all entries from the T-1234 tenant, and then, similarly store entries for T-4567,
T-6789 and T-Service. Afterwards, we identify all log entries with the tenant ID
T-Service and store them separately.
5.3.3.4 Marking Event Types
Marking the corresponding event types using the pre-defined matching rules (as shown) for
each log entry is the main objective of this step. Based on the set of fields used in marking,
there are two categories of event types. For the first category, we use the URL path (which
includes method, resources, etc.). For example, from the Grouped Logs in Figure 5.8, we
identify method, resources, resource ID and action as the potential fields which
together may provide unique information about each event type. Based on this assumption,
we build the matching rules as shown in Table 5.4. The first entry in the table shows that
the fields method: POST and resources: ports indicate the create port event
type. Whereas, to identify the add interface to router event type, we require the
action: add_router_interface field along with the method, resources and
resource ID fields. However, for the last entry in the table, these fields are not sufficient
to obtain the event type, as they have the same values for method, resources, resource
ID and action fields for multiple event types. These event types are considered as the second
category and marked in the following manner.
For the second category of event types, we identify event type of a log entry, we match
the request ID in the log file and request body, and look into the matching rules for that par-
ticular request body. For instance, Table 5.5 shows examples of matching rules between re-
quest body and event types. The first and second rows of the table show that the request body
values {"os-start": null} and {"os-stop": null} ensure that the requested
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Method Resources Resoruce ID Action Event Type
POST ports NaN NaN Create port
PUT ports port ID NaN Update port
DELETE ports port ID NaN Delete port










NaN NaN Create floating IP
PUT floating-
IPs
VM ID NaN Associate floating IP
POST servers VM ID actions TBD
Table 5.4: An excerpt of themapping to obtain the event types fromURL-method and path_info.
Note that, the term ‘NaN’ is used by OpenStack to indicate the unrepresentable value for the
specific fields, and the term ‘TBD’ is to indicate that the corresponding event type is not con-
clusive based on the identified fields.
Request Body Event Type
req_body: {"os-start": null} Start VM







Table 5.5: Examples of identifying event types from request bodies for the event types as the
last row of Table 5.4.
event types are start VM and stop VM, respectively. The third and fourth rows provide
event types (Add security group and Add floating IP) along with their involved
security group name (essential) and instance name (leapsVM), respectively.
In summary, we utilize the method, resource, resource id, action and request body fields to
mark all event types.
5.3.3.5 Aggregating Logs
Merging logs from different services (e.g., compute, network and storage) is the main goal
of this step. To this end, we first combine multiple log files and sort them based on times-
tamp. Next, we identify entries with the same timestamp (if any), and mark them specially
to later identify that they occurred at the same time in different services (if that helps any log
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"POST /v2.0/ports.json HTTP/1.1" Create
Port
System
Table 5.6: Showing part of multiple log entries in compute and network services referring to
one user request (Create VM).
analysis mechanism). Also, we identify any duplicate entry in different logs (as mentioned
in Section 5.3.1 that the same event might be logged in multiple services), and only keep the
corresponding log to the actual user request.
For example, Stage 5 in Table 5.6 shows two entries each from the compute service (Nova)
and network service (Neutron), respectively. The first row of the table is for the Create VM
event, which is actually initiated by a cloud user. On the other hand, the Create port event
is a system initiated event as a result of the user request. In other words, OpenStack creates a
port by itself while creating a VM.
5.3.3.6 Generating Outputs
Our log processor provides outputs as sequences of events. In this work, we mainly observe
the following three requirements for identifying events sequences. First, we preserve all transi-
tions that are present in the actual logs. Second, we maintain the relative order between events.
Third, in each sequence, we avoid cycles (by starting a new sequence when there is a repe-
tition) to facilitate capturing relationships between events (e.g., dependencies in our model),
flowing from top to bottom. To validate our approach, we use the generated events sequences
to build a Bayesian network and to perform sequence pattern mining in Sections 5.4 and 5.7.2,
respectively.
To generate the final output (i.e., sequences of events), the log processor performs the fol-
lowing steps:
• Read event types sorted by timestamp in the Aggregated Logs, and group event types in a
sequence till any event type is observed for the second time. In other words, a sequence
Seqi contains all event types from Eventm to Eventn−1, where the Eventn (the successor
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of Eventn−1) has already been observed in the sequence Seqi. Thus, no sequence contains
any repeated event types and hence, we avoid cycles in sequences.
• Start the next sequence from the last element of the previous sequence so that all transi-
tions within the sequences are preserved. In other words, the following sequence, Seqi+1,
starts with the Eventn−1, which is the last event of the Seqi sequence.
Aggregated Log Content
{Create router, Update router, Create network, Create VM,
Add interface to router, Create security group, Start VM,
Create VM, Add security group rule, Delete VM, Create VM, Create
security group, Start VM}
Output
Seq1 = {Create router, Update router, Create network, Create VM,
Add interface to router, Create security group, Start VM}
Seq2 = {Start VM, Create VM, Add security group rule, Delete VM}
Seq3 = {Delete VM, Create VM, Create security group, Start VM}
Table 5.7: An excerpt of outputs from LeaPS log processor.
In summary, our log processing approach addresses all challenges discussed in Section 5.3.2.
As an example, it provides sequences of events as shown in Table 5.7. Later, these sequences
will be utilized by our learning system to learn the dependency model presented in the next
section. The implementation details including the algorithms for our log processing are pre-
sented in Section 5.6.3. Also, the performance evaluation of our log processor is shown in
Section 5.7.2.
5.4 LeaPS Learning System
This section first describes the dependency model and then, presents the steps to learn proba-
bilistic dependencies for this model.
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5.4.1 The Dependency Model
We first demonstrate our dependency model through an example and then formally define the
model. The model will be the foundation of our proactive auditing solution (detailed in Sec-
tion 5.5).
Figure 5.9 shows an example of a dependency model, where nodes represent different event
types in a cloud and edges represent transitions between event types. For example, nodes,
create VM and create security group, represent the corresponding event types, and the edge
from create VM to create security group indicates the likely order of occurrence of those event
types. The label of this edge, 0.625, means 62.5% of the times an instance of the create VM

































Figure 5.9: An example dependency model represented as a Bayesian network.
Our objective is to automatically construct such a model from logs in clouds. As an example,
the following shows an excerpt of the event types event-type and historical event sequences hist
for four days related to the running example of Section 5.2.2.
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• event-type = {create VM (CV), create security group (CSG), start VM (SV), delete secu-
rity group rule (DSG)}; and
• hist = {day 1 : CV , CSG, SV ; day 2 : CSG, SV ; day 3 : CSG, DSG; day 4 : CV , DSG},
where the order of event instances in a sequence indicates the actual order of occurrences.
The dependency model shown in Figure 5.9 may be extracted from such data (note above
we only show an excerpt of the data needed to construct the complete model). For instance, in
hist, CV has three immediate successors (i.e., CSG, SV , DSG), and their probabilities can be
calculated as P(CSG|CV) = 0.5, P(SV |CV ) = 0.5 and P(DSG|CV) = 0.5.
As demonstrated in the above example, Bayesian network [94] suits our needs for capturing
probabilistic patterns of dependencies between events types. A Bayesian network is a proba-
bilistic graphical model that represents a set of random variables as nodes and their conditional
dependencies in the form of a directed acyclic graph. We choose Bayesian network to rep-
resent our dependency model for the following reasons. Firstly, the event types in cloud and
their precedence dependencies can naturally be represented as nodes (random variables) and
edges (conditional dependencies) of a Bayesian network. Secondly, the need of our approach
for learning the conditional dependencies can be easily implemented as parameter learning in
Bayesian network. For instance, in Figure 5.9, using the Bayes’ theorem we can calculate the
probability for an instance of add security group rule to occur after observing an instance of
create VM to be 0.52. More formally, the following defines our dependency model.
Given a list of event types event-type and the log of historical events hist, the dependency
model is defined as a Bayesian network B = (G,θ), where G is a DAG in which each node
corresponds to an event type in event-type, and each directed edge between two nodes indicates
the first node would immediately precede the other in some event sequences in hist whose
probability is part of the list of parameters, θ .
We say a dependency exists between any two event types if their corresponding nodes are
connected by an edge in the dependency model, and we say they are not dependent, otherwise.
We assume a subset of the leaf nodes in the dependency model is given as critical events that
might breach some given security properties.
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5.4.2 Learning Engine
The next step is to learn the probabilistic dependency model from the sequences of event in-
stances in the processed logs. To this end, we choose the parameter learning technique in
Bayesian network [79, 44, 94] (this choice has been justified in Section 5.4.1). We now first
demonstrate the learning steps through an example, and then provide further details.
Figure 5.10 shows the dependency model of Figure 5.9 with the outcomes of different learn-
ing steps as the labels of edges. The first learning step is to define the priori, where the nodes
represent the set of event types received as input, and the edges represent possible transitions
from an event type, e.g., from the create VM event to the delete VM, start VM and create secu-
rity group events. Then, P(DV |CV ), P(CSG|CV), P(SV |CV ) and other conditional probabilities
(between immediately adjacent nodes in the model) are the parameters; all parameters are ini-
tialized with equal probabilities. For instance, we use 0.33 to label each of the three outgoing
edges from the create VM node. The second learning step is to use the historical data to train the
model. For instance, the second values in the labels of the edges of Figure 5.10 are learned from
the processed logs obtained from the log processor. The third values in the labels of Figure 5.10
represent an incremental update of the learned model using the feedback from a sequence of
runtime events.
This learning mechanism mainly takes two inputs: the structure of the model with its pa-
rameters, and the historical data. The structure of the model, meaning the nodes and edges
in a Bayesian network, is first derived from the set of event types received as input. To this
end, we provide a guideline on identifying such a set of event types in Section 5.8. Initially,
the system considers every possible edge between nodes (and eventually deletes the edges with
probability 0), and conditional probabilities between immediately adjacent nodes (measured as
the conditional probability) are chosen as the parameters of the model. We further sparse the
structure into smaller groups based on different security properties (the structure in Figure 5.10
is one of the examples). The processed logs containing sequences of event instances serve as
the input data to the learning engine for learning the parameters. Finally, the parameter learn-
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Figure 5.10: The outcomes of three learning steps for the dependency model.
initialized parameters of the model), ii) training the initial model based on the historical data,
and iii) continuously updating the learned model based on incremental feedbacks.
5.5 LeaPS Proactive Verification System
This section presents our learning-based proactive verification system.
5.5.1 Likelihood Evaluator
The likelihood evaluator is mainly responsible for triggering the pre-computation. To this end,
the evaluator first takes the learned dependency model as input, and derives offline all indirect
dependency relationships for each node. Based on these dependency relationships, the evalua-
tor identifies the event types for which an immediate pre-computation is required. Additionally,
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at runtime the evaluator matches the intercepted event instance with the event type, and de-
cides whether to trigger a pre-computation or verification request.2 The data manipulated by
the likelihood evaluator based on the dependency model will be described using the following
example.
Pre-compute_Event  Properties
   Create VM (CV)    No bypass   
     Start VM (SV)       No bypass














 Property    Critical Event     Threshold         
No bypass   add SG rule (ASG)       0.5
No bypass   delete SG rule (DSG)   0.6
Property-CE-Threshold
              ASG=1  DSG=1  SV=1  CSG=1
CV=1     0.52      0.12        0.68      0.667
Conditional Probability Table
Figure 5.11: An excerpt of the likelihood evaluator steps and their outputs.
Figure 5.11 shows an excerpt of the steps and their outputs in the likelihood evaluator mod-
ule. In this figure, the Property-CE-Threshold table maps the no bypass of security group prop-
erty [18] with its critical events (i.e., add security group rule and delete security group rule) and
corresponding thresholds (i.e., 0.5 and 0.6). Then, from the conditional probability in the model,
the evaluator infers conditional probabilities of all possible successors (both direct and indirect),
and stores them in the Conditional-Probability table. The conditional probability for ASG hav-
ing CV (i.e., P(ASG/CV)) is 0.52 in the Conditional-Probability table in Figure 5.11. Next, this
value is compared with the thresholds of the no bypass property in the Property-CE-threshold
table. As the reported probability is higher, the CV event type is stored in the Property-PE table
so that for the next CV event instance, the evaluator triggers a pre-computation.
5.5.2 Pre-Computing Module
The purpose of the pre-computing module is to prepare the ground for the runtime verification.
In this work, we mainly discuss watchlist-based pre-computation [71]; where watchlist is a list
containing all allowed parameters for different critical events. The specification of contents in
a watchlist is defined by the cloud tenant, and is stored in the Property-WL table. We assume
2This is not to respond to the event as in incident response, but to prepare for the auditing, and the incident
response following an auditing result is out of the scope of this work.
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that at the time LeaPS is launched, we initialize several tables based on the cloud context and
tenant inputs. For instance, inputs including the list of security properties, their corresponding
critical events, and the specification of contents in watchlists are first stored in the Property-WL
and Property-CE-Threshold tables. The watchlists are also populated from the current cloud
context. We maintain a watchlist for each security property. Afterwards, each time the pre-
computation is triggered by the likelihood evaluator, this module incrementally updates the
watchlist based on the changes applied to the cloud in the meantime. The main functionality of
the pre-computing module is described using the following example.
Updated Watchlist
Pre-Compute_Event  Properties
  Create VM (CV)     No bypass
   Start VM (SV)      No bypass   
Property-PE
  Property          Watchlist content          
No bypass     Instances allow SG update
Property-WL
       











1 Create VM (1733)
2 Add security group rule (…, 1733)
3 Start VM (1733)
4 Delete security group rule (…, 1733) 
Figure 5.12: Showing steps of the updating watchlist for a sample event sequences.
Left side of Figure 5.12 shows two inputs (Property-WL and Property-PE tables) to the pre-
computing module. We now simulate a sequence of intercepted events (shown in the middle
box of the figure) and depict the evolution of a watchlist for the no bypass property (right side
box of the figure). (1) We intercept the create VM 1733 event instance, identify the event
in the Property-PE table, and add VM 1733 to the watchlist without blocking it. (2) After
intercepting the add security group rule (..., 1733) event instance, we identify that this is a
critical event. Therefore, we verify with the watchlist keeping the operation blocked, find that
VM 1733 is in the watchlist, and hence, we recommend to allow this operation. (3) We intercept
the start VM 1733 operation and identify the event in the Property-PE table. VM 1733 is then
removed from the watchlist, as the VM is active. (4) After intercepting the delete security group
rule (..., 1733) event instance, we identify that this is a critical event. Therefore, we verify with
the watchlist keeping the event instance blocked, find that VM 1733 is not in the watchlist, and
hence, identify the current situation as a violation of the no bypass property.
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5.5.3 Feedback Module
The main purposes of the feedback module are: i) to provide feedback to the learning engine,
and ii) to provide feedback to the tenant on thresholds for different properties. These purposes
are achieved by three steps: storing verification results in the repository, analyzing the results,
and providing the necessary feedback to corresponding modules.
Firstly, the feedback module stores the verification results in the repository. Additionally,
this module stores the verification result as hit or miss after each critical event, where the hit
means the requested parameter is present in the watchlist (meaning no violation), and the miss
means the requested parameter is not found in the watchlist (meaning a violation). Additionally,
we store the sequence of events for a particular time period (e.g., one day) in a similar format
as the processed log described in the learning module. In the next step, we analyze these results
along with the models to prepare a feedback for different modules. From the sequence of events,
the analyzer identifies whether the pattern is already observed or is a new trend, and accordingly
the updater prepares a feedback for the learning engine either to fine-tune the parameter or to
capture a new trend. From the verification results, the analyzer counts the number of misses for
different properties to provide a feedback to the user on their choice of thresholds (stored in the
Property-CE-Threshold table) for different properties. For more frequently violated properties,
the threshold might be set to a lower probability to trigger the pre-computation earlier.
5.6 Implementation
In this section, we detail the LeaPS implementation and its integration into OpenStack along
with the architecture of LeaPS (Figure 5.13) and a detailed algorithm.
5.6.1 Background
OpenStack [89] is an open-source cloud management platform that is being used almost in
half of private clouds and significant portions of the public clouds (see [92] for detailed statis-
tics). Neutron is its network component, Nova is its compute component, and Ceilometer is its
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telemetry for receiving event histories from other components. Each component of OpenStack
generates notifications, which are triggered by predefined activities such as VM creation, secu-
rity group addition, and are sent to Ceilometer for monitoring purposes. Ceilometer extracts the
information from the notifications, and transforms them into events.
5.6.2 LeaPS Architecture
Figure 5.13 shows an architecture of LeaPS. It has four main components: log processor, learn-
ing system, verification system and dashboard & reporting engine.
• The first component, namely, the log processor, obtains sequences of events from the re-
trieved raw cloud logs. To this end, the parser module first processes the raw logs to retrieve
identified fields in each log entry and systematically generates structured content stored as
CSV files. Then, the filter module groups the log entries tenant-wise and separates log entries
corresponding to the user initiated events. The interpreter module consults the mapping of
URL paths and request body to identify the corresponding event type of a log entry. The
merger module combines logs from different services (e.g., Neutron and Nova) of Open-
Stack. The sequence builder generates the sequences of events from the logs.
• The second component, namely, the learning system, is responsible for learning the proba-
bilistic dependencies using Bayesian network from the output of the log processing compo-
nent. To this end, the appropriate input formats of the learning engine are obtained from the
log processor. Then, the learning engine, which is a Bayesian network learning tool, learns
the probabilistic dependencies from the sequences of events.
• The third component, namely, the proactive verification system, incrementally prepares for
the verification and verifies the preconditions of the security critical events that are about to
occur. To this end, the likelihood evaluator consists of three modules. The interceptor in-
tercepts runtime event instances, the event matcher obtains the event type of the intercepted
event instances, and the critical event identifier detects the critical events from the intercepted
event type. Triggered by the likelihood evaluator, the pre-computation manager is to initial-
ize (by the initializer) and update (by the updater) watchlists. LeaPS leverages a proactive
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verification tool [71] to perform the runtime verification utilizing the pre-computed results.
The feedback module is to analyze the previous verification results and to provide feedback
to update the probabilities in the model.
• The fourth component, namely, the dashboard & reporting engine, is to provide an interface
to LeaPS users to interact with the system and to observe different verification results.
In the following, we describe the implementation details of different components of LeaPS.
5.6.3 Log Processor
The log processor first automatically collects logs from different OpenStack components, e.g.,
Nova, Neutron, Ceilometer, etc. We use Logstash [27], a popular open-source data processing
tool, for transforming un-structured and semi-structured logs into CSV format and available
for further processing. To enable Logstash transformation, we use the parsing rules that we
build for OpenStack logs in our case study. Afterwards, we implement filters in Python to
group and eliminate log entries. Then, we build a mapping between URL paths with request
body and event types, and consult this map to identify event type of each log entry. Next, we
merge Neutron and Nova logs based on the timestamps while handling conflicting issues. For
example, while a user requests to create a VM, the event (i.e., create port) happening at Neutron
is done by the tenant-service, and is removed while dividing events into different tenant
groups. Finally, to prepare the logs to be used in the LeaPS learning system and for other log
analysis purposes, we run a custom algorithm, which preserves all transitions in the actual logs,
implemented in Python to identify sequences in combined logs. The processLogs procedure in
Algorithm 6 implements all above-mentioned steps of our log processor.
5.6.4 Learning System
For learning, we leverage SMILE & GeNIe [9], which is a popular tool for modeling and learn-
ing with Bayesian network. SMILE & GeNIe uses the EM algorithm [22, 63] for parameter
learning. The learning module is responsible for preparing inputs to GeNIe, and conducting
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Algorithm 6 Log Processing ()
Input: CloudOS, parsing-rules, matching-rules
Output: sequence[]
1: procedure PROCESSLOGS(CloudOS)
2: for each component ci ∈ CloudOS do
3: rawLogs = collectLog(ci)
4: Fields[] = identifyLogFields(rawLogs, parsing-rules)
5: parsedLogs[ci] = parseLogs(rawLogs, Fields[], parsing-rules)
6: systemEvents[] = identifySystemEvents(CloudOS)
7: prunedLogs[ci] = pruneLogs(parsedLogs[ci], systemEvents[])
8: groupedLogs[ci] = groupLogs(prunedLogs[ci],CloudOS.tenants[])
9: markedEvents[ci] = markEvents(groupedLogs[ci],matching-rules)
10: combinedLogs = combineLogs(markedEvents[])
11: for each log entry entryi ∈ combinedLogs do
12: if entryi is not already in sequence[ j] then
13: sequence[ j] = sequence[ j] + entryi
14: else
15: j++;
16: sequence[ j] = sequence[ j] + entryi
17: return sequence[]
processed to convert them into the input format (in .dat) of GeNIe. Additionally, the structure
of the Bayesian network and its parameters are provided to GeNIe. Furthermore, we choose
the uniform option, where the assumption is that all parameters in the network form the uni-
form distribution with confidence is equal to one. Finally, GeNIe provides an estimation of the
parameters, which are basically probabilities of different transitions in the dependency model.
Additionally, to execute sequence pattern mining algorithms with log processor outputs, we
leverage SPMF [33], which is a popular open-source data mining library. The Learn procedure
in Algorithm 7 implements the learning steps of LeaPS.
5.6.5 Proactive Verification System
We intercept all requests to the Nova service as they are passed through the Nova pipeline,
having the LeaPS middleware inserted in the pipeline. The body of requests, contained in the
wsgi.input attribute of the intercepted requests, is scrutinized to identify the type of requested
events. Next, the pre-computing module stores the result of inspection in a MySQL database.
The feedback module is implemented in Python. Those modules work together to support the
139
methodology described in Section 5.5, as detailed in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Learning-Based Proactive Verification ()
Input: CloudOS, Properties, structure, sequence[]
Output: decision
1: procedure LEARN(sequence[], structure, Properties)
2: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
3: learnedParameters = learnModel(structure, sequence[])
4: dependencyModel = buildModel(structure, learnedParameters, pi.critical-events)
return dependencyModels
5: procedure EVALUATE-LIKELIHOOD(CloudOS, Properties, dependencyModels)
6: for each event type ei ∈ CloudOS.event do
7: Conditional-Probability-Table = inferLikelihood(ei, dependencyModels)
8: if checkThreshold(Conditional-Probability-Table,Property-CE-Threshold) then
9: insertProperty-PE(ei,Property-CE-Threshold.property)
10: interceptedEvent = intercept-and-match(CloudOS, Event-Operation)
11: if interceptedEvent ∈ Properties.critical-events then
12: decision = verifyWL(Properties.WL, interceptedEvent.params)
13: return decision
14: else if interceptedEvent ∈ Property-PE then
15: Pre-compute-update(Properties, interceptedEvent.params)
16: procedure PRE-COMPUTE-INITIALIZE(CloudOS, Properties)
17: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
18: WLi= initializeWatchlist(pi.WL, CloudOS)
19: procedure PRE-COMPUTE-UPDATE(Properties, parameters)
20: updateWatchlist(Properties.WL, parameters)
21: procedure FEEDBACK(Result, dependencyModels, Properties)
22: storeResults(Result, dependencyModels)




27: for each property pi ∈ Properties do
28: change-in-threshold[i] = analyzeDecision(Result.decision, pi)
5.6.6 Dashboard & Reporting Engine
LeaPS users interact with the system through a dashboard, which is implemented using a web
interface in PHP. Through this dashboard, users can enable proactive auditing so that LeaPS
starts intercepting cloud events and verify them. In the dashboard, tenant admins can initially
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select security properties from different standards (e.g., ISO 27017, CCMV3.0.1, NIST 800-53,
etc.). Through the monitoring panel, LeaPS continuously updates the summary of the verifica-
tion results. Furthermore, the details of any violation with a list of evidence are also provided.
Moreover, our reporting engine archives all the verification reports for a pre-defined period.
5.7 Experimental Results
In this section, we first describe the experiment settings, and then present LeaPS experimental
results with both synthetic and real data.
5.7.1 Experimental Settings
Both experiments on LeaPS log processor and proactive verification system involve datasets
collected from our testbed and the real cloud. In the following, we describe both environmental
settings.
Testbed Cloud Settings. Our testbed cloud is based on OpenStack version Mitaka. There
are one controller node and up to 80 compute nodes, each having Intel i7 dual core CPU and
2GB memory running Ubuntu 16.04 server. Based on a recent survey [92] on OpenStack, we
simulate an environment with maximum 1,000 tenants and 100,000 VMs. We conduct the
experiment for 10 different datasets varying the number of tenants from 100 to 1,000 while
keeping the number of VMs fixed to 1,000 per tenant. For Bayesian network learning, we use
GeNIe academic version 2.1. For sequential pattern mining, we use SPMF v.2.20. Table 5.8







Table 5.8: The number of events in both Neutron and Nova logs for different datasets generated
in our testbed cloud.
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Real Cloud Settings. We further test LeaPS using data collected from a real community cloud
hosted at one of the largest telecommunication vendors. To this end, we analyze the manage-
ment logs (sized more than 1.6 GB text-based logs) and extract 128,264 relevant log entries for
the period of more than 500 days. As Ceilometer is not configured in this cloud, we utilize Nova
and Neutron logs which increases the log processing efforts significantly.











Compute (Nova) Network (Neutron)
Figure 5.14: Time (in Seconds) required for parsing raw logs while varying the number of
events provided in different datasets.
5.7.2 Results on Log Processor
In the following, we present obtained experiment results for our log processor both in testbed
and real clouds.
Experiments with Testbed Cloud. The objective of the first set of the experiments is to mea-
sure the efficiency of our log processor for two different cloud services, e.g., compute (Nova)
and network (Neutron). Figure 5.14 shows the time required (in seconds) to parse logs of differ-
ent datasets. The results show that the parsing is the most time consuming step in log processing,
as this step parses text-based logs and stores them into CSV files. The parsing of our largest
dataset (DS5) requires around 3 minutes and around 2 minutes for Nova and Neutron logs,
respectively. Figure 5.16 shows the time required (in seconds) to group the log entries based
on tenant IDs and to eliminate system-initiated entries (from tenant-service). For the
largest dataset of Nova, the required time remains within 80 milliseconds. Grouping Neutron
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Compute (Nova) Network (Neutron)
Figure 5.15: Time (in Seconds) required for interpreting event types while varying the number
of events provided in different datasets.
logs, which is comparatively smaller in size, requires maximum 55 milliseconds. Figure 5.15
presents the results (in seconds) to interpret event types of all entries from the grouped logs for
Nova and Neutron. The trend for both services shows almost a linear increase while varying the
number of log entries. Interpreting event types for the largest dataset takes 16.72 seconds and
11.14 seconds for Nova and Neutron, respectively.
The second set of experiments is to measure the efficiency of aggregating logs from different
services and generating outputs by our log processor. Figure 5.17 shows the time in seconds to
aggregate logs from Nova and Neutron, and to generate inputs to the sequence pattern mining
algorithms implemented in the SPMF library [33]. The time to aggregate logs remains within
112 milliseconds for the largest dataset. The time for the input generation remains within two
milliseconds for the largest dataset and shows a linear increase. Figure 5.18 depicts the time re-
quired for the steps, i.e., eliminating and counting repeated entries, identifying sequences as the
outputs of the log processor, performed on the aggregated logs. In both steps, the larger datasets
show less increase in the required time. The time required for identifying sequences remains
within 2.6 seconds, and the eliminating repeated entries step takes maximum 4.2 seconds for
our largest dataset.
Applying Alternative Learning Techniques. To demonstrate the applicability of our log pro-
cessor, we further apply its outputs to run three popular sequence pattern mining (which is a
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Compute (Nova) Network (Neutron)
Figure 5.16: Time (in Seconds) required for grouping log entries based on tenant IDs while
varying the number of events provided in different datasets.











Aggregating Generating Inputs for SPMF
Figure 5.17: Time required (in seconds) for merging nova_api and neutron_server logs, and
generating inputs for the pattern mining library (SPMF).
data mining approach with broad range of applications) algorithms. Specifically, we first run
the PrefixSpan [95] algorithm, which mines the complete set of patterns. One potential applica-
tion could be to identify structures of dependencies among cloud events using this algorithm to
further enhance the proactive security solutions. Second, we execute the MaxSP [34] algorithm,
which mines maximal sequential patterns. Using this algorithm, we can easily identify the most
common patterns, which potentially can facilitate anomaly-based security solutions. Third, we
run the ClaSP [37] algorithm, which identifies the largest pattern with a minimum frequency.
This algorithm might be useful to identify unique patterns to profile a security violation or a
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Eliminating repeated Entries Generating Log Processor Output
Figure 5.18: Time required (in seconds) for eliminating repeated entries and generating log
processor output.
legitimate use. To this end, we generate inputs to SPMF, which is a sequence pattern mining
tool, and report the input generation time in Figure 5.18. We also report the efficiency results to
run these algorithms with the outputs of our log processor in Figure 5.19. We observe constant
time (one millisecond) while running ClaSP algorithm for different datasets. The MaxSP and
PrefixSpan algorithms take around 18 milliseconds and 6.5 milliseconds, respectively, for our
largest dataset.
Experiments with Real Cloud. The main objective of this part of the experiments is to evaluate
the applicability of our log processor in a real cloud environment. Table 5.9 shows the summary
of the results that we obtain for the real data. Due to the much larger size (e.g., 1.6 GB text-based
logs) of the real-life logs, the parsing time is quite long (4 hours and 40 minutes). However,
once LeaPS is active, it may potentially log intercepted events in an incremented manner to
avoid the delays at the parsing step. After parsing, we eliminate the log entries related to listing
resources and their details, as the corresponding events to these entries are beyond our interest.
The time for the remaining steps is quite similar to what is measured for our testbed cloud
logs with much smaller size of logs. Note that the grouping step is not measured for Neutron,
as the tenant ID is missing in the Neutron logs collected from the real cloud (as discussed in
Section 5.3.1). However, we group them arbitrarily to measure the time for next steps. From the
results of the real data, our observation is that our log processor is scalable once the parsing step
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Figure 5.19: Time required (in milliseconds) for running PrefixSpan, MaxSP and ClaSP algo-
rithms in the SPMF library.
is performed; which possibly allows our approach to process huge logs in a reasonable time.





Neutron 3,992,644 - 51.820s
Table 5.9: Summary of the experimental results with real data for Nova and Neutron services.
The parsing, merging and generating sequences steps are performed together for both services.
Note that the grouping step is not measured for Neutron, as the tenant ID is missing in the
Neutron logs collected from the real cloud.
5.7.3 Results on Proactive Verification System
In the following, we discuss the obtained experimental results for our proactive verification
system both in testbed and real clouds.
Experiments with Testbed Cloud. The objective of the first set of experiments with our proac-
tive verification system is to demonstrate the time efficiency. Figure 5.20 shows the time in
milliseconds required by LeaPS to verify the no bypass of security group [18] and no cross-
tenant port [53] properties. Our experiment shows the time for both properties remains almost
the same for different datasets, because most operations during this step are database queries;
SQL queries for our different datasets almost take the same time. Figure 5.21 shows the time
(in seconds) required by GeNIe to learn the model while we vary the number of events from
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2,000 to 10,000. In Figure 5.22, we measure the time required for different steps of the offline
pre-computing for the no bypass property. The total time (including the time of incrementally
updatingWL and updating PE) required for the largest dataset is about eight seconds which jus-
tifies performing the pre-computation proactively. A one-time initialization of pre-computation
is performed in 50 seconds for the largest dataset. Figure 5.23 shows the time in seconds re-
quired to update the model and to update the list of pre-compute events. In total, LeaPS requires













No Bypass No Cross-Tenant
Figure 5.20: Showing time required for the online runtime verification by varying the number
of VMs for the no bypass and no cross-tenant properties. The verification time includes the
time to perform interception, matching of event type and checking in the watchlist.












No Bypass No Cross-Tenant
Figure 5.21: Showing time required for the offline learning process by varying the number of












updating CPT updating PE updating WL total
CPT: Conditional Probability Table
PE: Pre-Compute Event
WL: Watchlist
Figure 5.22: Showing time required in seconds for the pre-computation considering the no
bypass property by varying the number of instances.
In the second set of experiments, we demonstrate how much LeaPS may be affected by a
wrong prediction resulted from inaccurate learning. For this experiment, we simulate differ-
ent prediction error rates (PER) of a learning engine ranging from 0 to 0.4 on the likelihood
evaluator procedure in Algorithm 7. Figure 5.24 shows in seconds the additional delay in the
pre-computation caused by the different PER of a learning engine for three different number of
VMs. Note that, the pre-computation in LeaPS is an offline step. The delay caused by 40% PER
for up to 100k VMs remains under two seconds, which is still acceptable for most applications.
In the final set of experiments, we compare LeaPS with a baseline approach (similar to [71]),
where all possible paths are considered with equal weight, and the number of steps in the model
is the deciding factor for the pre-computation. Figure 5.25 shows the pre-computation time for
both approaches in the average case, and LeaPS performs about 50% faster than the baseline
approach (the main reason is that, in contrast to the baseline, LeaPS avoids the pre-computation
for half of the critical events on average by leveraging the probabilistic dependency model). For
this experiment, we choose the threshold, N-th (an input to the baseline), as two, and the number
of security properties as four. Increasing both the value of N-th and the number of properties
increase the pre-computation overhead for the baseline. Note that a longer pre-computation
time eventually affects the response time of a proactive auditing.
Experiments with Real Cloud. Table 5.10 summarizes the obtained results. We first measure
148












updating CPT updating PE updating WL
CPT: Conditional Probability Table
PE: Pre-Compute Event
WL: Watchlist
Figure 5.23: Showing time required in seconds for the feedback modules considering the no
bypass property by varying the number of instances.
the time efficiency of LeaPS. Note that the results obtained are shorter due to the smaller size
of the community cloud compared to our much larger simulated environment. Furthermore, we
measure the prediction error rate (PER) of the learning tool using another dataset (for 5 days)
of this cloud. For the 3.4% of PER, LeaPS affects maximum 9.62 milliseconds additional delay
in its pre-computation for the measured properties.
Properties Learning Pre-Compute Feedback Verification PER Delay*
No bypass 7.2s 424ms 327ms 5.2ms 0.034 9.62ms
No cross-tenant 5.97s 419ms 315ms 5ms 0.034 9.513ms
Table 5.10: Summary of the experimental results with real data. The reported delay is in the
pre-computation of LeaPS due to the prediction error (PER) of the learning engine.
5.8 Discussions
Adapting to Other Cloud Platforms. LeaPS is designed to work with most popular cloud
platforms (e.g., OpenStack [89], Amazon EC2 [5], Google GCP [38] and Microsoft Azure [77])
with a one-time effort for implementing a platform-specific interface. More specifically, LeaPS
interacts with the cloud platform (e.g., while collecting logs and intercepting runtime events)
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Figure 5.24: The additional delay (in seconds) in LeaPS pre-computation time caused by dif-












Figure 5.25: the comparison (in seconds) between LeaPS and a baseline approach.
through two modules: log processor and interceptor. These two modules require to inter-
pret implementation specific event instances and intercept runtime events. First, to interpret
platform-specific event instances to generic event types, we currently maintain a mapping of
the APIs from different platforms. Table 5.11 enlists some examples of such mappings. Sec-
ond, the interception mechanism may require to be implemented for each cloud platform. In
OpenStack, we leverage WSGI middleware to intercept and enforce the proactive auditing re-
sults so that compliance can be preserved. Through our preliminary study, we identify that
almost all major platforms provide an option to intercept cloud events. In Amazon, using AWS
Lambda functions, developers can write their own code to intercept and monitor events. Google
GCP introduces GCP Metrics to configure charting or alerting different critical situations. Our
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understanding is that LeaPS can be integrated to GCP as one of the metrics similarly as the
dos_intercept_count metric, which intends to prevent DoS attacks. The Azure Event Grid is
event managing service from Azure to monitor and control event routing which is quite similar
as our interception mechanism. Therefore, we believe that LeaPS can be an extension of the
Azure Event Grid to proactively audit cloud events. Table 5.12 summarizes the interception sup-
port in these cloud platforms. The rest modules of LeaPS deal with the platform-independent
data, and hence, the next steps in LeaPS are platform-agnostic.
LeaPS Event
Type



























































Table 5.11: Mapping event APIs from different cloud platforms to LeaPS event types.
Cloud Platform Interception Support
OpenStack WSGI Middleware [113]
Amazon EC2-VPC AWS Lambda Function [5]
Google GCP GCP Metrics [38]
Microsoft Azure Azure Event Grid [77]
Table 5.12: Interception supports in major cloud platforms
Effects of False Positives in the Learning Technique. LeaPS leverages learning techniques
in a different manner so that the false positive/negative rates cannot affect the security of our
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system directly, and rather affects the performance of our system. In LeaPS, learning param-
eters of Bayesian network is utilized to learn the probabilistic dependencies. Any error in
learning results a dependency model with incorrect probabilities. Later, while consulting this
dependency model by the pre-computation module (as described in Section 5.5.2), LeaPS may
choose wrong highly-likely events and perform unnecessary pre-computation for them. At the
same time, LeaPS may delay the pre-computation for actual highly-likely events. The final
result of such mistakes in LeaPS due to the false positives/negatives in the learning tool is the
increase in the response time (as reported in Figure 5.24).
Possibility of a DoS Attack against LeaPS. To exploit the fact that a wrong prediction may
result in a delay in the LeaPS pre-computation, an attacker may conduct a DoS attack to bias the
learning model step by generating fake events and hence, to exhaust LeaPS pre-computation.
However, Figure 5.24 shows that an attacker requires to inject a significantly large amount (e.g.,
40% error rate) of biased event instances to cause a delay of two seconds. Moreover, biasing
the model is non-trivial unless the attacker has prior knowledge of patterns of legitimate event
sequences. Our future work will further investigate this possibility and its countermeasures.
Granularity of Learning. The above-mentioned learning can be performed at different levels
(e.g., cloud level, tenant level and user level). The cloud level learning captures business nature
only for companies using a private cloud. The tenant level learning depicts a better profile of
each business or tenant. This level of learning is mainly suitable for companies strictly following
process management, where users mainly follow the steps of processes. In contrast, the user
level learning is suitable for smaller organizations (where no process management is followed)
with fewer users (e.g., admins) who perform cloud events. Conversely, if a company follows
process management, user level learning will be less useful, as different users would exhibit
very similar patterns.
Dependency on Critical Event Lists. The list of critical events provided by LeaPS users for
each security property is very critical for LeaPS to accurately prevent any security violation.
Any incompleteness in this list may result in violations undetected by LeaPS. Therefore, we
provide a guideline on identifying different LeaPS inputs including lists of critical events. The
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steps to identify sets of event types as the inputs to the learning engine are as follows: i) from
the property definition, we identify involved cloud components; ii) we enlist all event types in
a cloud platform involving those components; and iii) we identify the critical events (which
is already provided by the tenant) from the list, and further shortlist the event types based
on the attack scenario. The specification of watchlist is a LeaPS input from the tenant. The
specification of watchlist can be decided as follows: i) from the property definition, the asset
to keep safe is identified; ii) the objectives of a security property are to be highlighted; and
iii) from the attack scenario, the parameters for the watchlist for each critical event is finalized.
Tackling Single-Step Violation. The proactive auditing mechanisms fundamentally leverage
the dependency in a sequence of events. In other words, proactive security auditing is mainly
to detect those violations which involve multiple steps. However, there might be violations of
the considered security properties with a single step. Such violations cannot be detected by the
traditional steps of proactive auditing with the same response time as reported in Figure 5.20,
and may be detected by performing all steps at a single point in several seconds (e.g., around six
seconds for a decent-sized cloud with 60,000 VMs as shown in Figure 5.22); which is still faster
than any other existing works (which respond in minutes). However, this response time might
not be very practical. To reduce the response time or at least not to cause any significant delay,
we perform a preliminary study as follows. Our initial results conducted in the testbed cloud
show that OpenStack takes more than six seconds to perform almost all user requests; which
implies the possibility of not resulting in any additional delay by LeaPS even for a single-step
violation. Additionally, During our case studies, we observed that OpenStack performs several
internal tasks to complete a user request. We may leverage this sequence of system events
corresponding to a single user request to proactively perform the LeaPS steps. We elaborate
those two ways of tackling single-step violations in our future work.
The Concept of Proactive Security Auditing for Clouds. The concept of proactive security
auditing for clouds is different than the traditional security auditing concept. Apart from ours,
proactive security auditing for clouds is also proposed in [16]. Additionally, the Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) recommends continuous auditing as the highest level of auditing [19], from
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which our work is inspired. The current proactive and runtime auditing mechanisms are more
of a combination of traditional auditing and incident management. For example, in LeaPS, we
learn from incidents and intercepted events to process or detect in a similar manner as a tradi-
tional incident management system. At the same time, LeaPS verifies and enforces compliance
against different security properties, which are mostly taken from different security standards,
and provide detailed evidence for any violation through the LeaPS dashboard. Therefore, the
concept of proactive security auditing is a combination of incident management and security
auditing.
5.9 Related Work
Table 5.13 summarizes the comparison between existing works and LeaPS. The first and second
columns enlist existing works and their verification methods. The next two columns compare
the coverage such as supported environment (cloud or non-cloud) and main objective (auditing
or anomaly detection). The next six columns compare these works according to different fea-
tures. The proactive feature is checked when a solution supports proactive verification. When
a solution offers an automated dependency learning, we check the automatic feature. We mark
this feature as ‘N/A’ for the works, which do not involve any dependencies. The dynamic fea-
ture refers to the dynamic and runtime pattern capturing. The probabilistic feature is marked
when a work involves non-deterministic or probabilistic dependencies. For non-dependency-
model-based works, we put ‘N/A’. The expressive feature is checked for the works, which
utilize well-known expressive policy languages (e.g., first order logic) to express security prop-
erties. By the self-reliant feature, we mean the works, which only depend on the user-provided
security properties for the accuracy of the verification. In the last four columns of the table, we
compare the works based on their supporting cloud platforms. The adaptable field is checked
for those works, which support multiple cloud platforms or describe how their works can be
ported to other platforms.
In summary, LeaPS mainly differs from the state-of-the-art works as follows. Firstly, LeaPS
is the first proactive auditing approach, which captures the dependency automatically from the
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patterns of event sequences. Secondly, LeaPS is the only learning-based work, which aims
at improving proactive auditing and not (directly) at anomaly detection. Thirdly, the dynamic
dependency model allows LeaPS to evolve over time to adapt to new trends. Finally, the LeaPS
methodology is cloud-platform agnostic. However, there are still few limitations in LeaPS.
LeaPS is less expressive than other general purpose formal verification approaches. LeaPS
relies on a complete list of critical events provided by tenant admins or security experts to
provide 100% accuracy.
Retroactive and Intercept-and-Check Auditing. Retroactive auditing approach (e.g., [70,
73, 110, 112, 108, 25] in the cloud is a traditional way to verify the compliance of different
components of a cloud. Unlike our proposal, those approaches can detect violations only after
they occur, which may expose the system to high risks. Existing intercept-and-check approaches
(e.g., [16, 88]) perform major verification tasks while holding the event instances blocked, and
usually cause significant delay to a user request. Unlike those works, LeaPS provides a proactive
auditing approach.
Proactive Auditing. Proactive security analysis in the cloud is comparatively a new domain
with fewer works (e.g., [16, 71, 114]). Weatherman [16] verifies security policies on a future
change plan in a virtualized infrastructure using the graph-based model proposed in [14, 13].
PVSC [71] proactively verifies security compliance by utilizing the static patterns in depen-
dency models. Both in Weatherman and PVSC, models are captured manually by expert knowl-
edge. In contrast, this work adopts a learning-based approach to automatically derive the depen-
dency model. Congress [88] is an OpenStack project offering similar features as Weatherman.
Foley et al. [31] propose an algebra for anomaly-free firewall policies for OpenStack. Many
state-based formal models (e.g., [103, 65, 66, 26]) are proposed for program monitoring. Our
work further expands the proactivemonitoring approach to cloud differing in scope and method-
ology.
Learning-Based Detections. There are many learning-based security solutions (e.g., [104, 43,
45, 55, 78, 46, 75]), which offer anomaly detection. Unlike above-mentioned solutions, this
work proposes a totally different learning-based technique to facilitate the proactive auditing.
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Doelitzscher et al. [25] Custom Algorithm Cloud Auditing - N/A • N/A - • • - - •
Ullah et al. [108] Custom Algorithm Cloud Auditing - N/A - N/A - • • - - -
Majumdar et al. [73] CSP Solver Cloud Auditing - N/A - N/A • • • - - -
Madi et al. [70] CSP Solver Cloud Auditing - N/A - N/A • • • - - -
Jiang et al. [55] Regression Technique Non-cloud Anomaly Det. • • - • - • N/A N/A N/A N/A
Solanas et al. [104] Classifiers Cloud Anomaly Det. - • - • - • • - - -
Ligatti et al. [66] Model Checking Non-Cloud Auditing • N/A • - • • N/A N/A N/A N/A
PVSC [71] Custom Algorithm Cloud Auditing • - - - - - • - - -
Weatherman [16] Graph-theoretic Cloud Auditing • - • - - - - - • -
Congress [88] Datalog Cloud Auditing • - - - • - • - - -
ProSAS Custom + Bayesian Cloud Auditing • • • • - - • - - •





Log Processing in Clouds. There exist several works (e.g., [67, 115, 76, 4, 39]) on log process-
ing in clouds. Lin et al. [67] leverage the big data analytics, Hadoop, and in-memory computing
capacity of Spark, to propose a cloud platform which can efficiently process and analyze logs in
batches. Similarly, Yu et al. [115] leverage cloud computing and distributed big data analytics to
process large amounts of logs. Unlike those works, we focus more on processing logs retrieved
from OpenStack clouds. However, leveraging such big data analytics and memory-efficient
methods may enhance the performance of our log processing. Sahara [76] offers a real-time
log analysis using Spark. Right after each log entry is created, it is fed into Sahara, parsed into
separate fields, stored and visualized at an HTTP endpoint. Although Sahara’s methodology
on real-time analysis can inspire our future attempt on this matter, Sahara currently does not
offer next stages (e.g., identifying event types and their sequences) of our log processing. Addi-
tionally, Amazon CloudWatch [4] and Google Cloud Dataflow [39] perform advanced real-time
analysis provided for troubleshooting of systems by other existing technologies. Unlike those
works, we focus more on identifying event types and their sequences in logs to facilitate various
learning techniques for analysis.
5.10 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an automatic learning-based proactive security auditing system,
LeaPS, which completes a mandatory pre-requisite step (e.g., log processing) and addresses
the limitations of existing proactive solutions (by automating the dependency learning). To this
end, we first conducted a case study on real-world cloud logs and highlighted the challenges
in processing such logs. Then, we designed and implemented a log processing approach for
OpenStack to feed its outputs to the learning tools to capture dependencies. Afterwards, we
leveraged learning techniques (e.g., Bayesian network) to learn probabilistic dependencies for
the dependency model. Finally, using such dependency models, we perform proactive secu-
rity auditing. Our proposed solution is integrated to OpenStack, a popular cloud management
platform. The results of our extensive experiments with both real and synthetic data show that
LeaPS can be very scalable for a decent-size cloud (e.g., 6 milliseconds to audit a cloud of
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100,000 VMs) and a significant improvement (e.g., about 50% faster) over existing proactive
approaches. In addition, we demonstrated that other learning techniques such as sequence pat-
tern mining algorithms can be executed on the outputs of our log processor efficiently (e.g., 18
milliseconds to find frequencies of all possible patterns using PrefixSpan). As future work, we
will investigate the feasibility of applying runtime data streaming to process logs incrementally
and in a more scalable manner. We also intend to conduct case studies on logging of other cloud





The ever-changing and self-service nature of clouds brings the necessity to audit the cloud
at runtime to ensure continuous security compliance, which is essential for cloud provider’s
accountability and transparency towards their tenants. To this end, there exist two types of
cloud-specific security auditing approaches: intercept-and-check and proactive. However, ex-
isting works under these approaches either fail to provide a practical response time due to the
sheer scale of the cloud, or require a future change plan in advance which may be impractical
in most cloud environments. In this thesis, we addressed these major limitations of the existing
runtime auditing solutions and proposed a proactive security auditing system for clouds. To this
end, we first proposed a runtime security auditing system for the user level of the cloud; which
verifies different authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., RBAC, ABAC and SSO)
incrementally. Second, to reduce the response time of runtime auditing, this thesis delivered a
proactive security auditing system; which offers a novel proactive auditing approach, where we
leverage the dependency relationships among cloud events to incrementally pre-compute the
major auditing efforts. As a result, the runtime effort in our proactive approach remains light-
weight and results in a practical response time (e.g., 8.5 milliseconds for 100,000 virtual ports).
Third, to extend the coverage of our auditing system and improve its practicality, we leveraged
learning techniques to design and implement an automated approach to process raw cloud logs
and utilize them to capture various dependency relationships.
However, our work still has a few limitations, which can be addressed in future works. First,
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our auditing approach is signature-based and hence, cannot detect any zero-day security viola-
tions. Potentially, an anomaly-based or hybrid (i.e., combining signature and anomaly based)
auditing approach may improve the coverage of our solution; which we consider as a future
work. Second, the efficiency of the current approach may be affected when multiple user re-
quests appear simultaneously. A parallel or distributed approach might reduce the effect of this
situation; which we consider as a potential future work. Third, our current proactive solution
cannot efficiently handle single-step violations. An efficient runtime approach might help to
address this concern. Fourth, our watchlist content identification process is currently static and
manual; which may affect the accuracy of our solution. Adapting similar approach as our feed-
back module in Section 4.3.5 may progressively and semi-automatically update the content of
watchlists; which will be covered in the upcoming work. Fifth, this work cannot prevent po-
tential privacy concerns from the audit results. We target this problem in our future work. As a
future work, we will also investigate the feasibility of applying runtime data streaming to pro-
cess logs incrementally and in a more scalable manner. We also intend to conduct case studies
on logging of other cloud platforms to offer a platform-agnostic log processing solution, which
might be useful for security solutions, which are involved with cloud logs.
In summary, this thesis work significantly contributes towards improving security, efficiency
and automation of cloud security auditing. Our hope is that this work can show a path to
future research as follows. Our proposed proactive approach may be adopted to other security
solutions (especially those which involve high computational overhead) to enable incremental
pre-computation and reduce the response time. Also, our idea of leveraging learning techniques
for efficiency, instead of security, may be useful to benefit other security solutions.
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